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INTRODUCTION 
The "pressures and problems that have led to corporate bank-
ruptcy law also operate in the case of a sovereign borrower in financial 
distress."l Yet legal scholars have never systematically examined sover-
eign debt restructuring in light of bankruptcy reorganization law prin-
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ciples, which are designed to solve such fundamental problems as the 
ability of holdout creditors to undermine collective action toward a 
negotiated settlement. Moreover, absent the bankruptcy reorganiza-
tion incentives that encourage free market liquidity, multilateral gov-
ernmental institutions such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) must act by default as lenders of last resort. This not only forces 
taxpayers to subsidize foreign governments and their creditors, but 
also creates problems such as moral hazard: countries anticipating an 
IMF bailout might have less reason to take a prudent economic 
course, and lenders expecting protection from the consequences of 
default might have a greater tendency to take unwarranted financial 
risks. This Article proposes that an international convention for sover-
eign debt restructuring based on three fundamental principles of 
bankruptcy reorganization law could address these problems, without 
requiring supervision by an international bankruptcy court. The con-
vention also would permit the IMF, through a mechanism of back-to-
back nonrecourse lending, to continue its current practice of impos-
ing conditionality on funding without triggering the problems pres-
ently associated with IMF lending. 
A. The Difficulty of Restructuring Sovereign Debt 
This Article addresses the problem of countries, rather than com-
panies, in default.2 Sovereign states or countries ("States"), like com-
panies, often must borrow money to pay for imports or to fund 
projects, such as highways or power plants. The borrower, whether a 
2 Indirect relationships exist, however, between companies in default (private-sector 
default) and countries in default (public-sector default). If companies that a country relies 
on for tax revenues and employment are in default, the country's economy may decline, 
thereby precipitating a public-sector default. Cf infra note 33 (discussing how raising in-
terest rates in certain Asian countries in order to stabilize their economies actually in-
creased defaults on corporate debt, thereby further impairing those countries' 
economies). Moreover, although restructuring the foreign debt of companies is usually 
addressed initially by the company's domestic legal framework for bankruptcy reorganiza-
tion (which may be modified by adoption of the UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE LAw (UNCITRAL) MODEL LAw ON CRoss-BORDER INSOLVENCY, available at 
United Nations Commission on International Trade (last updated Apr. 29, 1999) <http:// 
www.uncitral.org», foreign creditors confronting both private- and public-sector default 
might attempt to link a restructuring of the country's public-sector debt to a restructuring 
of its private-sector debt. See Alfred Mudge, Sovereign Debt Restructure: A Perspective of Counsel 
to Agent Banks, Bank Advisory Groups and Servicing Banks, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 59, 69-
70 (1984); see also BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETrLEMENTS, BIS QUARTERLY REvrE\v: INTERNA-
TIONAL BANKING AND FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 10 (Nov. 1998) (describing the re-
port of the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems on the advances in reducing 
foreign debt exchange settlement risk and offering as a "key element" the "ongoing coop-
eration with existing and prospective private sector groups"); BANCO CENTRAL DO BRASIL, 
BULLETIN: STATISTICAL TABLES (Mar. 1999) (indicating that in some countries the amount 
of cross-border debt incurred by the private sector exceeds that incurred by the public 
sector). This Article focuses on the restructuring of public-sector debt. 
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State or company, is then obligated to repay the debt according to a 
fixed maturity schedule. If a company fails to pay its debts, a system of 
corporate bankruptcy or insolvency law usually regulates the relation-
ship between the debtor-company and its creditors.3 In contrast, if a 
State fails to pay its debts-for example, "[d]uring the 1980s and 
1990s, more than 50 countries recorded arrears or multilateral debt 
restructurings on their externalliabilities"4-no legal system presently 
regulates the relationship between the State and its creditors.5 This 
Article examines whether sovereign debt restructuring should be sub-
ject to supranational regulation. 
I begin this examination by using the legal framework for corpo-
rate bankruptcy as a basis for comparison. In the United States, for 
example, debtor-companies with inherently good businesses may un-
dergo reorganization, but those with inherently bad businesses are 
often liquidated.6 Courts, the debtor-company, and its creditors all 
devote significant resources to determining whether the company is 
worth more reorganized or liquidated.7 In contrast, States are not liq-
3 The tenns "bankruptcy law'" and "insolvency law" generally are interchangeable. I 
will refer to bankruptcy law, because the tenn is more commonly used in the United States. 
4 Sachs, supra note 1, at 1. The problem of sovereign debt restructuring is becoming 
so pervasive that Congress recently established the Financial Institutions Advisory Commis-
sion to advise on issues of financial institution refonn in this context. See E-mail from jef-
frey D. Sachs, Galen L. Stone Professor of International Trade, Harvard University, to 
Steven L. Schwarcz 1 (Dec. 20, 1999) (on file with author). Of course, a State, like a 
company, 1vill try to avoid defaulting on its debt. See Benjamin J. Cohen, A Global Chapter 
11,75 FOREIGN POL'y 109,111 (1989) (observing that " [w]ith rare exceptions, Third World 
governments have deliberately chosen not to repudiate their debts or othenvise refuse to 
acknowledge their full contractual obligations"); Kevin A. Kordana, Tax Increases in Munici-
pal Bankruptcies, 83 VA. L. REv. 1035, 1072 (1997) (noting that only three countries have 
outright repudiated their foreign debt since the First World War). Default can have an 
adverse effect on the State's credit ratings and financial reputation. Sometimes, however, 
default-in the technical sense of "failure of a debtor to make timely payment of interest 
and principal as they come due," JOHN DOWNES &jORDON EllIOT GoODMAN, DICTIONARY 
OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 129 (4th ed. 1995)-cannot be avoided. 
5 See, e.g., Mechanism Must Be Found to Avoid Moral Hazard in Crises, IMF Deputy Says, 69 
BankingRep. (BNA) 623 (Oct. 20, 1997) [hereinafter Mechanism] (reportingthatlMFFirst 
Deputy Managing Director, Stanley Fischer, believes that "[i]n a sovereign crisis ..• there 
simply is no accepted bankruptcy procedure"). My examination of the relationship be-
tween a State and its creditors focuses on its foreign creditors; a State could impose 
whatever regulation it wishes on domestic creditors. 
6 United States bankruptcy law is governed by Title 11 of the United States Code (the 
"Code"), 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
7 In other words, these entities all scrutinize whether the company's value as a going-
concern is worth more than the value of its assets sold piecemeal. Under U.S. law, for 
example, companies in bankruptcy ("debtors") either will be liquidated or reorganized. 
Although a corporate debtor can choose either option at the outset of a bankruptcy case, 
most debtors initially attempt reorganization-a process governed by Chapter 11. See 11 
U.S.C. § 706(a) (1994) (pennitting the debtor to convert a liquidation into a reorganiza-
tion). However, the judge has the power to convert the reorganization into a liquidation 
for various reasons, including instances when losses continue and no "reasonable likeli-
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uidated.8 Reorganization is therefore the goal of any sovereign debt 
restructuring. 
The genius of bankruptcy reorganization law is that it provides 
incentives for debtors and their creditors, notwithstanding their dispa-
rate interests, to reach a voluntary agreement on the terms of the re-
structuring.9 Agreement on a plan of reorganization lO is rewarded,11 
failure to agree is penalized.12 As a result, most corporate restructur-
ings are consensual.13 The basis of corporate reorganization law's effi-
ciency rests in the underlying theory of freedom of contract: voluntary 
contracting maximizes value.14 
Although sovereign debt restructuring is likewise consensual, 
achieving consensus is a haphazard affair. The conflicting interests of 
hood of rehabilitation" exists, id. § 1112(b)(1), or when the debtor is unable to "effectuate 
a plan" of reorganization, id. § 1112(b)(2). 
8 See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 1, at 8 ("[L]iquidation is ... basically out of considera-
tion for a debt-strapped national government."); see also BARRY EICHENGREEN & RICHARD 
PORTES, CRISIS? WHAT CRISIS? ORDERLY WORKOUTS FOR SOVEREIGN DEBTORS 7 (1995) ("The 
fundamental difference between a sovereign state and a firm is the public interest in main-
taining a country as a going, indeed a well-functioning concern."); Rory Macmillan, To-
wards a Sovereign Debt Worn-Out System, 16 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 57, 75 (1995) ("Debates 
over whether reorganization or liquidation is more efficient for failing corporate debtors 
are inappropriate in the context of government debtors: there can be no talk of an eco-
nomically efficient liquidation and distribution of a people's government." (citation omit-
ted) ). But see Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual 
Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 425, 472 (1993) (challenging the 
Code's assumption that municipal debtors should not be dismembered because "[m]erely 
to give the city a fresh start, but not to address the fundamental causes of its financial 
problems, may be no favor"). In a country debt-restructuring context, I show that a State 
can at least partially address the fundamental causes of its financial problems while preserv-
ing its political and geographical integrity. See infra Part II. Whether a bankruptcy system 
should allow liquidation of States is a political question beyond this Article's scope. 
9 A debtor-company's shareholders also may be involved in the reorganization pro-
cess. However, because States have no shareholders, they are excluded from this analysis. 
10 The plan of reorganization sets forth both how to reorganize the debtor and how 
to repay the debtor's creditors. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (1994) (stating the confirma-
tion requirements of a plan of reorganization). 
11 Agreement permits both confirmation of the plan of reorganization and payment 
of creditors; absent agreement (or a non-consensual plan, discussed infra note 12), a plan 
of reorganization cannot be confirmed and therefore creditors cannot be paid. See 11 
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (requiring acceptance by each class of "impaired" creditor claims for 
plan confirmation). 
12 If the parties cannot reach a consensus, the debtor may be liquidated or, if viable, 
reorganized under a non-consensuaI plan that follows the absolute priority rule of liquida-
tion. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (granting power to ajudge to convert a reorganization 
case to a liquidation) with id. § 1129 (b) (2) (granting power to confirm, or "cramdown," a 
non-consensuaI plan only if the plan comports with the absolute priority rule). 
13 See, e.g., MARR S. SCARBERRY ET AL., BusINESS REORGANIZATION IN BANKRUPTCY 839 
(1996) ("Most plans are confirmed consensually under section 1129(a) of the Bankruptcy 
Code."). 
14 A consensual plan of reorganization is analogous to voluntary contracting. I qualify 
the comparison because the plan's voluntariness is subject to legally imposed incentives 
and disincentives. See supra notes 11-12. 
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the State and its creditors make it difficult, if not impossible, to reach 
agreement on a restructuring plan. This difficulty is exacerbated by 
the collective action problem of reaching agreement among credi-
torsl5-a problem that has worsened significantly in recent years as 
States have shifted their borrowing source from banks to bond inves-
tors in the lower cost capital markets.16 One or more creditors may 
hold out, hoping that the need to reach an agreement will induce 
other parties to buyout their claims or pay them a premium.17 Conse-
quently, "[a] t each stage of a financial workout, collective action 
15 Creditors themselves may be private entities, such as commercial banks, pension 
funds, or even individual investors, or public entities, such as other States or multilateral 
agencies. 
In the instance of creditor States, their actions tend to accord with policies and proce-
dures that have arisen through historical precedent, an informal arrangement referred to 
as the "Paris Club." EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supra note 8, at 23. This is in contrast to the 
"London Club," an informal framework that has arisen through historical precedent for 
rescheduling claims of commercial banks against States. Id. at 26. 
Theoretically, the unsecured claims of private and public creditors are equal and rata-
ble (pari passu), see Alexis Rieffel, The Rnle of the Paris Club in Managing Debt Problems, in 
INTERNATIONAL BORROWING: NEGOTIATING AND STRUcruRING INTERNATIONAL DEBT TRANSAC-
TIONS 481, 485-88 (Daniel D. Bradlow ed., 3d ed. 1994), and, in practice, are generally 
treated as comparable. See EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supra note 8, at 24 (observing that Paris 
Club agreements commit the debtor-8tate "to seek debt relief from private creditors as 
generous as the official relief granted by the Paris Club," a principle referred to as "compa-
rable treatment"). This Article, accordingly, makes no distinctions based on creditor iden-
tity, except with regard to the issue of classification of claims for super-majority voting. See 
infra notes 274-89 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 280-86 and accompanying text (describing this trend, and explaining 
that the greater number of capital market investors, as compared to banks, and the rela-
tively smaller amounts of their respective investments decreases the likelihood of obtaining 
creditor consent). Another collective action problem is that creditors that otherwise may 
favor a negotiated settlement may be motivated to try to enforce their claims against the 
debtor-8tate because they fear that other creditors will be the first to enforce their claims 
against assets that are insufficient to pay all claims-the"' creditor grab race. '" Sachs, supra 
note 1, at 7. This problem, however, is less significant in a sovereign debt context than in a 
corporate context because creditors can only attempt to attach the State's assets that are 
located in other jurisdictions, and "[u]sually, only limited assets exist outside the debtor 
country and much of that is legally immune from attachment." James B. Hurlock, The Way 
Ahead for Sovereign Debt, INT'L FIN. L. REv., July 1995, at 10, 11; see also EICHENGREEN & 
PORTES, supra note 8, at 31 ("While the debtor state may have some assets within the juris-
diction of the courts in another country, it is frequently very difficult to levy execution 
against such assets, because of the law of sovereign immunity."); Rory Macmillan, The Next 
Sovereign Debt Crisis, 31 STAN.]' INT'L L. 305, 353 (1995). But see Mechanism, supra note 5, at 
623 (arguing that "the international community needs to find a mechanism that is 'legally 
accepted' by all countries to ensure private investors share in the risks and costs of dealing 
with [financially distressed states]"). 
17 Scholars also refer to this situation as a holdout problem. For example, a schism 
recently arose in Russia's debt restructuring when one of 19 banks broke ranks to an-
nounce the creation of a ruble-based investment fund, for which the bank indirectly would 
be paid a 2% management fee. SeeAlan Cowell, More Trouble Seen on Defaulted Russian Debt, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1999, at C4. 
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problems plague the readjustment of debt claims, to the detriment of 
the creditors as well as the debtor."18 
The recent movie Waking Ned Devinfi19 playfully illustrates this 
problem. Devine, an heir-less resident of a rural Irish town, promptly 
dies from shock after winning a £6.7 million nationallottery.20 The 
fifty-two remaining residents of the town want one of their own to 
collect the lottery jackpot by impersonating Devine, and subsequently 
distribute the winnings equally among the residents, yielding each ap-
proximately £130,000.21 To accomplish this scheme, each resident 
would have to agree to identify the imposter as Ned Devine to govern-
ment lottery inspectors.22 Unfortunately, one rather unpleasant resi-
dent attempts to hold out for a much larger share, threatening to 
reveal the fraud if her demand is not met.23 Similarly, in a sovereign 
debt restructuring context, any lender whose consent is needed for an 
overall settlement24 could hold out for a disproportionate share on 
the threat of preventing the settlement. Hence, agreement can take 
years.25 
Attempts by multilateral governmental entities such as the IMF to 
aid the process of sovereign debt restructuring may have further com-
plicated this situation. The IMF has acted as the lender of last resort 
to financially troubled States, enabling them to avoid default and its 
consequences.26 Unfortunately, IMF lending has created a moral haz-
ard risk:27 countries anticipating an IMF bailout might have less rea-
18 Sachs, supra note 1, at 6. See also Charles Upson, Bankers'Dilemmas: Private Coopera-
tion in Rescheduling Sovereign Debts, in CoOPERATION UNDER .ANARCHY 200 (Kenneth A Oye 
ed., 1986) (providing an overview of the collective action problem for sovereign debt 
restructuring) . 
19 WARING NED DEVINE (Fox Searchlight Pictures 1998). 
20 See id. 
21 See id. 
22 See id. 
23 See id. In the movie, the holdout could have obtained a 10% government award by 
revealing the fraud. See id. That possibility exacerbates the collective-action problem, but 
is not a necessary condition for the problem to arise. 
24 Cf. infra note 278 (explaining why settlements usually require the consent of all 
lenders). 
25 In the 1980s, for example, Brazil sought to restructure its debt by converting it into 
collateralized bonds. See Philip]. Power, Sovereign Debt: The Rise of the Secondary Market and 
Its Implications Far Future Restructurings, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 2701, 2745 (1996). Hoping for 
greater profit, its fourth largest creditor, the Dart family, held out and refused to convert 
its debt. See id. at 2746-48. This led to litigation and an almost decade-long impasse. See id. 
at 2748-54. 
26 Since 1982, "almost all debt restructuring agreements of sovereign borrowers ... 
have been linked in one way or another with an IMF loan to the debtor country." Sachs, 
supra note 1, at 2. 
27 The term "moral hazard" has various related meanings. In the insurance context, 
in which the term arose, it means "the deliberate efforts by the insured to bring about the 
insured event, as when the owner of life insurance commits suicide." Richard A. Epstein, 
Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14]. LEGAL STUD. 645, 653 (1985). See generally 
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son to take a prudent economic course,28 and lenders that anticipate 
being protected from default might have a greater tendency to take 
unwarranted financial risk.29 Notwithstanding the lack of empirical 
evidence of the extent, if any, to which the moral hazard risk actually 
influences the behavior of States or their creditors, the potential for 
moral hazard figures prominently in the media debate: 
Some economists believe that bailouts increase "moral hazard" by 
rewarding and encouraging bad policies by governments and exces-
sive risk-taking by banks .... 
IMF economists like to argue that these moral-hazard problems 
are minimal. But consider the case of the recent $42 billion [IMF] 
package for Brazil. How did the Brazilians qualify for this support? 
They did so mostly by not exercising sound fiscal policies. If their 
policies had been better, they would not be in their current difficul-
ties .... 
Russia is another example .... Since [1993], the availability of 
IMF and other foreign money provided an excuse to avoid making 
tough political decisions. Instead of cutting public outlays or in-
creasing tax collections, undertaking efficient privatizations or en-
acting legal reforms, the government counted on foreign bailouts to 
hold things together. 
The sequence of unrestrained global bailouts began with Mex-
ico in 1995 [where] the IMF-U.S. lending package was effectively a 
Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 QJ. ECON. 541 (1979) (providing an 
economic analysis of the standard of care for the insured in the moral hazard context). In 
a more general economic context, however, the term simply refers to the greater tendency 
of people who are protected from the consequences of risky behavior to engage in such 
behavior. See Charles G. Hallinan, The "Fresh Start" Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Histori-
cal Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REv. 49, 84 (1986) (relying on the 
economic definition of moral hazard: debtors and creditors that are protected from the 
consequences of default "could be expected to increase both excessive borrowing and ex-
cessive resort to bankruptcy"). 
28 This is not to say that moral hazard is unrestrained. The IMF's delay in funding 
Russia during its economic crisis in 1998, and Russia's resulting default, may have actually 
reduced moral hazard. See Paul Blustein, IMF Ready to Resume Russia Aid, WASH. POST, Apr. 
29, 1999, at El. Furthermore, even if States anticipate an IMF bailout, they will want to 
avoid (1) the possibility of default and its associated reputational costs, and (2) the re-
duced autonomy over their economies that results from conditionality, see infra notes 31-36 
and accompanying text, imposed by the IMF on its loans. 
29 See Mechanism, supra note 5, at 623. 
IMF lending to countries in trouble does create a "moral hazard." But that 
hazard does not result because IMF lending encourages countries to "be-
have recklessly," .... 
"Instead, the hazard is that the private sector may be too willing to 
lend, because it knows that a country in trouble will go to the fund rather 
than default. ... " 
Id. (quoting Stanley Fischer, First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF). 
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reward for corrupt and risky bank lending and poor 
macroeconomic policies .... 
. . . [T]he IMF might consider changing its name to the IMH-
the Institute for Moral Hazard.3o 
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The IMF has attempted to reduce moral hazard by imposing con-
ditions of fiscal responsibility on its lending, such as requiring bal-
anced domestic budgets and devaluing local currency in order to 
attain better exchange rates.31 This approach is known as conditional-
ity.32 These attempts to alleviate moral hazard, however, sometimes 
fail.33 Failure is not surprising given the IMF's history of raising 
money through taxpayer dollars,34 and the politics of deciding which 
States should benefit from loans and on what conditions.35 Alterna-
tively, the IMF could attempt to reduce moral hazard by refusing to 
act as a lender of last resort. This refusal, however, may be politically 
untenable absent an alternative source of financing.36 
Multilateral governmental lending is also problematic to the ex-
tent it depends on taxation as a funding source. The IMF, for exam-
ple, collects money from its member-States in order to make its 
30 Robert]. Barro, The IMF Doesn't Put Out Fires, It Starts Them, Bus. WK., Dec. 7, 1998, 
at 18, 18. When a realistic risk of default exists, creditors have more incentive to monitor 
their loans. Conversely, if a lender of last resort reduces the chances of default, creditors 
have less incentive to monitor. IMF loans provided at subsidized interest rates may also 
increase the risk of moral hazard. See Charles W. Calomiris, The IMF's Imprudent Role as 
Lender of Last Resort, CATO]., Winter 1998, at 275, 277; STAFF OF JOINT ECON. CoMM., 105TH 
CoNG., IMF FINANCING: A REvIEW OF THE IssUES 8 (Comm. Print 1998) [hereinafter IMF 
FINANCING]. 
31 See Power, supra note 25, at 2712 & n.50. These conditions are often called "auster-
ity measures." !d. 
32 See Claudio Grossman & Daniel D. Bradlow, Are We Being Propelled Tuwards a People-
Centered TransnationalLegal Order?, 9 AM. U.]. INT'L L. & POL'y 1,5 n.17 (1993) (discussing 
IMF's use of "conditionality"). 
33 In 1997, for example, the IMF pressured Asian nations to raise their interest rates 
and impose other austerity measures in return for IMF funding. See Ben Wildavsky, Curing 
the Asian Flu: Two VIeWS on the Proper Medicine, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REp., Dec. 14, 1998, at 
43, 43. This strategy could have backfired by raising borrowing costs for many businesses 
in those States, causing them to default. See id. (aIIeging that World Bank officials feared 
that austerity measures "would scare off investors [to private companies located in those 
countries] and make credit so scarce that [those] companies would not get the capital they 
need to survive"). 
34 See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. 
35 I later show, however, that the IMF can impose conditionality without these impedi-
ments. See infra notes 199-204. 
36 See, e.g., Marcus Miller & Lei Zhang, Sovereign Liquidity Crisis: The Strategic Case for a 
Payments Standstill (Non-Technical Summary) 2 (Centre for the Study of Globalisation & 
Regionalisation Working Paper No. 35/99, May 1999), available at <http:// 
www.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/glob-fin.html> ("What can the IMF do to avoid being 
[forced to fund bailouts]?"). I later propose that the private credit and capital markets can 
constitute this alternative source of funding. See infra notes 178-206 and accompanying 
text. 
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loans.37 The member-States in turn raise this money directly or indi-
rectly through their taxing power.38 This practice has sparked contro-
versy over whether taxpayers of wealthier IMF member-States are 
effectively subsidizing the defaulting States, as well as the defaulting 
States' creditors. For example, one scholar has criticized the IMF's 
use of taxpayer funds to bail out foreign commercial banks that invest 
in debt-strapped nations.39 Another commentator similarly obseIVes 
that 
[f] or all their vigorous rhetoric about the glories of the free market 
and financial deregulation, the money-center banks would not get 
out of this mess unless the government stepped in and rescued 
them. As the IMF lent huge sums to the debtor nations to keep 
them going, the taxpayers of the United States and other industrial 
nations were effectively assuming the obligations in behalf of the 
banks. The more that the public treasuries lent to Mexico and the 
others, the safer would be the managers and shareholders of Ci-
tibank, Morgan Guaranty, Chase and Chemical and the others.40 
Others argue, however, that dealings with the IMF have not 
forced taxpayers to bear additional costs. As Robert Rubin asserts, 
"over the past fifty years, our contribution to the IMF has not cost the 
taxpayer one dime. There are no budget outlays. Our contribution 
37 The IMF's primary means of financing is by "capital subscriptions," which represent 
quotas assessed against each member-State in amounts "broadly determined by its eco-
nomic position relative to other members." IAfF Quotas and Quota Reviews (visited July 25, 
1999) <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/quotas.htm> [hereinafter IMF Quo-
tas]. In 1999, for example, total quotas assessed increased by 45%, from approximately 
$200 billion to $290 billion. See id. 
38 A government also could choose borrowing as the funding source. See, e.g., Fareign 
operations, Expart Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations far Fiscal Year 1999: Hearings 
on H.R 4569/S. 2334 Befare a Suhcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 105th Cong., 2d 
Sess.93 (1998) [hereinafter Appropriations Hearings] (statement of Robert E. Rubin, Secre-
tary of the Treasury) (observing that "over time [the U.S.] Treasury generally needs to 
increase its issuance of securities to the public [to fund IMF costs] .... Any such issuance 
would increase the national debt and interest payments on it"). Because the national debt 
and interest thereon ultimately would be paid through taxation, however, the ultimate 
funding source would be taxes. Cf Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, The Market far 
Deadbeats, 25]. LEGAL STUD. 201, 214 (1996) (noting that "[u]nder Ricardian equivalence 
theories, a state's debt load represents anticipated future taxes" (citation omitted»; Neal 
E. Devins, In Search of the Lost Chard: Reflections on the 1996 Item Veto Act, 47 CAsE w. REs. L. 
REv. 1605, 1625 (1997) (arguing that because Congress must usually rely on unpopular tax 
increases to check the national debt, a statute that places more of the blame on the Execu-
tive Branch is very appealing). 
39 See International Economic Issues, and Their Impact on the U.S. Financial System: Hearings 
Befare the House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, lOlst Congo 360-64 (1989) 
(statement of Jeffrey D. Sachs, Professor of Economics, Harvard University). Professor 
Sachs asserts that, because international organizations such as the IMF were being "mis-
used as conduits of taxpayer dollars to pay interest to banks," the United States should not 
support these organizations in the short-term. Id. at 362. 
40 WILLIAM GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE 520-21 (1987). 
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does not increase the deficit, or divert resources from other spending 
priorities."41 
The view that there is no cost to taxpayers appears to rest more 
on form than substance. Although some characterize IMF capital sub-
scriptions as "investments," because "member countries earn interest 
on their deposits in the IMF,"42 repayment by the IMF, although antic-
ipated,43 is not assured;44 and the IMF pays less than a market rate of 
interest.45 In some cases, this interest rate is even below the member-
41 Implications of Asian Financial Crisis: Before the House Comm. On Banking & Financial 
Services, 105th Congo (1998) (statement of Robert E. Rubin, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, 
Jan. 30,1998). C. Fred Bergsten argues that the American taxpayer incurs zero cost from 
U.S. contributions to the IMF because every dollar contributed produces an equal amount 
of U.S. claims to draw currencies from the IMF. See The International Monetary Fund and the 
National Interests of the United States: Hearing Before theJoint Economic Comm., 105th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 136-37 (1998) [hereinafter Hearings on the IMF] (statement of C. Fred Bergsten, Direc-
tor, Institute for International Economics). Professor John Head even argues that the 
United States enjoyed a net gain on its IMF deposits during most of the 1980s due to 
interest accruing to the United States from the IMF's use of those deposits. See John W. 
Head, Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis: The Rnle of the IMF and the United States, RAN. J .L. 
& PUB. POL'y, Spring 1998, at 70,88-89. I later demonstrate that these types of arguments 
exalt form over substance. See infra notes 42-48 and accompanying text. 
42 Stanley Fischer, The Asian Crisis: A View from the IMF, Speech at the Midwinter 
Conference of the Bankers' Association for Foreign Trade (Jan. 22, 1998) (transcript on 
file with author). The U.S. Treasury Department similarly characterizes the payment of 
the U.S. subscription as an investment because of the "equivalent increase in the U.S. re-
serve position in the IMF." Appropriations Hearings, supra note 38, at 92 (statement of Rob-
ert E. Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury). 
43 See Appropriations Hearings, supra note 38, at 92 (statement of Robert E. Rubin, Sec-
retary of the Treasury) (arguing that " [t]he likelihood that the IMF would fail to repay the 
U.S. is extremely remote"). Because the IMF is a financial cooperative, member-States pay 
capital subscriptions when they join, and theoretically have the right to a return of capital 
if they ever withdraw as members. See IMF Quotas, supra note 37. 
44 See, e.g., IMF FINANCING, supra note 30, at 3 (concluding that "[i]t is doubtful that 
[payment of the U.S. quota subscription to the IMF] will ever be fully recovered"); see also 
Hearings on the IMF, supra note 41, at 112, 115 (statement of Dr. Lawrence B. Lindsey, 
Resident Scholar, The American Enterprise Institute) (observing that "at least one private 
sector analysis of the IMF balance sheet found that if it were a bank, serious questions 
could be raised about the lMF's capital adequacy"). One might question whether the IMF 
would ever have sufficient funds to repay its largest member, especially at a time when 
other members are seeking to withdraw their subscriptions or IMF loans are in default. 
45 The IMF pays interest on the U.S. reserve position at a rate "determined as the 
weighted average of representative short-term [government borrowing] rates in the United 
States, Japan, Germany, France and the United Kingdom." Appropriations Hearings, supra 
note 38, at 93-94 (statement of Robert E. Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury). Unfortunately, 
that blended rate often is lower than the rate for three-month U.S. Treasury bills, making it 
not only below-market for U.S. government investments but also below the U.S. govern-
ment's cost of funds (i.e., the rate on U.S. Treasury bills). See Hearings on the IMF, supra 
note 41, at 69 (statement of C. Fred Bergsten, Director, Institute for International Econom-
ics). Only a foolish investor would seek a rate of return that is equal to or less than its cost 
of funds. 
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State's own cost of funds.46 IMF funding therefore does appear to 
impose a cost on taxpayers.47 
To be sure, taxpayers benefit indirectly from IMF loans that pre-
serve the integrity of the world's financial system.48 But this Article 
asserts that these same benefits can be achieved by privatizing the 
funding of sovereign debt restructuring.49 Moreover, this type of 
privatization would avoid the politics of relying on taxation as the 
source of IMF funding, which can delay funding availability, thereby 
impairing a debtor-State's restructuring efforts and deepening the 
crisis.50 
For all of these reasons, I argue for the adoption of an interna-
tional convention for sovereign debt restructuring based on bank-
ruptcy reorganization law principles. Such a convention could help to 
solve the collective action problem, minimize the moral hazard prob-
lem, and avoid any taxation problems.51 Under the convention, finan-
46 See Hearings on the IMP, supra note 41, at 69 (statement of C. Fred Bergsten, Direc-
tor, Institute for International Economics). 
47 See IMF FINANCING, supra note 30, at 3. The Joint Economic Committee explains: 
One diversion in an IMF performance review is the dubious contention that 
under existing budget rules the IMF appropriation is not a net outlay and 
therefore involves no taxpayer cost. Although current accounting rules 
mask the cost of the IMF quota increases to the U.S., economic analysis 
clarifies the true nature of the transaction: real economic resources are 
transferred at subsidized interest rates from the U.S. economy to other 
nations. 
Id. Taxpayer cost is also exacerbated by the intertemporaI nature of taxation and repay-
ment. See OUVIER JEAN BLANCHARD & STANLEY FISCHER, LEcruRES ON MACROECONOMICS 
128-29 (1989) (discussing intertemporaI reallocation of taxes); DAVID ROMER, ADVANCED 
MACROECONOMICS 185 (1996) (same). Taxes always create intertemporaI distributional is-
sues because taxes are imposed on people today, but create benefits that arise in the fu-
ture; they always impose burdens and confer benefits on different people. See Richard L. 
Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 
CoLUM. L. REv. 941, 1007 (1999). In the present case of IMF quotas, even if a member-
State's capital subscription is ultimately repaid, theoretically enabling that State to reduce 
taxes, the taxpayers who benefit from the reduction are not the same as those who paid the 
original taxes. The usual justification is that the benefit to future taxpayers counter-bal-
ances harm to current taxpayers. See Richard A Epstein, Justice Across the Generations, 67 
TEX. L. REv. 1465, 1487-89 (1989) (examining why future generations should receive bene-
fits from past generations). But raising taxes to fund IMF loans lacks this justification: 
these taxes do not benefit the State's taxpayers, but rather the citizens of foreign debtor-
States that borrow from the IMF. 
48 See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 42. 
49 See infra notes 178-206 and accompanying text (discussing capital market funding 
for loans to debtor-States). Therefore, this Article does not attempt to balance the cost to 
taxpayers against the intangible benefits of funding loans to troubled States. Some schol-
ars also may contend that rich States have an obligation to subsidize poor States. Yet, even 
that contention would fail in the common IMF funding scenario where the debtor-State 
uses the loan proceeds to repay its debts, thereby primarily benefitting the debtor-State's 
creditors. 
50 See infra note 181 and accompanying text. 
51 This solution would also avoid the related politicization that results from having to 
decide which States should benefit from loans, and on what conditions. 
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ciers of a State's debt restructuring would have priority over claims of 
other creditors, and creditors would be bound to a plan of reorganiza-
tion that is agreed to via super-m~ority voting, whereby an affirmative 
vote by a specified m~ority of each class of creditors binds all credi-
tors in that class, even those that vote negatively or fail to vote.52 In 
these contexts, I demonstrate that an international convention would 
be superior to private contracting. 53 Contrary to assumptions made in 
the economic literature, this type of approach should be largely self-
executing and would not require supervision by a bankruptcy court. 
Although occasional scrutiny and monitoring by a neutral interna-
tional institution such as the IMF would be necessary to ensure that 
the priority financing does not result in overinvestment, existing insti-
tutions could perform that role. By acting merely as a funding inter-
mediary, the IMF could also impose appropriate conditionality, 
without creating the moral hazard and taxation problems presently 
associated with direct IMF lending. This approach can best be under-
stood in the context of the current academic debate. 
B. The Academic Debate 
There are remarkably few scholarly works on sovereign debt re-
structuring, and none are by bankruptcy law scholars.54 This section 
will briefly survey the current debate, which primarily exists among 
economists. Professor Sachs, a leading economist at Harvard, argues 
that "[t]he IMF's own tactics-and failure to act like a bankruptcy 
manager-help to breed failures."55 For example, the IMF's reliance 
on taxpayer dollars, which may not be immediately available, can 
render this institution incapable of providing timely financial assist-
ance to a State in order to prevent the collapse of critical governmen-
tal functions.56 Sachs believes that the IMF could solve this problem 
by implementing an international legal framework to encourage mar-
52 See infra notes 172-74, 274-89 and accompanying text (discussing 11 u.s.c. §§ 364, 
1126 (1994». 
53 See infra notes 209-11 and accompanying text (analyzing why the priority should be 
granted under international law) and Part I1.C.1 and accompanying text (analyzing why 
international law must provide for super-majority voting, and why private contracting 
would fail). 
54 The world's political leaders have also debated the concept of an international 
bankruptcy system, but have yet to take action. See John H. Chun, Note, "Post-Modem" Sover-
eign. Debt Crisis: Did Mexico Need an International Bankruptcy Forum?, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 2647 
(1996) (evaluating the two proposals for dealing with a sovereign debt crisis offered by the 
Group of Seven after their summit on June 15-16, 1995, in Halifax, Nova Scotia). The G-7 
debated over the creation of an Emergency Financing Mechanism or an International 
Bankruptcy Agency (rnA). See id. at 2651-52. I discuss the rnA proposal infra notes 356-58 
and accompanying text. 
55 Sachs, supra note 1, at 13. 
56 See id. Sachs also discusses the problems of moral hazard and collective action in 
his condemnation of the IMF. See id. at 6-9, 13-14. 
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ket lending to States, which it could accomplish by"supervis[ing] the 
extension of 'administrative priority' [loans] for new private-market 
borrowing for a liquidity-strapped member government. "57 Conse-
quently, Sachs calls for "the review and harmonization of private-sec-
tor bankruptcy practices."58 
Professors Miller and Zhang, also economists, argue for legaliza-
tion of a "standstill" or freezing of claims against a debtor-State by 
analogizing to the stay of claims59 that automatically arises in U.S. 
bankruptcy cases.60 Miller and Zhang claim that the freeze "might be 
used to stop creditor races and to allow for debt restructuring."61 This 
argument relies on the central assumption that a standstill will neces-
sarily cause creditors to take a "hit" by canceling the payment of inter-
est during the standstill period.62 That assumption may be partly 
flawed, however, because a standstill need only suspend the payment 
of interest, which would continue to accrue. Indeed, permitting a 
debtor-State to use the stay to cancel its interest costs invites strategic 
manipulation by States that ultimately are able to pay those costs, and 
also would be unfair to creditors of those States. For these reasons, 
Chapter 11 requires a solvent debtor ultimately to pay interest that 
accrues during the bankruptcy case, notwithstanding the stay.63 If, 
similarly, a debtor-State ultimately must pay accrued interest, then the 
temporary freezing of payment would merely be an annoyance to 
creditors.64 
Professor Cohen, a chaired professor of international economic 
affairs, asserts, without supporting analysis, that there are "five crucial 
safeguards" to consider in developing a reform plan for sovereign 
debt restructuring,65 and that Chapter 11 's procedures already incor-
57 [d. at 11-12. According to Sachs, the IMF should playa role "far more like an 
international bankruptcy court and far less like the lender oflast resort to member govern-
ments." [d. at 14; see also id. at 15 (analogizing the IMF's role in an international context to 
the role played by a central bank in a domestic context). 
58 [d. at 15. 
59 This is the automatic stay provided for under 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994). 
60 Miller & Zhang, supra note 36, at 18-22. 
61 [d. at ll. 
62 [d. at 5, 20. 
63 See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (5) (1994). See also ChaimJ. Fortgang & Lawrence P. King, 
The 1978 Code: Some Wrong Policy Decisions, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1148, 1151, ll60-61 (1981) 
(arguing that to disallow the accrual of interest in this situation would be a "patently unjust 
result" and would permit strategic manipulation). 
64 Technically, a temporary payment freeze could reduce a creditor's effective rate of 
return if the creditor accrues neither penalty interest nor interest on delayed interest pay-
ments. That reduction, however, is likely to be minimal because interest payments consti-
tute only a fraction of a loan's principal amount 
65 Cohen, supra note 4, at 123. Cohen actually refers to the debt restructuring of less 
developed countries, but he does not appear to differentiate that from generic sovereign 
debt restructuring. See id. 
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porate those safeguards.66 First, he would grant debt forgiveness to 
States that face "real insolvency."67 This Article later argues that lim-
ited debt forgiveness, or "discharge," would be appropriate under a 
sovereign debt restructuring plan that is agreed to by super-majority 
voting.68 Next, Cohen advocates changing or reinterpreting account-
ing regulations so that creditors could stretch out capital losses for 
debt reduction.69 If this change is necessary, however, it should be 
implemented in the same manner as are accounting changes gener-
ally, through the process established by the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB),70 and not through a sovereign debt restruc-
turing law.71 Third, Cohen would make debt relief contingent upon 
implementation of needed reforms.72 Alternatively, this Article argues 
that privatizing funding under bankruptcy reorganization principles 
will motivate States to adopt those needed reforms at an earlier stage, 
when they are more effective.73 Cohen's fourth safeguard is to ensure 
mutual recognition of rights and obligations of both creditors and the 
State.74 Because any sovereign debt restructuring law would naturally 
set forth mutual rights and obligations, this proposal is not problem-
atic. Finally, Cohen would preserve a voluntary and market-oriented 
negotiating framework to avoid further politicization of the debt is-
sue.75 Similarly, this Article claims that applying bankruptcy reorgani-
zation principles to sovereign debt restructuring will effectively 
preserve a consensual, market-oriented negotiating framework and, 
by shifting lending strategies away from tax-based funding, will avoid 
further politicization.76 
66 See id. at 124. 
67 [d. at 123. Cohen refers to his proposal as "selectivity." [d. (typeface altered). He 
would not, however, grant debt forgiveness for States that merely face illiquidity. See id. To 
that extent, Cohen and I are clearly in agreement. See infra notes 226-33 and accompanying 
text (discussing liquidity). 
68 See infra notes 243-55 and accompanying text. 
69 See Cohen, supra note 4, at 123. Cohen labels this proposal "flexibility." [d. (type-
face altered). 
70 See FASB, An open Decision-Making Process (visited August 11, 1999) <http:// 
www.rutgers.edu/Accounting/raw/fasb/facts/fasfact4.html>. 
71 The appropriateness of that change is beyond the scope of this Article. A complete 
analysis must balance the need to facilitate sovereign debt restructuring with the need for 
clear disclosure. 
72 See Cohen, supra note 4, at 123. Consistent with IMF terminology for imposing 
conditions on loan funding, Cohen calls this proposal "conditionality." !d. (typeface 
altered). 
73 See infra notes 178-81 and accompanying text. Moreover, in this Article, I propose a 
convention under which the IMF, to the extent necessary, could continue to impose condi-
tionality without causing the problems presently associated with IMF lending. See infra 
notes 197-208 and accompanying text (discussing nonrecourse back-to-back lending). 
74 See Cohen, supra note 4, at 124. He labels his fourth proposal "mutuality." [d. 
(typeface altered). 
75 See id. Cohen refers to his final proposal as "autonomy." [d. (typeface altered). 
76 See infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text. 
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Mter articulating these safeguards, Cohen briefly attempts to ex-
plain the manner in which Chapter 11 procedures already embody 
them: 
Mutuality and autonomy are preserved by an essentially voluntary 
and market-oriented negotiating framework based on explicit rec-
ognition of respective rights and obligations. Selectivity is main-
tained in the debtor's right to make the initial decision to seek 
protection. Flexibility is inherent in the virtually unlimited scope 
provided for final terms of settlement. And conditionality is re-
flected in the court's assignment to a supervisory role over the 
debtor's ongoing operations.77 
He concludes that "[t]he challenge is to translate [these five safe-
guards] into a specific design that is likely to be practicable and 
effective. "78 
Economists Barry Eichengreen and Richard Portes have written 
perhaps the most comprehensive work on sovereign debt restructur-
ing.79 Inspired by the Mexican crisis of 1994-95, they first examine the 
ways that "financial markets, governments and multilateral institutions 
respond to" that type of crisis.80 Mter reviewing the history of sover-
eign debt restructuring,81 Eichengreen and Portes then examine how 
to make the process of restructuring, which often "take[s] years to 
complete,"82 more efficient.83 In this context, they consider the feasi-
bility of "a 'bankruptcy court' and procedure modelled on Chapter 
11."84 These scholars conclude, however, that "there are significant 
obstacles" to feasibly implementing such a reform, and that those ob-
stacles are "insurmountable for the foreseeable future. "85 Nonethe-
less, Eichengreen and Portes make several other useful 
recommendations,86 including the establishment of a "mediation ser-
vice for conciliation and voluntary arbitration. "87 
77 Cohen, supra note 4, at 124. 
78 Id. For example, he assumes that instituting these safeguards on an international 
level would require a supranational institution analogous to the Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
court, or at least a mediator. See id. at 124-25. I later argue that the creation of a new 
institution may not be necessary. See infra notes 361-86 and accompanying text. 
79 See EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supra note 8. 
80 Id. at xv. 
81 See id. at 19-28. 
82 Id. at 4. 
83 See id. at 2846. 
84 10. at 42. 
85 !d. (referring to obstacles such as the "great divergences that exist among national 
perspectives and laws on the best ways of dealing with problems of bankruptcy"). As this 
Article will show, I disagree that such obstacles are insurmountable. See infra Part II.C. 
86 See EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supra note 8, at 48-51. One of their recommendations 
is for the creation of official bondholders' committees. See id. at 48. I later argue, however, 
that official creditors' committees are unnecessary. See infra notes 271-73 and accompany-
ing text. 
87 EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supra note 8, at 49. 
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Although Chapter 11 inspires the arguments of Miller and 
Zhang88 and of Cohen,89 little normative rationale supports their as-
sertions. Eichengreen and Portes base their arguments on certain 
economic assumptions about bankruptcy theory,90 but they do not sys-
tematically explore the normative basis of Chapter 11 itself, which is 
only partly economic.91 The task of applying bankruptcy reorganiza-
tion principles to sovereign debt restructuring, however, would ap-
pear to be primarily normative: 
There is considerable confusion as to how the principles of bank-
ruptcy should translate to the case of sovereign borrowers . . . . 
Therefore, the question is mostly a normative one-how should in-
ternational practice, and specifically IMF practice, be arranged in 
view of the lessons of bankruptcy law.92 
This Article now turns to that task and to the more general analysis 
that it engenders. 
II 
ANALYSIS 
This Article outlines a conceptual basis for sovereign debt restruc-
turing by examining the conceptual basis of Chapter II-including in 
that examination other related chapters of the Code, such as Chapter 
9 which focuses on municipal government reorganization93-and 
then by analyzing how that conceptual basis should be modified to 
address sovereign debt restructuring and its problems. This Article 
then uses that modified conceptual basis to propose model rules for 
an international convention on sovereign debt restructuring. Finally, 
it examines possible ways to implement those rules. Contrary to the 
assumptions that many scholars make in economic literature, this Arti-
cle illustrates that sovereign debt restructuring based on principles of 
Chapter 11 reorganization would not require a bankruptcy court's 
supervision. 
This analysis does not assume that Chapter 11 is always a perfect 
system for debt restructuring.94 Some scholars have criticized Chapter 
11, most notably Michael Bradley and Michael Rosenzweig who advo-
88 See Miller & Zhang, supra note 36. 
89 See Cohen, supra note 4. 
90 See EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supra note 8, at 8-11. 
91 See infra Part ITA (analyzing the normative basis of Chapter 11). 
92 Sachs, supra note 1, at 8. 
93 See infra notes 14647 and accompanying text Unless the context otherwise re-
quires, references in this Article to Chapter 11 or to principles of Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tion shall also include those other related Chapters of the Code. 
94 Cf. Eichengreen & Portes, supra note 8, at 14 (cautioning that "proponents of an 
international Chapter 11 must recognize that Chapter 11 is seriously criticized in the 
United States"). 
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cate its repeal.95 They claim that agency costs make Chapter 11 ineffi-
cient by prolonging management and by allowing companies that 
should liquidate to attempt reorganization.96 In place of Chapter 11, 
Bradley and Rosenzweig would institute a market solution requiring 
residual claimants to either cure the defaults of more senior claim-
ants, such as by raising money in the capital markets to repay the com-
pany's debt, or risk losing their claims to the next-most senior 
claimants.97 Regardless of whether these criticisms are valid in a cor-
porate context,98 they have little application to sovereign debt restruc-
turing because liquidation is not an option.99 Further, their proposed 
market solution would also be inapplicable because States have no 
residual claimants or owners.lOO 
This Article's methodology nonetheless risks being incomplete in 
two ways: (1) the conceptual basis of corporate reorganization under 
one or more foreign insolvency laws might be better suited to sover-
eign debt restructuring than Chapter 11, or (2) the matters compared 
are too dissimilar to be meaningful.lOl With respect to the first risk, 
my examination of corporate reorganization under several foreign in-
solvency laws reveals that the conceptual basis of those laws is remark-
ably similar to that of Chapter 11.102 Four of those countries' laws are 
actually based on Chapter 11 or its antecedent statutes in the United 
States, and the one law not actually based on Chapter 11 is based on 
95 See Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzw'eig, The Untenable Case far Chapter 11, 101 
YALE LJ. 1043 (1992). 
96 See id. at 1076, 1078. 
97 See id. at 1078-86. In effect, their proposal gives residual claimants the option of 
buying out the senior creditors in order to retain their residual claim. See id. at 1081. The 
process continues until either a class of residual claimants buys out the senior creditors or 
the most senior creditors become the residual claimants. See id. at 1081-82. 
98 See Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case far Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE LJ. 437 
(1992) (challenging the Bradley and Rosenzweig thesis). Professor Warren argues, among 
other things, that the data do not prove Bradley and Rosenzweig's case and that plausible 
alternative hypotheses may explain many of their statistical findings. See id. at 440-67. She 
also counters that Bradley and Rosenzweig focus only on bankruptcy'S goal of preseIVing 
value for public shareholders and bondholders, thereby omitting its distributional goals. 
See id. at 467-77. She concludes that Congress should not repeal Chapter 11 because, "thus 
far, no one has come up with a good substitute." ld. at 478. 
99 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing why sovereign States are not 
liquidated). 
100 See supra note 9 (observing that States have no shareholders). 
101 See Cass R Sunstein, Commentary, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARv. L. REv. 741, 
744 (1993) ("For analogical reasoning to work well, we have to say that the relevant, known 
similarities give us good reason to believe that there are further similarities and thus help 
to answer an open question."). 
102 With the help of LL.M. students Ori Demb from Israel, Mike Perry from Canada, 
Yasuto Hashinaga from Japan, Tomas Allende from Argentina, and Till Hafner from Ger-
many, I examined corporate reorganization under the bankruptcy and insolvency laws of 
their countries. Although this group is not a statistically meaningful sample, it does repre-
sent a range of both civil and common law States on different continents. 
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principles that are remarkably similar to those of Chapter 11.103 
Moreover, preliminary research also suggests that 
[for countries that] have market economies and share the same as-
sumptions and broad objectives for formal reorganization, it [is] 
highly likely, if not inevitable, that [those] countries [will] develop 
[bankruptcy] reorganization systems that function in essentially the 
same way ... [because] [t]he functional aspects of these systems 
[are] shaped not by culture or politics, but by necessity.l04 
103 Japan modeled its corporate reorganization law, Kaisha kosei ho [Corporate Reor-
ganization Act], Law No. 172 of 1952, after Chapter X of the U.S. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 
as amended-the predecessor statute to Chapter 11. See HAJIME KANEKO ET AL., JOKAI KAI-
SHA KEsEl Ho, (Jo) 11, 14 (1973) Like the most important sections of Chapter 11 that I 
will discuss, see infra notes 172-234 and accompanying text, Law No. 172 gives priority to 
loans made in order to enable a company to continue in business, see Law No. 172 of 1952, 
arts. 119-3, 208, 209, and also provides for super-majority voting of creditors, see id. art. 205. 
For a general discussion of Law No. 172, see Tasuku Matsuo, Carporate Reorganization, in 7 
DOING BUSINESS INJAPAN §§ 8.01-.06 (Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 1999). 
Chapter 11 forms the basis of the essential elements of German corporate reorganiza-
tion law as well. See MICHAEL BLATZ & ANDREA K. BUTH, REsrRUKrURIERUNG, DANIERUNG, 
INSOLVENZ 84 (1998). Further, the Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) was 
influenced by, and is largely reflective of, Chapter 11. See, e.g., L. Shorten, BIA: Help or 
Hindrance, 17 CAN. LAw. 37 (1993) (characterizing the 1992 amendments to Canada's BIA 
as "Canada's Chapter 11") ; Jacob S. Ziegel, The Modernization of Canada's Bankruptcy Law in 
a Comparative Context, 33 TEX. INT'L LJ. 1 (1998) (discussing the substantive and proce-
dural similarities of Canada's BIA and Chapter 11). 
The reorganization provisions ("Concurso Preventivo") of Argentina's insolvency law, 
Law No. 24522, Aug. 7, 1995, [LV-D] A.D.L.A. 4381, also are based on Chapter 11. See, e.g., 
Julio C. Otaegui, Commentario del Articulo 48 de la Novisima Ley de Concursos en Homenaje al 
Maestro Raymundo L. Fernandez, in DERECHo EMPREDARIO AcruAL 799, 803-04 (Osvaldo R 
Gomez Leo ed., 1996) (observing that the Argentine Congress expressly took U.S. Chapter 
11 as the model for corporate rehabilitation). Thus, it includes what I show to be Chapter 
11 's two most important contributions to sovereign debt restructuring: super-majority vot-
ing (binding each class of creditors to a reorganization plan by a vote of holders of a 
majority in number and at least two-thirds by amount of the claims, under Concurso 
Preventivo Art. 45) and priority financing of the reorganization (at least in a limited form 
under Concurso Preventivo Art. 13). 
Israeli reorganization law, codified in Companies Ordinance Chapter 10, sections 233, 
333-34, 307(a), & 300,1983, is the only one that does not appear to be based on Chapter 
11; nonetheless, its principles, as interpreted by the courts, are remarkably similar to those 
of Chapter 11. The Israeli Supreme Court has found the Ordinance to advance three reor-
ganization goals: (1) rehabilitation of viable debtors, including abrogation of the tradi-
tional "absolute priority" rule in order to encourage consensual plans of reorganization; 
(2) equality of distribution for creditors; and (3) economic efficiency. See C.A. 217/88, 
Hapoalim-Bank v. Trustee of the Scheme of Arrangement Between the Encyclopedias Pub-
lishing Firm et al., 44(2) P.D. 698, 703. These goals are remarkably similar to U.S. bank-
ruptcy reorganization norms. See infra notes 115-44 and accompanying text (discussing the 
same norms under Chapter 11). Furthermore, section 233(b) of the Ordinance provides 
for a form of super-majority voting-each class of creditors is bound to a reorganization 
plan by a vote of a majority of those present holding at least three-quarters by amount of 
the claims. See also C.A. 700/71, Otzar Kablanim Ltd. v. Sherf, 27(1) P.D. 561, 564 (con-
firming section 233(b)'s power to override contrary contractual voting provisions). 
104 Lynn M. LoPucki & George G. Triantis, A Systems Approach to Comparing U.S. and 
Canadian Reorganization of Financially Distressed Companies, 35 lIARv. INT'L LJ. 267, 342 
(1994). 
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In contrast, scholars may assert that existing differences between 
national bankruptcy systems could make a bankruptcy reorganization 
approach to sovereign debt restructuring impractical.105 But those 
differences may be less significant than at first perceived. A national 
bankruptcy system must address both companies that liquidate and 
those that reorganize. From this perspective, the differences between 
national bankruptcy systems are significant because some favor liqui-
dation while others favor reorganization.106 As previously discussed, 
however, States do not liquidate.l07 Therefore, a broad comparison of 
bankruptcy systems would highlight differences that are not applica-
ble to debtor-States. Because they always reorganize, the more precise 
comparison for debtor-States would be between national bankruptcy 
reorganization systems. My analysis already compares five of those sys-
tems and concludes that they are conceptually similar to Chapter 
11.108 Furthermore, I focus on those aspects of Chapter 11 that come 
into play once a debtor decides to reorganize. 
Additionally, even if national bankruptcy reorganization systems 
were not conceptually similar, the analogy to Chapter 11 serves only as 
a starting point for inquiry. Absent an overarching theory of sovereign 
debt restructuring, which does not exist because sovereign debt struc-
turing is purely a matter of contract negotiationl09 thus rendering 
105 See, e.g., E-mail from Richard Portes, Distinguished Global VlSiting Professor, Haas 
School of Business, University of California at Berkeley, to Steven L. Schwarcz 1 (October 
24, 1999) (on file with author) (stating that the differences between national bankruptcy 
systems constitute "one of the bases for our [Portes & Eichengreen's] conclusion that an 
international bankruptcy procedure of the type you [Schwarcz] suggest will not be 
acceptable") . 
106 See, e.g., Julian R Franks et al., A Comparison of US, UK, and Gennan Insolvency Codes, 
FIN. MGMT., Autumn 1996, at 86, 93-94. 
107 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
108 See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text. Professor Portes states that the pri-
mary article that he and Professor Eichengreen relied on for their conclusion that a bank-
ruptcy reorganization approach to sovereign debt restructuring is impractical was Franks et 
al., supra note 106, which compares U.S. and U.K. bankruptcy law to German insolvency 
law. See E-mail from Richard Portes, supra note 105 (stating such reliance). Nonetheless, 
the corporate reorganization part of the new German insolvency law, Insolvenzordnung 
(InsO), v. 5.10.94 (BGBl. I S.2866) (eff.Jan. 1, 1999), is not only based on U.S. Chapter 
11, see BLATZ & BUTH, supra note 103 but also includes super-majority voting and priority 
financing provisions similar to what I propose for the Convention. See InsO §§ 244, 264, 
55ll, 56, 80. _ 
109 See, e.g., Mudge, supra note 2, at 59 ("Sovereign debt restructure is contractual 
agreement between individual debtor and individual creditor with respect to the debt in 
question, and nothing more."). 
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each situation unique,llo analogy can help suggest rational legal 
outcomes. 1 11 
Turning to the second risk, I believe that the matters being com-
pared under this analogy are indeed similar enough to be meaningful. 
Although sovereign States and non-sovereign corporations are funda-
mentally different, this Article's analysis takes into account the reor-
ganization of sovereign entities by exammmg municipal 
reorganization under Chapter 9 of the Code.112 Although bankruptcy 
judges supe:rvise Chapters 9 and 11 cases (whereas equivalent judicial 
supervision may be impractical for sovereign States), this fact does not 
weaken the analogy because those matters that require judicial super-
vision are inapplicable to States.113 
A Deriving a Normative Framework for Regulation 
In deriving a normative framework for regulation, I first examine 
the conceptual basis of Chapter 11 and then analyze possible modifi-
cations that address sovereign debt restructuring problems.1l4 The 
first analysis is complicated, but also universalized, by disagreement 
on Chapter 11' s normative underpinnings. 
Traditionally, Chapter 11 attempts to advance two overall goals: 
to rehabilitate viable debtors and to ensure equality of distribution 
among creditors.ll5 Some scholars, however, argue that the only nor-
110 See id. at 60 ("Each restructure is negotiated separately in its own factual context 
.... There are no general rules, and the solution to yesterday's problem is not the answer 
to today's question. The solution for the Kingdom of Oz simply will not work for the Re-
public of Zoo . .. Each situation is unique • •.. "); see also Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen 
Knippenberg, The Implied Good Faith Filing Requirement: Sentinel of an Evolving Bankruptcy 
Policy, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 919, 966 (1991) (expressing "distrust of any all-embracing, formal 
model of bankruptcy law and policy"). 
III See Sunstein, supra note 101, at 767 (arguing that when there is insufficient infor-
mation to agree on an overarching theory to deduce the "right" outcome, analogy can help 
produce a rational legal outcome). But see RICHARD A. POSNER, OvERCOMING LAw 518-22 
(1995) (arguing that although "[a]nalogies can be suggestive, even illuminating," their use 
should not exclude attempts to find facts and policies for deciding the case at hand). 
112 See infra note 147 and accompanying text. 
113 See infra notes 359-74 and accompanying text (observing that bankruptcy courts do 
not playa role in debt negotiations in the United States-the parties themselves do the 
negotiating-and that while certain administrative oversight functions are delegated to a 
U.S. trustee, those functions do not appear relevant to sovereign debt restructuring). 
114 My analysis does not necessarily differentiate between short-term and long-term 
debt. Although short-term debt may be a greater problem for States than long-term debt, 
see, e.g., Miller & Zhang, supra note 36, at 8 (arguing that short-term debt is the "Achilles 
heel" of recent countries in crisis), a default on short-term debt almost always permits 
holders oflong-term debt to accelerate their maturities, essentially converting it into short-
term debt. Moreover, covenant breaches in long-term debt may permit acceleration-irre-
spective of the short-term debt. Finally, the claims of holders of long-term and short-term 
debt generally are pari passu. 
115 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm, 77 TE.'X. 
L. REv. 515, 542-43 (1999). A third, lesser, goal is efficient administration of the bank-
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mative goal of bankruptcy reorganization law should be economic effi-
ciency.I16 These contrasting views represent two distinct, and possibly 
irreconcilable, philosophies of corporate reorganization.117 
Traditionalists believe that bankruptcy law plays a unique role 
that "advances substantive goals that are both important and distinc-
tive."118 In contrast, scholars who follow principles of economic effi-
ciency ("free marketers") believe that "a coherent bankruptcy law 
must recognize how it fits into both the rest of the legal system and a 
ruptcy process. See id. at 543. Other scholars, however, have proposed different articula-
tions of bankruptcy's traditional goals. See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an 
Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336, 343-73 (1993). Professor Warren, for example, has 
argued that there are four such goals: to "enhance the value of [the] failing [debtor]," id. 
at 344; to provide for equality of distribution (except for deliberate deviations from equal-
ity); to "constrain externaIization of business losses to parties not deaIingwith the debtor," 
id. at 361; and to create reliance on private monitoring; see also id. at 370 (arguing that 
"[t]he debtor is typically the only party with access to full information about its outstanding 
obligations, future business plans, and income projections," and thus is "usually best able 
to assess how successful the business is likely to be in meeting its continuing obligations, 
and to determine whether bankruptcy provides an opportunity to enhance the value of the 
business"). Professor LoPucki has argued that Chapter 11 addresses four problems: liquid-
ity, so that assets are not disposed of at bargain prices; communication and coordination 
among all interested parties; relief from contract provisions that depress the value of the 
estate; and oversight of shifts in management and ownership that accompany insolvency. 
See Lynn M. LoPucki, Correspondence, Strange VISions in a Strange World: A Reply to Professors 
Bradley and Rosenzweig, 91 MICH. L. REv. 79, 100.06 (1992). Both Warren and LoPucki's 
goals, however, are included within the goals of debtor rehabilitation and equality of distri-
bution. See Schwarcz, supra, at 544 n.168. 
116 See, e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LoGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAw 1-6 
(1986); Barry E. Adler, Finance's Theoretical Divide and the Proper Role of Insolvency Rules, 67 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1107, 1107-11 (1994); Frank H. Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, 
27 J. FIN. ECON. 411 (1990); Robert K Rasmussen, The Ex Ante Effects of Bankruptcy Reform on 
Investment Incentives, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159, 1159-65 (1994). 
117 See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE LJ. 573, 595-99 
(1998). Professor Baird concludes that these two philosophies cannot be reconciled by 
empirical data because the split "is at bottom normative." Id. at 596. Therefore, 
"[b]ridging the gap between [these philosophies] ... 'must ultimately dissolve into a study 
of aesthetics and morals. '" Id. at 599 (quoting RH. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & 
ECON. 1, 43 (1960}); see also Donald R Korobkin, The Role of Normative Theory in Bankruptcy 
Debates, 82 IOWA L. REV. 75, 76 (1996). Professor Korobkin observes that 
[b]ankruptcy scholars are profoundly divided over the proper direction of 
bankruptcy law. One school-the 'free-market critics' -argues that the law 
of corporate reorganization frustrates the voluntary choices of commercial 
actors and therefore should be replaced with various proposals designed to 
maximize allocative efficiency. The other school-the 'traditionaIists'-de-
fends the basic structure of current law, while also attacking free-market 
proposals as ill-conceived and impractical. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). For an approach to bankruptcy law analysis that accommodates 
both of these philosophies, see Schwarcz, supra note 115, at 523 (considering each philoso-
phy separately before advocating a hybrid approach, thereby allowing readers with a pris-
tine philosophical bent to focus on their own perspectives). 
118 Baird, supra note 117, at 576. Legal scholars have described these goals as debtor 
rehabilitation, equality of distribution, and minimizing cost of administration. See, e.g., 
Schwarcz, supra note 115, at 542-43. 
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vibrant market economy."1l9 A dean of American banknIptcy juris-
prudence, Professor Douglas Baird, suggests that the differences be-
tween traditionalists and free marketers arise out of their different 
starting axioms.120 I therefore examine the disputes over these axioms 
in an attempt to understand which axioms might apply to sovereign 
debt restructuring. 
Baird identifies three disputes.121 The first addresses the rehabili-
tative role of banknIptcy law, questioning the role the law should play 
in "keeping a firm intact as a going concern."122 Free marketers con-
tend that banknIptcy law's only role is "determining whether keeping 
the firm intact makes economic sense."123 A firm that has a sound 
business, but that is likely to fail because of the amount of debt in its 
capital structure,124 should be kept intact.125 But a firm with an inher-
ently unsound business should be allowed to fail "to ensure that [its] 
assets are put to their best use."126 Traditionalists, on the other hand, 
argue that banknIptcy law "serves an important purpose in rehabilitat-
ing firms that, but for banknIptcy protection, would fail. Jobs would 
be lost and communities damaged, economically and otherwise, if the 
protections that banknIptcy law provides were unavallable."127 
This dispute over rehabilitation applies, however, only indirectly 
to sovereign debt restructuring. At least in the present world order, 
119 Baird, supra note 117, at 577. Professor Baird uses the term "proceduraIist" in lieu 
of the term "free marketer." ld. The latter term, however, is more commonly used in the 
literature. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 115, at 523. 
120 See Baird, supra note 117, at 575. 
121 See id. at 57~0. 
122 ld. at 577. 
123 ld. Thus, free marketers posit that "[a]ll bankruptcy can do is ensure that fights 
among creditors and other investors of capital do not accelerate a firm's liquidation." ld. at 
578. As part of their focus on economic efficiency, free marketers would oppose rules that 
allow parties "to take actions without bearing their full costs." ld. at 583. 
124 Such a firm is sometimes referred to as a "good company, bad balance sheet." See 
Debtor-in-Possession Loan Rating Criteria, DEBTOR-IN-POSSESSION LoANS SPECIAL REPORT (Fitch 
Investors Service Inc., New York, N.Y.), Mar. 25, 1991, at 4 (stating that Fitch favors rating 
loans to such bankrupt companies). Professor Baird describes such a firm as having finan-
cial but not economic distress. See Baird, supra note 117, at 580-81. 
125 See, e.g., Baird, supra note 117, at 581-82 (observing that "[f]or the [free marketer], 
bankruptcy law exists to solve the problem of financial distress" and further that "[t]he 
mission of bankruptcy is to ensure that firms do not fail simply because they have creditors 
they cannot pay"). 
126 ld. at 582. Professor Baird illustrates this re-use of assets by the example of a restau-
rant in a large city: "If a bad restaurant is replaced by a much better one, employment 
levels in the city may even increase. Keeping a bad restaurant in business postpones the 
inevitable and delays a desirable shift oflabor and capital to somewhere the inputs can be 
put to better use." ld. at 580. 
127 ld. at 577. Professor Baird says that traditionalists "do not distinguish sharply be-
tween economic and financial distress." ld. at 582. Whether or not that is true, the parties 
participating in the bankruptcy case do make such a distinction. For example, lenders are 
reluctant to advance debtor-in-possession financing to bankrupt firms with inherently un-
sound businesses. See Debtor-in-Possession Loan Rating Criteria, supra note 124. 
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sovereign States are not liquidated and their assets then redistributed 
for more valuable economic uses.128 Thus, there is no need to deter-
mine whether keeping the State intact makes economic sense, nor am 
I advocating that such a determination be made. The only goal here is 
rehabilitation, and any sovereign debt restructuring scheme should 
facilitate, or at least not impede, that goal. 
Professor Baird next identifies the debate over whether bank-
ruptcy law should be a closed or an open system.129 Free marketers 
believe that bankruptcy should be an open system, and that conse-
quently its rules should "be crafted with an eye to the way they affect 
the incentives of those who are involved with firms that are not in 
bankruptcy and have no immediate prospect of getting there."130 
Their concern is that "[s]ubstantive rules implemented exclusively in 
bankruptcy are suspect because of the effects they may have on invest-
ment beforehand. . . . Inconsistency may do more harm than good 
.... "131 Traditionalists, on the other hand, believe that bankruptcy is 
a self-contained, closed system, because "the breathing space that 
bankruptcy law gives distressed firms and the other costs it imposes on 
the participants have only a modest effect on how creditors and others 
behave ex ante."132 Thus, traditionalists justify the goal of avoiding 
certain preferential but nonfraudulent prepetition transfers,133 be-
128 
129 
130 
See supra note 8. 
See Baird, supra note 117, at 578. 
[d. 
131 [d. at 578 (footnote omitted); if. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) 
(reasoning that "[u]niform treatment of property interests [inside and outside bank-
ruptcy] serves to reduce uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping, and to prevent a 
[ debtor] from receiving 'a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy'" 
(quoting Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961»). Because of the 
problems associated with differing incentives, free marketers argue that economic forces 
should operate in bankruptcy just as they do outside of bankruptcy. See Baird, supra note 
117, at 578. Therefore, the burden should rest on traditionalists to justify bankruptcy rules 
that are different from nonbankruptcy rules. See id. at 590 & n.50. 
132 Baird, supra note 117, at 578. Baird also observes that "[t]raditiona1ists are able to 
pay ex ante effects so little heed because of the sheer difficulty of identifying these effects 
with any certainty. Hard evidence that these [effects] matter is elusive." [d. at 589. 
133 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994). Section 547(b) states in relevant part: 
[T]he trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in prop-
erty-
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor; 
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such 
transfer was made; 
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent; 
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition ... 
... and 
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would re-
ceive if-
(A) the case were a case under Chapter 7 of this title; 
(B) the transfer had not been made; and 
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cause this avoidance advances the goal of equality of distribution 134 
while, they argue, only modestly affecting prepetition dealings be-
tween the debtor and its creditors. 
This dispute appears more directly relevant to sovereign debt re-
structuring. States, unlike corporations, require less "breathing 
space" because their sovereignty already provides that. Therefore, 
States have less need for special bankruptcy rules. Alternatively, ex 
post modification of creditors' rights by "[s]ubstantive rules imple-
mented exclusively in bankruptcy" can have adverse effects such as 
increasing sovereign borrowing costs.135 Sovereign debt restructuring 
rules should therefore be crafted to minimally affect the incentives of 
those who negotiate with nonbankrupt States. 
Baird's third dispute concerns the implementation of bankruptcy 
law and focuses on the judge's role in the bankruptcy process.136 Free 
marketers "see the judge as a disinterested arbiter"137 in a system in 
which parties make their own decisions, and the judge acts simply "to 
ensure that the biases of the parties are taken into account and all 
relevant information is gathered and disclosed."138 Those biases, for 
example, include the desire of institutional creditors to liquidate the 
firm and the agency costs of the shareholders.139 In contrast, tradi-
tionalists believe that "[i] mplementing the goals of bankruptcy re-
quires investing the judge with broad discretion to ensure that 
bankruptcy's goals are vindicated,"140 a belief that free marketers may 
consider "hopelessly sentimental."141 
This dispute is also relevant to sovereign debt restructuring. 
Granting judicial arbiters broad discretion to bind sovereign States 
may simply be politically unacceptable.142 Accordingly, any frame-
[d. 
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided 
by the provisions of this tide. 
134 See Schwarcz, supra note 115, at 578 ("The dominant expression of equality of dis-
tribution under bankruptcy law is found in Section 547(b) .... "). 
135 Baird, supra note 117, at 578. 
136 See id. at 579. 
137 [d. 
138 [d. 
139 See id. 
140 !d. 
141 [d. at 593 (explaining that free marketers disagree with giving judges broad discre-
tion because the court-administered bankruptcy process would impose even more unneces-
sary costs). Indeed, giving the judge equitable discretion, coupled with the concomitant 
vagueness in bankruptcy rules, "merely gives the parties more cause for litigation and 
hence increases the cost of the reorganization without providing any offsetting benefit." 
[d. at 595. 
142 See Chun, supra note 54, at 2677 n.237 ("A sovereign cannot realistically be ex-
pected to submit to a court-like entity who [sic] can issue binding rulings."). 
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work for sovereign debt restructuring should minimize adjudicatory 
discretion. 143 
Hence, a supranational legal framework for sovereign debt re-
structuring has at least three normative underpinnings: (1) it should 
foster, or at least not impair, the State's ultimate economic rehabilita-
tion; (2) it should minimally affect nonbankruptcy incentives; and (3) 
it should require only minimal adjudicatory discretion in its adminis-
tration.l44 Moreover, any complete framework must take into account 
the following maJor problems associated with sovereign debt restruc-
turing: collective action, moral hazard, and taxation. Thus, a com-
plete framework requires that any international convention for 
sovereign debt restructuring foster the three normative underpin-
nings above as well as attempt to relieve the major problems associ-
ated with sovereign debt restructuring. 
The next section of this Article attempts to use this framework to 
model a system of rules for an international sovereign debt restructur-
ing convention (the "Convention"). I begin by identifying the provi-
sions of the Code that might be relevant to sovereign debt 
restructuring and then analyze those provisions in light of the pro-
posed framework. 
B. Modeling Regulatory Rules for an International Convention 
The only provisions of the Code that might be relevant to sover-
eign debt restructuring are included in Chapter 11, which governs 
corporate reorganization, and in the Code's related chapters: Chapter 
9, which governs adjustment of debts of municipal governments; 
Chapter 3, which governs administration of the bankruptcy case;145 
and Chapter 5, which contains provisions concerning the relationship 
between creditors and the debtor. (At first, I considered focusing on 
Chapter 9 because it contains the Code's only provisions for reorgani-
zation of a political entity; analysis showed, however, that Chapter 9 
adds little to the other Chapters because it primarily incorporates 
their provisions by reference146 and contains few provisions that are 
143 Undeniably, judicial arbiters should not have the power to interfere with the State's 
political or governmental powers, property or revenues, or use or enjoyment of income-
producing property. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 904 (1994) (prohibiting the bankruptcy court 
from interfering with "(1) any of the political or governmental powers of the debtor; (2) 
any of the property or revenues of the debtor; or (3) the debtor's use or enjoyment of any 
income-producing property"). The Convention I propose does not purport to interfere 
with these powers or rights. See infra notes 360-70 and accompanying text. 
144 Adjudicatory power would be based on consent of the State, as expressed through 
an international convention. See infra note 323 and accompanying text. 
145 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303 (1994). 
146 See id. § 901. 
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unique to municipal debtors.147) I analyze these provisions in light of 
the proposed framework.148 
Commencing the Case: Sections 301 and 303 of the Code set forth 
the procedures for initiating a bankruptcy case.149 Under § 301, a 
debtor has the discretion to voluntarily file a bankruptcy petition with-
out being insolvent or meeting other requirements, except those dis-
cussed below. The rationale behind this Section is that a debtor knows 
best when bankruptcy protection is appropriate.150 Courts, however, 
have imposed the requirement that a debtor must file any voluntary 
petition in good faith. 151 Creditors may only file an involuntary bank-
ruptcy case against debtors under § 303 in limited circumstances, such 
as when a debtor is generally not paying its debts when due. This 
requirement prevents creditors from using the threat of bankruptcy to 
harass ordinary debtors.152 This rationale applies even more strongly 
147 Those few provisions are obvious anyway. For example, unless a municipal debtor 
consents or the reorganization plan provides otherwise, a court may not interfere with a 
municipal debtor's political or governmental powers, property or revenues, or use or en-
joyment of income-producing property. See id. § 904. Municipal debtors are the only par-
ties allowed to file a plan for adjustment of their debts. See id. § 941 (varying 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1121's authorization of judicial modification of the debtor's exclusive right to file a 
plan). Further, the court may confirm municipal plans only if any needed regulatory or 
electoral approval either has been obtained or its being obtained is an express condition of 
the plan. See id. § 943 (b) (6). Perhaps the only non-obvious provision provides, apparently 
to protect the common municipal financing technique of issuing tax-exempt, nonrecourse 
industrial revenue bonds, that "special revenues" acquired by a municipal debtor after the 
commencement of its bankruptcy case remain subject (after subtraction of any operating 
expenses needed to generate the special revenues) to pre-bankruptcy liens. See id. § 928. 
That result would be obvious but for the special provision in 11 U.S.C. § 552 cutting off 
many pre-bankruptcy liens of corporate debtors. 
148 Relevant provisions under these Chapters include §§ 301, 303 (providing proce-
dures for instituting a bankruptcy case); §§ 362, 922 (automatically staying actions against 
the debtor); § 364 (c), (d), (e), (f) (obtaining credit); § 365 (assuming or rejecting con-
tracts); § 507 (a)(l) (providing priority to certain creditor claims); §§ 524 (a)(l) & (a)(2), 
727, 1141(d) (discharging unpaid debts); §§ 547, 549 (avoiding preferences); § 1102 (cre-
ating committees to represent creditors); § 1123 (setting forth contents of plan of reorgan-
ization, other than irrelevant subsections (a)(6), (a)(7), (c), and (d»; § 1126 (providing 
for acceptance of plan of reorganization, other than subsection (d) because a State has no 
equity owners); and § 1129 (setting forth confirmation standards for a reorganization 
plan). 
149 Id. §§ 301, 303. 
150 See, e.g., Warren, supra note 115, at 370 (arguing that "[t]he debtor is typically the 
only party with access to full information about its outstanding obligations, future business 
plans, and income projections," and is thus "usually best able to assess how successful the 
business is likely to be in meeting its continuing obligations, and to determine whether 
bankruptcy provides an opportunity to enhance the value of the business"). 
151 See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY t 301.04[1] (15th ed. rev. 1996) [hereinafter Cor.-
UER]. In a municipal bankruptcy, § 921 (c) of the Code explicitly permits a court to dismiss 
a bankruptcy petition not filed in good faith. Cj. McConnell & Picker, supra note 8, at 460-
61 (questioning why the good faith requirement is explicit only for municipal bankruptcy 
filings). 
152 See ROBERT L. JORDAN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 224 (5th ed. 1999). 
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to municipal debtors, and hence the Code flatly prohibits creditors 
from filing involuntary bankruptcy cases against municipalities. I53 
Curiously, however, § l09(c) of the Code allows municipalities to 
file a bankruptcy petition only if they are insolvent on a cash flow 
basis, which means that the municipality is "generally not paying its 
debts as they become due [or is] unable to pay its debts as they be-
come due."154 Unfortunately, a cash flow insolvency standard 
almost certainly makes both creditors and debtor worse off in those 
cases actually culminating in bankruptcy [because it] postpones the 
day of reckoning, while the city continues to pile on new debt at 
ever-increasing interest rates, further burdening the municipal 
budget and guaranteeing that each creditor will receive less value in 
bankruptcy. The problem is not easy to solve, because the insulation 
of municipal assets from seizure and sale makes the idea of balance 
sheet insolvency meaningless, and there is no obvious alternative.I55 
Absent an insolvency requirement for filing, the foregoing ap-
proach for commencing a bankruptcy case appears sensible for sover-
eign debt restructuring. Few States would willingly subject themselves 
to a Convention under which creditors could force the State into in-
voluntary bankruptcy. Moreover, in a case in which creditors might 
want to subject the State to the Convention's rules, the State itself 
would have an equal or greater interest in choosing those rules. IS6 
Identification of the interests of the State and its creditors would 
therefore obviate the need for creditors to act as "monitors and insti-
gators of outside intervention."157 Furthermore, imposing an insol-
vency requirement could be counter-productive-discouraging the 
153 See 11 U.S.C. § 901 (a), which makes § 303 (involuntary bankruptcy) inapplicable 
to municipalities; see also In re Richmond Unified Sch. Dist., 133 B.R. 221, 225 (Bankr. N.D. 
Cal. 1991) (noting that permitting involuntary filings against municipalities "may consti-
tute an invasion of State sovereignty contrary to the Tenth Amendment, and would consti-
tute bad policy" (quoting H.R. REp. No. 95-595, at 321 (1977». 
154 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C) (defining insolvency for a municipality). This test "reflects 
the pre-Code common law view, which treated the municipal debtor as having few physical 
assets available for creditors and instead focused almost exclusively on the ability of the 
debtor to generate revenues through property taxes." McConnell & Picker, supra note 8, at 
456. 
155 McConnell & Picker, supra note 8, at 456-57. 
156 Under the Convention, financiers of the State's debt restructuring would have pri-
ority over claims of other creditors. Also, the Convention would bind all creditors to a plan 
of reorganization that is agreed to by super-majority voting of creditors and, upon such 
agreement, the Convention would discharge debts not provided for in the plan. See infra 
notes 241-54 and accompanying text. A creditor might want the first rule to apply in order 
to provide liquidity to the State. However, if the State needs liquidity and cannot obtain it 
elsewhere, the State would want to file. Likewise, a creditor who is frustrated by unanimity 
requirements in loan agreements might want the second rule to apply in order to achieve 
an overall debt restructuring plan. Similarly, the State would be frustrated by its inability to 
reach such a plan and, therefore, would want that rule to apply. 
157 McConnell & Picker, supra note 8, at 478. 
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Convention's use by States that wish to avoid being branded as insol-
vent. I5S Thus, this protocol should empower only the State itself, and 
not its creditors, to commence the case. Further, provided that the 
State files its case in good faith,159 the filing should be upheld. As 
discussed above, imposing other filing requirements might prevent 
the State from taking advantage of bankruptcy protection when the 
State needs it the most,I60 thereby harming both the State and its 
creditors. 
This approach to commencing a case appears neutral from the 
standpoints of collective action and taxation. Although the approach 
might appear to foster moral hazard to the extent external observers 
cannot reliably ascertain whether a State is acting in good faith when 
commencing a case, the substantive rules of the Convention that I 
later propose are themselves neutral from the standpoint of moral 
hazard. 161 Therefore, commencing a case in order to implement 
those rules would not foster moral hazard. Depending on the applica-
ble bankruptcy rules,I62 the approach could potentially foster eco-
nomic rehabilitation; moreover, except in the presumably rare case in 
which creditors allege a bad faith filing, application of this approach 
eliminates adjudicatory discretion. The only potential disadvantage to 
this approach is that rules that operate only in bankruptcy could ad-
versely affect nonbankruptcy incentives. The magnitude of that effect, 
however, depends on the substantive nature of the rules, and this Arti-
cle proposes bankruptcy rules that do not materially adversely affect 
nonbankruptcy incentives.I63 Thus, the Convention should provide 
that the debtor-State alone may commence the case. 
158 Indeed, the Convention does not differentiate between exogenous and endoge-
nous factors that lead to default (except to the limited extent that irrational exogenous 
factors would justify IMF temporary liquidity to a State that is othexwise economically 
sound, see infra notes 224-34 and accompanying text). Differentiation would be counter-
productive because political leaders that might be blamed for the economic failure would 
be reluctant to have their States use the Convention. 
159 I later discuss, however, the possibility of disputes arising out of a good faith filing 
requirement. See infra text accompanying note 385. 
160 A balance sheet insolvency test for States, as for municipalities, also would be mean-
ingless because "the solvency of a country is not well defined." EICHENGREEN & PORTES, 
supra note 8, at 14. 
161 Each of these rules having been selected in part for their neutrality from that stand-
point, if not their potential to reduce moral hazard. See infra notes 179-80 and accompany-
ing text (arguing that shifting the source of funding to priority funding in private markets 
would reduce moral hazard), p. 999 (arguing that any increase in State moral hazard re-
sulting from discharge would be offset by a decrease in creditor moral hazard), p. 1005 
(arguing that super-majority voting would be neutral from the standpoint of moral 
hazard). 
162 I discuss these rules infra notes 164-312 and accompanying text. 
163 Adoption of explicit bankruptcy rules would even reduce the impact on non-bank-
ruptcy incentives to the extent creditors, ex ante, have greater certainty of ex post bank-
ruptcy events. See EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supra note 8, at 77-78. 
984 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:956 
Stays. Section 362 of the Code in a non-municipal context, and 
§ 922 in a municipal context, provide that commencement of the 
bankruptcy case automatically stays the enforcement of all lawsuits 
and claims against the debtor, as well as any other actions to obtain 
possession of the debtor's property.164 Would a stay also make sense 
in the context of sovereign debt restructuring? After weighing the rel-
evant criteria, I propose that the Convention not include a stay. 
A stay's net effect on moral hazard may be neutral. A stay would 
increase moral hazard to the extent that a State protected by the stay 
will be less careful to avoid default. It would reduce moral hazard, 
however, to the extent that creditors fearing the stay will be more 
careful when extending credit. Thus, in the context of moral hazard, 
these counterbalancing effects may cancel each other out. Further, a 
stay's effect on taxation would also be neutral. 
A stay could provide some modest benefits. It could minimize 
part of the collective action problem by preventing an enforcement 
race among creditors. This problem, however, loses significance in the 
sovereign-debtor context because creditors could only attempt to at-
tach the State's relatively few assets located in other jurisdictions. 165 A 
stay could also theoretically foster economic rehabilitation by permit-
ting the State to suspend payments while attempting to restructure 
its economy. However, the State's unilateral decision to suspend 
payments would produce virtually the same effect as a stay,166 
164 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 922 (1994). 
165 See Hurlock, supra note 16, at 11. Potentially a stay could avert the "rush to grab 
foreign exchange reserves by selling domestic currency or redeeming foreign-currency ob-
ligations issued by the government or domestic firms." ErCHENGREEN & PORTES, supra note 
8, at 16. The Convention may better address this type of grab race, however, by providing 
emergency liquidity to inherently viable States. See infra notes 226-33 and accompanying 
text. The only drawback is that short-term creditors could attempt to grab the liquidity to 
satisfy their maturing debt. See, e.g., Barry Eichengreen, Bailing in the Private Sector: Burden 
Sharing in International Financial Crisis Management, 23 FLETCHER WORLD An. 57, 57 (1999) 
(observing that the Mexican "government used its U.S. and International Mop.etary Fund 
(IMF) loans to retire its short-term, dollar-indexed debt obligations at full value as they 
matured"); E-mail from Richard Portes, supra note 105 ("Providing emergency liquidity 
simply permits short-term creditors to grab it all."). States can reduce that drawback, how-
ever, by limiting their short-term debt exposure. See Timothy A. Canova, Banking and Fi-
nancialRefrmn at the Crossroads of the Neoliberal Contagion, 14AM:. U. INT'L L. REv. 1571, 1622-
29 (1999) (arguing that a grab of emergency liquidity by short-term creditors can be 
avoided by restricting the issuance of short-term debt). States indeed will have less incen-
tive to issue short-term debt once the IMF ceases acting as a lender of last resort. 
166 See, e.g., BARRY EICHENGREEN, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITEC-
TURE 92 (1999) (questioning "whether there really is the need to create [an international 
bankruptcy court] with the ability to impose a standstill, because governments can already 
declare a unilateral moratorium"). Two differences exist between a stay and a State's uni-
lateral decision to suspend payments. First, a State's unilateral decision to suspend pay-
ments would not prevent the State from later making preferential payments to certain 
creditors, whereas a formal stay imposed on the State would prevent the State from doing 
so. Addressing this preference problem separately, however, may be more efficient. See 
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except with respect to the relatively few assets located in other 
jurisdictions.I67 
The costs of a stay, however, would outweigh these benefits. Ap-
plication of a stay will likely generate significant litigation on issues 
including when the stay should apply, when it should end, and what 
exceptions should be allowed.I68 Furthermore, the possibility of a stay 
could adversely affect nonbankruptcy incentives: for example, credi-
tors anticipating the possibility of non-payment during the restructur-
ing period might charge the State higher interest rates. 
Moreover, the policy reasons supporting a stay in the corporate 
bankruptcy context do not apply to sovereign debt restructuring. 
There are 1:\vo rationales for a stay: (1) the belief that stopping credi-
tor collection efforts will "accomplish the orderly and even administra-
tion of the debtor's property and financial affairs,"169 and (2) the 
hope that preventing a grab race among creditors intent on seizing 
assets will promote equality of distribution.17o As discussed above, 
however, a State itself can prevent creditor collection efforts or a grab 
race even without a stay, except with respect to the few assets located 
outside its borders. I71 
Thus, although a stay could provide benefits to a State, that 
State's unilateral decision to suspend payments would have much the 
same effect without incurring the costs of implementing a formal stay. 
As a result, I propose that the Convention not include a stay. 
infra notes 256-67 and accompanying text. Second, States may be hesitant to unilaterally 
suspend payments "for fear that they will jeopardize their future credit market access 
[whereas] a government which received [de jure] approval for its standstill would suffer 
relatively little damage to its reputation." EICHENGREEN &; PORTES, supra note 8, at xvii. If 
States adopt the Convention, however, its implicit assumption that States will unilaterally 
suspend payments should provide a measure of de jure justification therefor. 
167 In this context. some scholars have argued that a stay might help to mitigate dam-
age to the reputation of a State that unilaterally suspends its debt payments. See EICHEN-
GREEN &; PORTES, supra note 8, at 40. Even then, however, " [r]eputation will be preserved 
only if the markets believe that financial distress was not the debtor's 'fault'" -a determina-
tion that is difficult to make. [d. Moreover, if the problem was the debtor's fault. then "a 
standstill might still be justifiable, but then the debtor's reputation should suffer." [d. at 41. 
168 See DAVID G. EpSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 3-1, at 63 (1993). According to Epstein, 
Nickles, and White, 
[d. 
[e]very year there are hundreds of reported proceedings that implicate 
[the stay under] section 362 [of the Code]. More often the difficulty is 
deciding the facts required to apply section 362 rather than construing the 
law that it states .... Also, [the stay] is stretched and pulled by many unu-
sual circumstances and by very many clever lawyers. The tension regularly 
produces novel issues of interpretation and application. 
169 [d. § 3-1, at 59. Professor Baird describes this as a "mechanism to preserve the status 
quo while we sort out the affairs of the debtor." DOUGI_AS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF 
BANKRUPTCY 193 (rev. ed. 1993). 
170 See EpSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 168, § 3-1, at 60-61. 
171 See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text. 
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Reorganization Financing. Section 364 of the Code outlines a pro-
cedure for a debtor to obtain financing for its reorganization from the 
credit and capital markets.172 This financing is commonly referred to 
as debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing. In order to attract DIP fi-
nancing, the Code gives priority to lenders and investors that provide 
such financing.173 Without this priority, financing would likely be un-
available because the information asymmetry between the State and 
potential financiers may be large (a bankrupt company rarely has full 
financial transparency)174 and also because new financiers will not 
want to be "taxed" by the claims of existing creditors. 
The technique of granting priority in order to attract credit and 
capital market financing may be even more compelling in a sovereign 
than a corporate debt restructuring context. In both cases, access to 
funding is critical to economic rehabilitation: a financially troubled 
State will need "fresh working capital during restructuring, so that 
critical governmental functions don't collapse."175 Without a priority, 
however, States could not obtain credit and capital market financing 
for the same reasons such financing would be unavailable in a corpo-
rate context: the information asymmetry between the State and poten-
tial financiers may be large-indeed, there may be even less 
transparency for sovereign debtors, which are not ordinarily subject to 
financial reporting and whose officials might not be held accountable 
under national law for providing misinformation-and new financiers 
will not want to be taxed by existing claimS.176 Financially troubled 
States therefore can presently look only to the IMF as lender of last 
172 The capital markets are "markets where capital funds-debt and equity-are 
traded. Included are private placement sources of debt and equity as well as organized 
markets and exchanges." JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELUOT GoODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FI-
NANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 59 (3d ed. 1991). The term "credit markets" refers to banks, 
finance companies, and other traditional institutional lenders. All of these are private, 
free-market sources of funds. 
173 See 11 U.S.C. § 364(a) (1994). Moreover, if the priority scheme laid out in § 364(a) 
is inadequate to attract sufficient financing, the judge may authorize the granting of collat-
eral. See id. § 364(c), (d). If necessary, the judge may even authorize the obtaining of 
credit secured by a senior lien on property already pledged as collateral if the original 
secured party is adequately protected. See id. §§ 364(d), 361 (defining adequate 
protection). 
174 Section 1125 of the Code attempts to address this problem for bankrupt companies 
by replacing the transparency requirement of the federal securities law with a more prag-
matic standard of "adequate information," which considers the type and detail of informa-
tion that is "reasonably practicable in light of the nature and history of the debtor and the 
condition of the debtor's books and records." Id. § 1125 (a) (1). 
175 Sachs, supra note 1, at 13. 
176 See EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supra note 8, at 15 (arguing that granting a priority 
prevents under-investment and therefore "is desirable if the implications for moral hazard 
can be contained"). 
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resort, creating the taxation and moral hazard problems described 
earlier. 177 
Shifting the source of funding from the IMF to private credit and 
capital markets would help to solve these problems. This shift to pri-
vate markets would eliminate the need for taxpayers to pay for the 
funding and would avoid politicizing the decisions of when and to 
whom the IMF should make funding available.178 The shift would also 
significantly reduce the problem of moral hazard.179 Although the 
size of the credit and capital markets is large enough to accommodate 
the legitimate financing needs of restructuring States,180 a State will 
have no assurance that private credit will be available. The risk of 
potential default will make the State more careful when obtaining 
credit, and arguably more disciplined in its economic planning. Ex-
isting creditors will face that same risk of default and will find their 
claims subordinated even if private credit is available. Therefore, 
those creditors will lend more carefully. 
Furthermore, the shift to private markets could significantly 
shorten a State's time frame for obtaining credit. Private financiers 
can usually arrange credit within weeks, whereas the IMF can some-
times take months to arrange funding. As a result, "IMF loans are 
usually too little, too later;] [b]y the time they arrive, the government 
may have lost control of the situation."181 
In giving priority to the financiers of a sovereign debt restructur-
ing, this framework potentially could adversely affect nonbankruptcy 
177 See supra notes 27-53 and accompanying text (describing the moral hazard and 
taxation problems arising out of IMF funding). Despite these problems, I later argue that 
the IMF nonetheless should remain as a lender of last resort for fundamentally sound 
States that merely have liquidity problems. See infra notes 314-15 and accompanying text. 
178 Professor Sachs additionally argues that this shift would enable States to remain in 
contact with the private markets, thereby enabling them to make a "rapid transition back 
to market borrowing once the panic had subsided," and would impose "a market test on 
each loan ... (albeit a weak test, since the new loans would be supported by the assign-
ment of ... priority over existing debts)." Sachs, supra note 1, at 12. 
179 An interesting inverse relationship exists between priority and moral hazard. 
Although granting priority to new lenders helps to ensure that the debtor-State can obtain 
funding, subordinating prior creditors to that funding increases the likelihood that, if the 
restructuring ultimately is unsuccessful, the prior creditors will suffer losses. 
180 See, e.g., Moises Nairn, Mexico's Larger Story, 99 FOREIGN POL'y 112, 122-23 (1995) 
("Today, the magnitude of the funds controlled by private investment managers makes the 
volumes typically supplied by the IMF and the World Bank almost irrelevant."); Chun, 
supra note 54, at 2671 n.185 (observing that "the amount of money controlled by bond-
holders and mutual fund managers dwarfs a typical loan granted by the IMF"). 
181 Sachs, supra note 1, at 14; seea~oEICHENGREEN, supra note 166, at 61 & nA (arguing 
that "international assistance as currently constituted" cannot protect debtor-States from 
"serious damage," because "[alII too often, IMF-Ied rescues are ineffective in containing a 
panic because the Fund's resources are limited and doled out a drop at a time," and that 
"this is inevitably the case"); Sachs, supra note 1, at 13-14 (comparing the three weeks 
needed for Macy's Department Store to obtain funding in Chapter 11 with the year needed 
for Russia to obtain IMF funding). 
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incentives by effectively subordinating the State's unsecured creditors. 
However, this potential drawback helps to reduce moral hazard, and 
no other adverse effects appear likely.182 Furthermore, the adverse 
effect on nonbankruptcy incentives should not be excessive. From the 
State's standpoint, granting priority should only minimally affect ex 
ante availability and cost of credit; this is because granting priority will 
not lower the State's debt rating,183 and also because an IMF loan al-
ready has de facto priority over other claims.184 My proposal only 
privatizes the source of the funding. From a creditor's standpoint, the 
adverse effect on nonbankruptcy incentives similarly will be minimal, 
at least on a relative basis, because current policy already de facto sub-
ordinates creditor claims to IMF loans. Even on an absolute basis, that 
effect may be minimal. I have argued that, in a corporate lending 
context, permitting debtors to grant priority to attract new money 
credit "tends to create value for unsecured creditors," even though 
those creditors' claims are subordinated to the new money.185 The 
availability of new money credit increases a debtor's liquidity, thereby 
reducing its risk of failure and increasing the expected value of un-
secured claims.186 Likewise, permitting a debtor-State to grant priority 
in order to increase liquidity will reduce the risk of economic fail-
ure187 to that extent.188 
182 Granting a priority appears neutral from the standpoint of collective action. Pri-
vate lenders are less likely to demand collateral in a sovereign context than a corporate 
context because the amount of corporate assets available to pay creditors is fixed, see 11 
U.S.C. § 726(a) (1994), whereas States have indefinite existence and taxing power and are 
therefore more likely to pay creditors in the long term. Because they are less likely to 
demand collateral, less need should exist for adjudicatory discretion in deciding if and 
when to grant it. 
183 See infra note 338 and accompanying text (referring to discussions with Standard & 
Poor's, a leading rating agency). 
184 See EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supra note 8, at 24 (stating that the IMF is regarded as a 
preferred creditor). 
185 Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 
DUKE LJ. 425, 425 (1997). Although this Article deals with secured lending priorities, its 
argument applies equally to any set of lending priorities that arise merely by operation of 
law. 
186 See id. at 430. Without liquidity, the debtor-State cannot order crucial imports, 
purchase equipment, or continue with modernization. The effect can be similar to an 
economic boycott. 
187 Although not dispositive, one can make an empirical argument for the beneficial 
effect of priority lending on a State's unsecured creditors by analogy to the response of 
trade creditors in a corporate context. Suppliers to bankrupt companies often refuse to 
extend trade credit until those companies enter into loan agreements with third parties, 
such as banks or finance companies, to enable them to borrow postpetition. See id. at 470-
71. Those loan agreements are all made on a priority basis under Chapter 11 of the Code. 
See 11 U.S.C. § 364 (1994); Schwarcz, supra note 185, at 471. Once debtors obtain these 
lending commitments, suppliers generally re-extend trade credit to the debtor. See 
Schwarcz, supra note 185, at 471. 
188 The extent to which liquidity will reduce the risk of a State's, as opposed to a corpo-
ration's, economic failure is unclear. Because there is likely to be a difference, I caution 
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Despite the advantages of new investment, new money credit 
could decrease value to unsecured creditors if overinvestment oc-
curS.189 In a corporate lending context, I have argued elsewhere that 
monitoring and inherent disincentives limit the risk of overinvest-
ment.190 Those disincentives would not apply in a sovereign or DIP 
financing context, however, because they arise out of imperfections in 
the corporate bankruptcy process191 that do not affect either of these 
situations.192 In a DIP financing context, therefore, the Code com-
pensates by allowing creditors that are concerned about overinvest-
ment to scrutinize and object to an excessive amount of DIP financing 
and, where appropriate, to monitor its use.193 
Upfortunately, creditors of a State have no similar mechanism to 
protect their rights. Creditors cannot rely on the new lender to pro-
tect their rights because the new lender's priority claim usually en-
sures repayment notwithstanding overinvestment. Therefore, in 
order to prevent overinvestment,194 a sovereign debt restructuring 
scheme might utilize a neutral entity to scrutinize and object to exces-
sive amounts of new priority financing and to monitor its use when 
that one cannot simply apply the numerical analysis used in my earlier work to debtor-
States. See Schwarcz, supra note 185. 
189 In this context, overinvestment means that a debtor invests proceeds of the new 
money credit in a project that is less valuable than the proceeds. Cf. id. at 436 & n.45 
(discussing how debtors can misuse loan proceeds). Scholars sometimes refer to over-
investment as "excessive investment." EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supra note 8, at 11. In con-
trast to overinvestment, underinvestment refers to a situation in which insufficient credit is 
available to permit investment in a valuable project. See id. For example, Professors 
Eichengreen and Portes observe that the United Kingdom receivership code, under which 
the equivalent of DIP lending priority is possible only with the permission of existing credi-
tors, has been criticized for leading to underinvestment. See id. 
190 See Schwarcz, supra note 185, at 436-40 (describing the benefits and limitations of 
monitoring); id. at 455-62 (examining disincentives). A rational corporate debtor is also 
economically motivated to avoid granting priority prematurely because of the costs associ-
ated with doing so. See id. at 446-49. 
191 See id. at 456-58. 
192 Those imperfections are irrelevant because sovereign debt restructuring is not gov-
erned by the Code, see supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text, and DIP financing is gov-
erned by special bankruptcy rules that transcend those imperfections, see Schwarcz, supra 
note 185, at 470-71 & nn.206-07. 
193 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 364{c), 1109{b) (1994) (permitting DIP financing only after notice 
and a hearing, at which creditors have the right to appear and be heard). As a practical 
matter, however, creditors rarely object. See infra note 426 and accompanying text. 
194 Cf. infra Part II.C (discussing further the IMF's potential role in implementing the 
rules proposed in this Article). The recent Russian experience has shown that even the 
IMF cannot absolutely protect against overinvestment or misuse of loan proceeds. If those 
problems occur, however, they should be no worse for loans made under the Convention 
than for loans from the JMF's own funds. 
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appropriate.195 The IMF, which is already "the central coordinating 
institution of sovereign debt,"196 could potentially serve in this role. 
That neutral entity-here, the IMF-could most effectively per-
form the tasks of scrutiny and monitoring by acting under the Con-
vention as an intermediary funding source. The IMF would borrow 
funds from the capital markets on a nonrecourse basis197 and re-Iend 
those funds to the debtor-State.198 Simultaneously, the IMF would as-
sign the debtor-State's priority loan to the capital market lenders as 
collateral. As a credit matter, the lenders thus would be in the same 
position as if they had made the loan directly to the State.199 
Priority Loan Obligation Nonrecourse Borrowing 
Debtor-
State 
Relending Funds ($) 
IMP 
Secured by 
Assignment of 
Priority Loan 
Obligation 
Capital 
Markets 
Lending Funds ($) 
195 For example, a neutral entity could seIVe a monitoring role by imposing condition-
ality on disbursement of the financing. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. My 
proposal enables the IMF to continue to impose conditionality as appropriate. Further-
more, if a State were to misuse loan proceeds or fail to comply with loan terms it could be 
in breach of the loan agreement, and thus in immediate default-a situation the State will 
want to avoid. 
196 Chun, supra note 54, at 2692. 
197 In the present context, the term nonrecourse means that "the obligation to repay 
borrowed money is secured by specific assets of the debtor [in this case, the IMF's right to 
repayment of the loan made to the debtor-State], but the [capital market] creditor does 
not have general recourse to the debtor's [i.e., the IMF's] remaining assets." Schwarcz, 
supra note 185, at 462-63; see also BlACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1057 (6th ed. 1990) (defining 
nonrecourse debt as " [dJebt secured by the property that it is used to purchase"). 
198 I will refer to this process as "nonrecourse back-to-back lending." 
199 The lenders are entitled to proceeds of the collateral-the debtor-State's promise 
to repay the IMF loan on a priority basis-but have no claim against the IMF or its assets. 
Structuring the loan in this manner entails slightly higher, but still relatively de minimis, 
transaction costs. 
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Although the IMF would continue to involve itself in the transac-
tion, this intermediary funding approach would avoid many of the 
moral hazard and taxation problems presently associated with direct 
IMF funding. By acting solely as an intermediary, the IMF would re-
duce its dependence on taxation because loan funding would come 
from the capital markets,200 and not from the IMF's capital subscrip-
tions.201 By borrowing on a nonrecourse basis, the IMF would avoid 
liability for the debtor-State's potential default, thereby reducing 
moral hazard, because capital market lenders could look only to their 
collateral-the debtor-State's assigned loan-for repayment.202 More-
over, the intermediary funding approach would enable the IMF to 
continue its current practice of imposing conditionality on fund-
ing.203 The IMF's role as intermediary would also be neutral from the 
200 Capital market investors have widely accepted the use of nonrecourse financing, 
especially in the context of securitization, which is similar to the type of nonrecourse fi-
nancing I propose. See Schwarcz, supra note 185, at 463 (discussing the "widespread use of 
non-recourse debt" in "project financing, securitization, and other forms of structured fi-
nance"). In a securitization, capital market investors advance funds to a "bankruptcy-re-
mote" intermediary (the special purpose vehicle, or SPV), which simultaneously transfers 
the funds on a nonrecourse basis to a company (the originator). See Steven L. Schwarcz, 
The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN.J.L. Bus. & FIN. 133, 135-36 (1994). As considera-
tion for the funds, the originator assigns its right to receive payments at future dates (re-
ceivables) to the SPY. See id. Because the investors' sole claim is against these receivables, 
they "are concerned only with the cash flows coming due on these receivables, and care 
little about the originator's financial condition." Id. at 136. Nonrecourse financing using 
the IMF-an institution not subject to bankruptcy-as an intermediary is similar to securi-
tization. Capital market investors would advance funds on a nonrecourse basis to the IMF, 
which represents the SPY because it is a bankruptcy-remote intermediary. However, the 
IMF also represents the originator because it originates the receivable-the debtor-State's 
obligation to repay the IMF loan-by simultaneously (1) lending the funds to the debtor-
State to create the receivable, and then (2) assigning the receivable to the investors. Be-
cause their sole claim is against the receivable, the investors should care little about the 
IMF's financial condition. As a credit matter, the real difference between a securitization 
and this type of nonrecourse financing is that investors in the former will typically look to a 
statistically large number of receivables, see id. at 135, whereas investors in the latter would 
look to a single receivable due from the debtor-State. Nonetheless, the priority status of 
that receivable and the fact that its obligor is a sovereign State should compensate for that 
difference. 
201 Cf. IMF FINANCING, supra note 30, at 9 (suggesting that the IMF consider alternative 
sources of funding, such as borrowing from the capital markets). 
202 Thus, a State's ability to obtain capital market financing and the interest rate 
thereon would depend entirely on the credit of the State, not of the IMF. 
203 For a discussion of the IMF's practice of imposing conditionality on its lending, see 
supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. The IMF is well situated to impose conditional-
ity; by agreeing to keep the information confidential, it maintains the most comprehensive 
financial information on its member-States. See International Monetary Fund, Country In-
formation (visited March 26, 2000) <http://www.imf.org/external/country/index.htm>. 
This Article assumes that economic efficiency guides the lMF's imposition of conditional-
ity. The extent to which such conditionality reflects political rather than economic consid-
erations is a topic for further study. 
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standpoint of the other considerations discussed in this Article, and 
might even facilitate the administration of the debt restructuring.204 
The only drawback to the intermediary funding approach is that 
the IMF would bear administrative costs for acting as an intermediary. 
The IMF could pay these costs out of its normal budget or it could 
require States that are parties to the Convention to ratably share these 
costs. Alternatively, the IMF could recoup these costs by charging a 
higher rate on the loan to the State than is payable to the capital mar-
ket lenders,205 although the State would then be paying more interest 
than it would if borrowing directly from the capital markets. Because 
of these administrative costs, the intermediary approach may not be 
quite as efficient as facilitating direct debtor-State access to capital 
market funding. Nonetheless, the continuing involvement of the IMF 
may make the intermediary approach more practical.206 
Whether a State secures funding directly or through an interme-
diary, even unsecured creditors should want the State to have access 
to priority credit once a neutral entity undertakes to monitor and pre-
vent overinvestment.207 Thus, the Convention should authorize a pri-
ority in order to attract financing from the credit and capital markets, 
while also mandating that a neutral entity such as the IMF scrutinize 
and object to an excessive amount of new priority financing, monitor 
its use as appropriate, and potentially act as a nonrecourse funding 
intermediary.208 
Although one might argue that the priority need not be granted 
under supranational law, I believe that it should. First, a State that 
gives priority to particular lenders under its internal law could later 
change that law, creating uncertainty for lenders.209 A supranational 
law, however, could penalize States that grant and then attempt to 
204 See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. 
205 Once the State repays those lenders, the IMF would be entitled to surplus collec-
tions constituting the interest differential. See U.C.C. § 9-608(a) (1) (A) (1998). 
206 Some scholars have queried whether the IMF would need to co-lend in order to 
maintain its incentive to monitor. For example, the IMF might participate in 10% of each 
private market loan. Although co-lending is possible, it is unnecessary because the IMF 
already has a significant reputational stake in sovereign debt restructuring. Furthermore, 
co-lending has costs: it would (1) require financing from taxation, and (2) increase moral 
hazard to the extent that it reduces the amount private market sources must finance. See 
supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. 
207 See supra text accompanying notes 185-206; see also infra Part II.C (discussing imple-
mentation of these constraints). 
208 Section 507 (a) (1) of the Code similarly establishes priority for the actual, necessary 
costs and expenses of preserving the debtor's estate. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a) (1), 503(b) 
(1994). I analogize the ability to grant this priority, which permits a State to obtain goods 
and services on credit, to the ability to grant priority in order to obtain lending credit. See 
supra note 187 and accompanying text. Therefore, the Convention might provide a prior-
ity for the actual and necessary costs and expenses of preserving the State. 
209 Conceivably, a State might even mislead lenders by a bait-and-switch tactic-give 
priority in order to attract financing, and subsequently unilaterally reverse the priority. 
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reverse these priorities.210 Second, giving priority to later creditors 
under a State's internal law might offend nonpriority creditors, 
thereby impairing that State's access to future private credit. In con-
trast, an international convention would gain legitimacy through the 
very process of its adoption as well as the normative reasons advanced 
in support thereof.211 
Granting the priority under supranational law in order to attract 
private funding will reduce moral hazard only if multinational govern-
mental entities such as the IMF will allow the market to work, and 
avoid acting as de facto lenders of last resort. This goal is an in-
dependent good regardless of whether the Convention is ratified. 212 
Eliminating a multinational lender of last resort creates a risk, how-
ever, that even by offering priority, a State might sometimes be unable 
to obtain private market funding at any cost, thereby forcing the State 
into default. On balance, though, allowing default in those circum-
stances may be the best means of reducing moral hazard: "[T]he IMF 
approach is seriously flawed because . . . [it] wrongly assumes that a 
debt default or moratorium is unacceptable. The main problem with 
this [assumption] is that it creates moral hazard .... Prospective loss 
keeps the banks careful, and if that entails default by country debtors, 
so be it."213 Default can therefore have a positive long-term effect.214 
210 For example, the Convention could subject a State that repudiates a priority 
granted under the Convention to a monetary penalty. That State would be subject to an 
additional reputational cost, including impairment of its future ability to borrow. If the 
IMF acts as a supervisory authority under the Convention, it also could take steps to en-
force the priority in the same manner that it presently enforces obligations among its 
member-States, such as by using peer pressure, publicity, denial of membership benefits, 
and potentially even expulsion from membership. See Robert M. Barnett, Exchange Rate 
Arrangements in The International Monetary Fund: The Fund As Lawgiver, Adviser, and Enforcer, 7 
TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. LJ. 77, 89-93 (1993). 
211 Cf. 1 JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REAsON AND THE 
RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIEIY 264 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984) (arguing that the justifi-
cation for legal norms derives from "principles whose validity could in tum be criticized"). 
Moreover, DIP financing and its priorities enjoy widespread legitimacy in the United 
States. See, e.g., SCARBERRY ET AL., supra note 13, at 204-14 (discussing the importance of DIP 
financing to a corporate reorganization). 
212 To the extent IMF funding would not foster moral hazard, that funding should be 
able to co-exist with the private funding discussed in this Article. Cf. infra notes 224-31 and 
accompanying text (proposing that the IMF continue to offer liquidity in limited 
circumstances). 
213 HAL S. SCOTT & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 1243 (5th ed. 1998). 
214 Even the IMF now appears to prefer default to a bailout. See Emerging Market Bonds, 
A Crash Course in Default, EUROMONEY, Oct. 10, 1999, at 47, 50 [hereinafter Emerging Market 
Bonds] (noting that permitting default is a new approach by creditor-States and the IMF). 
Thus, the IMF suggested to Romania that it may have to renegotiate at least 80% of its 
eurobond payments falling due in May and June 1999 in order to obtain IMF funding. See 
From Bail-Out to Bail-In, ECONOMIST, Mar. 27, 1999, at 71, 71. But see Richard Waters, Con-
cern Over Emerging Market Rescue, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Apr. 14, 1999, at 4 (arguing against 
a bail-in policy); Deepak. Gopinath, Whos Afraid 0lthe Big Bad Bail-In?, INSTITUTIONAL INVES-
TOR,June 1, 1999, at 79,79 (arguing that default could jeopardize a State's access to finan-
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A defaulting State and its creditors may attempt to negotiate a restruc-
turing plan,215 but any consensual plan would require concessions on 
both sides. Consequently, the State may have to impose the austerity 
measures that it sought to avoid,216 and its creditors might have to 
lower interest rates, extend maturities, or write-off some of their 
claims. These sacrifices would ultimately eliminate moral hazard; the 
State bears the cost of not having taken a prudent economic course, 
and its creditors bear the cost of having taken unwarranted financial 
risk. 
Nonetheless, commentators have argued that default can "trigger 
failures offoreign banks," and therefore must be avoided.217 Whether 
or not that risk was once realistic, it is no longer a significant con-
cern.218 For example, in the recent Asian financial crisis, the loans 
from U.S. and Japanese banks to Korea represented merely six per-
cent and nine percent of the capital of those banks respectively,219 
which is "small potatoes even assuming an extremely improbable de-
fault on all debt."220 Even in the worst case scenario, when default is 
likely to trigger the failure of smaller, regional banks, the solution 
should not be to subsidize all banks but only those in need: 
Even when one considers the problem as regional, the numbers are 
manageable .... In the worst case, the few foreign banks at serious 
risk could receive targeted support from their own central banks-it 
is foolish to funnel funds through debtor countries so all foreign 
banks get aid [whether or not they need itJ.221 
In the future, the risk of bank failure should diminish even further as 
bank loans are increasingly replaced by bonds.222 The risk of States 
cial markets at a time when it most needs money); Belinda Rabano, Tired After Asia, Russia 
and Brazi~ Lenders Seek Private "Bail-Ins", AsIAN WALL ST. j., Sept. 27, 1999, at 25 (arguing 
that higher costs effectively could shut off access to international capital markets for States 
rated "B" or lower). 
215 Perhaps this plan might implement the super-majority voting provisions of the 
Convention. See infra notes 287-93 and accompanying text. 
216 By the same token, States that are too poor even to attempt to impose austerity 
measures should continue to receive IMF (and World Bank) assistance because it would 
not increase moral hazard. Thus, the Convention should not restrict such programs as the 
World Bank's Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Debt Initiative which gives debt re-
lief to "poor countries with good policy performance," such as Bolivia, Guyana, 
Mozambique, and Uganda. See The HIPC Debt Initiative (visited Jan. 18, 2000) <http:// 
www.worldbank.org/hipc/about/hipcbr/hipcbr.htm> (describing this program). 
217 Scon & WELLONS, supra note 213, at 1244. 
218 See id. 
219 See id. 
220 Id. 
221 !d. 
222 See infra notes 28().81 and accompanying text. 
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defaulting on their bonds does not create the same systemic risk as 
does the risk of bank failures.223 
Nonetheless, the balance between default and moral hazard 
might shift when the debtor-State has been economically and finan-
cially prudent, and the factors causing default are largely exogenous. 
In that case, IMF funding would not foster moral hazard. Whether the 
IMF or other nonmarket entities should provide funding in these cir-
cumstances depends on political considerations,224 as well as the abil-
ity of administrators to assess whether a given default is caused by 
exogenous or endogenous factors.225 
Although this assessment sometimes may be difficult, the IMF or 
some other multilateral entity almost certainly should consider acting 
as a lender of last resort when a default would result from irrational 
exogenous factors, such as a financial panic, even though the State is 
economically sound.226 IMF funding then would not foster moral haz-
ard,227 and the debtor-State should be able to repay the IMF when the 
panic subsides.228 The IMF would merely provide a form of temporary 
"liquidity, "229 and would not assume a credit risk that a State taking 
223 For example, bond market investment is not regulated, whereas bank investment is 
heavily regulated. See, e.g.,JoNATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAw AND 
REGULATION 73-85 (2d ed. 1997) (asserting that banks are among the most regulated indus-
tries and discussing the basic rationales for bank regulation). 
224 For example, political considerations might enter the IMF funding decision if a 
State allocates significant resources to social programs which it cannot objectively afford, 
and consequently faces default. 
225 In comparison, the Code, which presumes that corporate bankruptcies generally 
result from exogenous factors, relies solely on private-market funding and does not con-
template governmental funding. 
226 The Mexican financial crisis of 1994-1995 exemplifies such a liquidity crisis to some 
extent. Because of market volatility, Mexico was unable to roll over its $28 billion in short-
term bonds and-with only $6 billion in foreign reserves-was unable to pay those bonds. 
See Eichengreen, supra note 165, at 57. Some commentators argue that Mexico was 
healthy, but for the market volatility. See Chun, supra note 54, at 2656, 2659, 2664-65 (argu-
ing that the 1994-95 Mexican crisis was one of liquidity rather than solvency, in contrast to 
the Mexican financial crisis in 1982). 
227 Critics nonetheless might argue that even liquidity funding fosters moral hazard. 
See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CRISIs-EFFORTS TO AN-
TICIPATE, AVOID, AND REsOLVE SOVEREIGN CRISES (1997) (GAO/NSIAD/GGD 97-168); 
Nairn, supra note 180, at 128 (arguing that the 1994-95 "Mexican bailout sent the wrong 
signal to governments and investors ... that the potential losses of private investors eventu-
ally could be absorbed by governments and multilateral financial institutions, thus blurring 
the principle that both governments and investors should enter the game of portfolio in-
vestments at their own risk"). 
228 See SCOTT & WELLONS, supra note 213, at 1244 ("If ... the contagion were irrational 
(like a bank run panic), the IMF should lend funds as international lender oflast resort. 
Once the runs stopped, the loans could be repaid."). 
229 The IMF's organizers originally envisioned this role at Bretton Woods in 1944. See 
Chun, supra note 54, at 2696-97. The IMF already may be offering this type of liquidity: 
"[A]s of April [1999], the Fund instituted so-called contingent credit lines. The idea is to 
provide financing for up to a year to countries that have sound economic fundamentals 
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prudent fiscal measures230 would have been able to avoid.231 More-
over, liquidity would help solve the so-called multiple equilibrium 
problem that Sachs identified: the value of assets in financial markets 
often depends on market expectations, which in turn depend on asset 
values.232 For example, if depositors have confidence in the ability of 
a bank to repay their deposits, they will keep their money on deposit, 
and accordingly the bank will repay those deposits in the normal 
course. But depositors who suspect that others are about to withdraw 
their money may panic and attempt to withdraw their money first. 
The result is a bank run, which can create problems even for healthy 
and solvent banks. The same problem could arise in a sovereign 
context: 
Assume a government which can maintain service on its debts as 
long as its creditors renew their maturing obligations. In the ab-
sence of expectations of substantial redemptions, each creditor is 
willing to renew maturing obligations. But if the number of credi-
tors refusing to roll over their maturing obligations reaches a criti-
cal threshold, the government will lack the resources needed to 
redeem them and also maintain service on its other debts. In this 
setting a run on the debt can be self-fulfilling.233 
Liquidity would assure investors that fundamentally healthy States will 
be able to forestall this type of response ab initio. 
Finally, I recognize that leaving the funding decision to the mar-
kets removes that decision from the foreign relations arena, a result 
that mayor may not be politically acceptable. The ultimate balance of 
but are faced with a sudden loss of confidence in the markets." Laura Cohn & David 
Fairlamb, Will the IMP Get a Dose of Its Own Medicine?, Bus. WK., Oct. 4, 1999, at 36, 37. 
230 Thus, a State that incurs short-tenn debt without regard to the source of repayment 
should not be entitled to liquidity if a default on such debt is primarily endogenous-the 
result of imprudent financial management. Cf Canova, supra note 165, at 1622-29 (arguing 
that a grab race for emergency liquidity by short-tenn creditors can be avoided by restrict-
ing the issuance of short-tenn debt). 
231 This distinction between liquidity and credit enhancement is well established in the 
capital markets. For example, a rating agency, such as Standard & Poor's or Moody'S, usu-
ally will not provide a rating on short-tenn debt securities unless creditworthy third parties, 
such as banks, ensure timely payment. See Schwarcz, supra note 200, at 140. Those third 
parties, however, do not expect to suffer losses. They only provide liquidity to creditworthy 
companies, and therefore expect repayment as soon as the company receives the cash that 
it would otherwise use to pay the securities. See id. This minimal risk is reflected in the fee 
that third parties charge for providing liquidity, which is typically much lower than the fee 
that would be charged for credit enhancement. See id. at 141 n.30. 
232 See Sachs, supra note 1, at 3-6. 
233 EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supra note 8, at 16-17. Eichengreen and Portes explain 
that even if all creditors would be better off by rolling over their maturing debt, the suspi-
cion that some creditors will redeem their debt may cause other creditors to seek repay-
ment first. See id. 
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political and economic interests, however, is beyond the scope of this 
Article.234 
Executory Contracts: Section 365 of the Code permits a debtor in 
bankruptcy to assume or reject certain executory contracts and leases, 
subject to court approval.235 This provision fosters debtor rehabilita-
tion by allowing the debtor to choose between continued perform-
ance of beneficial contracts and termination of burdensome 
contracts.236 In the latter case, a debtor that rejects the contract or 
lease is deemed to breach that contract as of the date immediately 
preceding the bankruptcy petition.237 Accordingly, any claim arising 
out of the breach is treated as a prepetition, and therefore nonpri-
ority, claim, which is pari passu with other prepetition claims against 
the debtor.238 The debtor may thus be able to settle that prepetition 
claim for a fraction of its face amount.239 
These rights are likely to be less important in a sovereign than a 
corporate debt restructuring context. The first right-to elect to con-
tinue performance of beneficial contracts-is unnecessary in a sover-
eign context because nothing in the Convention would restrict a 
debtor-State from continuing to perform its contracts. The second 
right-to elect to terminate burdensome contracts-is also unneces-
sary. If a debtor-State wishes to terminate a contract, it may do so 
according to standard international contract law doctrine: any party to 
a contract may breach the contract.240 The breaching party simply 
234 For example, the IMF, an inherently political body, might decide to provide 
loans-were private-market funding unavailable-to an economically imprudent State with 
a large nuclear arsonal in order to preserve the political stability of the State. Also, States 
sometimes might decide to act as lenders of last resort to States that are strategic partners. 
See EICHENGREEN, supra note 166, at 60 (observing that the "rationale for the [1997] South 
Korean [loan] package [led by the United States and the IMF], in security circles at least, 
was that the Korean Peninsula is too important geopolitically for [its] economy to be left 
unaided"). 
235 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1994). A contract is executory where the "obligation of 
both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the 
failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the 
performance of the other." Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 
MINN. L. REv. 439, 460 (1973). 
236 See David S. Kupetz, The Bankruptcy Code Is Part of Every Contract: Minimizing the Im-
pact of Chapter 11 on the Non-Debtor's Bargain, 54 Bus. LAw. 55, 61 (1998). 
237 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(I). 
238 See id. (assuming such other claims are unsecured); see also 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) 
(describing the order of distribution of claims). 
239 "'[I]n the United States, general unsecured creditors can expect to receive nothing 
in bankruptcy 80% of the time and an average of 4-5 cents on the dollar 20% of the time.'" 
Schwarcz, supra note 185, at 455 n.130 (quoting Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The 
Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE LJ. 857, 886 n.107 
(1996». 
240 See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS Art. 7.1.1 
(UNIDROIT 1994) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES] (defining non-performance); OSCAR 
SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAw IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 311 (1991) ("It can now be said 
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assumes liability on a nonpriority basis for damages caused by the 
breach.241 Because the Convention does not give priority to such a 
claim for breach, a debtor-State's liability for contract breach would 
be pari passu with other nonpriority claims against the State. This 
mirrors the result under § 365, whereby a corporate debtor's liability 
for contract breach would be pari passu with other nonpriority claims 
against the corporation. Thus, § 365's primary benefit to a corporate 
debtor-the ability to terminate a burdensome contract without in-
curring a priority claim-is unnecessary in a sovereign context.242 
Discharge: Sections 524, 727, and 1141 of the Code address the 
discharge, or nullification, of a corporation's debts.243 Corporate 
debtors that are liquidated are not discharged from their debts.244 
The rationale for disallowing discharge is that the corporate form is 
artificial, and hence assets should be re-applied to their highest 
uses.245 The Code discharges reorganized corporate debtors, how-
ever, from debts that are not provided for in the plan of reorganiza-
tion.246 The rationale is that "the debtor corporation . . . may 
continue in business after confirmation of the plan. If its debts were 
not discharged, typically it would immediately be in financial dis-
tress. "247 For the same reason, the Code discharges municipal govern-
ments from all debts except those provided for in the plan of 
reorganization.248 
that it is widely agreed that a breach of a contract by a State in itself is not a violation of 
international law. . . . A private PaI"o/ does not obtain remedies on the international law 
level against a State that has breached the contract."); cJ. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON· 
TRAGI'S § 235 (1981) [hereinafter REsrATEMENT] (setting forth the general principle of 
breach upon non·performance of a contract). 
241 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 240, at Art. 7.4.1; see also REsrATEMENT, supra note 240, 
§ 346 (describing the same right to damages). 
242 From the standpoint of the framework I use to test the neutrality of other Code 
sections, the right to assume or reject executory contracts does not affect the outcome of 
the analysis, and therefore is generally neutral. This right could, however, marginally in-
crease the need for judicial discretion. See Orion Pictures Corp. v. Showtime Networks (In 
reOrion Pictures Corp.), 4 F.3d 1095,1099 (2d Cir. 1993) (observing that "[i]n reviewing a 
trustee's or debtor-in-possession's decision to assume an executory contract ... a bank-
ruptcy court sits as an overseer of the wisdom with which the bankruptcy estate's property 
is being managed by the trustee or debtor-in·possession"); Warren, supra note 115, at 352 
(noting the discretion of bankruptcy courts to decide whether to permit a debtor to as-
sume executory contracts). 
243 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 524,727, 1141 (1994). 
244 See id. § 727(a) (1) (prohibiting discharge of non-individual debtors in liquidation). 
245 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Spring 1987, at 173, 182-83. 
246 See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) (discharging only those debts not provided for in the plan 
of reorganization). 
247 SCARBERRY ET AL., supra note 13, at 956. 
248 See 11 U.S.C. § 944(b), (c). Section 901 (a) also makes § 524(a)(l) and (a)(2) ap-
plicable to municipal bankruptcies by reference. There is a technical difference between 
corporate discharge and municipal discharge: The former binds all creditors, whereas the 
latter does not bind creditors that "had neither notice nor actual knowledge of the [bank-
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By analogy, a sovereign debt restructuring plan should discharge 
a reorganizing debtor-State, which does not liquidate, from debts that 
are not provided for in its plan of reorganization. Discharge would be 
neutral from the standpoints of collective action and taxation. 
Although it might increase a State's moral hazard by excusing repay-
ment under certain circumstances, to some extent that increase would 
be offset by the decrease in creditor moral hazard. Discharge, how-
ever, could have a significant effect on a State's economic rehabilita-
tion, to the extent it permits a State that is greatly overburdened with 
debt to attempt to cancel at least a portion of those debts. 
The arguments against discharge appear to be minor. It might 
seem that a process of discharge would require an arbiter to exercise 
discretion,249 but that discretion arises primarily in the case of an indi-
vidual debtor, not a corporate or municipal one.250 Also, it might 
seem that discharge would radically undermine nonbankruptcy incen-
tives of creditors. Those creditors would be protected, however, by the 
requirement of super-majority voting by classes of claims, which I later 
show gives veto power to each voting class, thereby preventing a State 
from devising a plan to harm creditors.251 The same rationale justifies 
corporate discharge: 
Where the plan does not provide for creditors to be paid 100% 
of their claims, creditors may initially think that it is unfair for the 
chapter 11 debtor to receive a discharge of prepetition debts. How-
ever, creditors can require that all of the value of the debtor's assets 
be distributed to them by voting against the plan; if a class of un-
secured claims does not accept the plan, then ... the plan cannot 
be confirmed .... 252 
Indeed, from this perspective, one can view discharge as a corollary of 
the super-majority voting requirement: there would be no need for 
this voting requirement if creditors were paid in full.253 
The Convention therefore should discharge debts not provided 
for in an approved plan.254 This limited discharge would not, how-
ruptcy] case." [d. § 944(c)(2). This Article expresses no view as to which result should 
apply to the discharge of debtor-States. 
249 The questions of whether a debtor should apply its assets to payment of creditor 
claims before discharge and, if so, which assets should be applied, can be controversial. See, 
e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 522, 523 (listing exemptions and exceptions to discharge). 
250 See id. § 522(b) (restricting exemptions to individual debtors); § 523(a) (restricting 
exceptions to discharge to individual debtors). 
251 See infra notes 274-93 and accompanying text (discussing super-majority voting by 
classes of claims). 
252 SCARBERRY ET AL., supra note 13, at 956. 
253 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1126(f) (deeming creditors who are paid in full under a plan 
to have accepted the plan). 
254 Compare Kordana, supra note 4, at 1038-39, 1090, 1096-99 (favoring discharge of 
bankrupt municipalities on the basis that investors are wealthier than average municipal 
citizens and are able to diversify their investments). 
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ever, restrict programs such as the World Bank's RIPC Debt Initiative 
which gives general debt relief to the poorest countries.255 
Avoiding Powers: Sections 547 and 549 of the Code address the 
avoidance of preferential payments and other transfers under certain 
circumstances.256 Should preferential payments by debtor-States also 
be subject to avoidance? To analyze this question, one must distin-
guish between payments made prior to the filing of a bankruptcy peti-
tion (prepetition payments), which are governed by § 547,257 and 
payments made after filing (postpetition payments), which are gov-
erned by § 549.258 
The avoidance of prepetition preferential payments would be neu-
tral from the standpoint of taxation, and would marginally reduce 
creditor moral hazard and collective action by reducing the chance 
that a creditor could keep any prepetition payments. On the other 
hand, avoidance would marginally impair economic rehabilitation by 
reducing the likelihood that a State's suppliers of goods and services 
will extend trade credit.259 It would also increase the need for an arbi-
ter to exercise discretion when deciding which prepetition payments 
to avoid, and it would impair nonbankruptcy incentives by making 
creditors uncertain about whether they can retain prepetition pay-
ments. Moreover, from a policy standpoint, the need to avoid prefer-
ential payments appears less significant in a sovereign than in a 
corporate context. The vast majority of corporate debtors in bank-
ruptcy are liquidated,260 in which case unpaid creditors remain un-
paid. However, sovereign States are not liquidated, and therefore a 
State is more likely to repay its creditors over time.261 The Code im-
255 See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
256 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547, 549. Section 547(b)(4)(A) avoids payments or other transfers 
made by an insolvent debtor filing within 90 days prior to filing for bankruptcy, to the 
extent that such payments enable a creditor to receive more than it would be entitled to in 
the event of the debtor's liquidation. Section 549 is designed to avoid unauthorized pay-
ments or other transfers the debtor made while in bankruptcy. 
257 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A). 
258 See id. § 549 (a)(l). 
259 To address this concern, § 547(c) (2) of the Code provides that preferential pre-
petition payments made to corporate debtors in the ordinary course of business, and on 
ordinary business terms, cannot be avoided. See id. § 547(c) (2). This exception, however, 
is the subject of much litigation. See, e.g., Jeff Bohm & David B. Young, Preferences and 
Fraudulent Transfers: A Lender's Perspective, in 2 18TH .ANNuAL CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 
BANKRUPTCY AND REORGANIZATION 95, 142 (PLI Com. L. & Practice Course Handbook Se-
ries No. A-737, 1996) ("One of the most frequently litigated defenses to a preference ac-
tion is the ordinary course of business exception established by 11 U.S.C. § 547 (c)(2)."). 
Therefore, its adoption would significantly increase the need to exercise adjudicatory 
discretion. 
260 See CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAw OF BANKRUPTCY 2 (1997). 
261 Because the Convention permits discharge, there is no assurance that a State's 
creditors always will be repaid. Any discount on payment will be subject, however, to super-
majority voting of the State's creditors. See infra notes 274-93 and accompanying text. Thus, 
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plicitly recognizes that ultimate repayment of creditors should excuse 
avoidance of an otherwise preferential payment.262 I therefore pro-
pose that the Convention need not avoid prepetition preferential 
payments. 
The avoidance of post petition preferential payments263 would be 
neutral from the standpoints of moral hazard and taxation, and would 
have no effect on nonbankruptcy incentives. It would marginally re-
duce the postpetition collective action problem by discouraging credi-
tors from attempting to gain an advantage over other creditors. To 
that extent, however, such avoidance would marginally impair eco-
nomic rehabilitation by preventing a debtor-State from using a divide-
and-conquer tactic of paying creditors that agree to the State's restruc-
turing conditions. Furthermore, it would increase the need for an 
arbiter to exercise discretion when deciding which postpetition pay-
ments to avoid.264 One can argue that avoiding postpetition preferen-
tial payments enhances economic rehabilitation by preventing a 
debtor-State from using the proceeds of priority new money credit to 
repay existing creditors, thereby preventing the transfer of wealth to 
those creditors at the cost of reducing the debtor-State's liquidity.265 
However, a rational debtor-State would not choose to squander its li-
quidity by repaying existing creditors.266 Finally, from a policy stand-
point, sovereign debtors are more likely than corporate debtors to 
creditors always will be repaid unless they voluntarily agree, voting on a class by class basis, 
to a discount. (The foregoing result assumes that any securities exchanged for debt as part 
of a restructuring plan yield their anticipated value. I also recognize that some States could 
refuse to pay their debts indefinitely, see, e.g., Roben Plehn, Securitization of Third WarldDebt, 
23 INT'L LAw. 161, 180 n.92 (1989) (referring to defaults by successor governments on 
bonds issued by Czarist Russia and pre-revolutionary China), and that unless repayment 
includes accrued interest, creditors would lose the time value of their money. Those cases, 
however, are the "rare exceptions." See supra note 4.) 
262 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (3) (allowing a solvent debtor to make preferential 
payments). 
263 Technically, § 549 permits a debtor to avoid any unauthorized postpetition pay-
ment, whether or not that payment is preferential. See id. § 549. The real goal of that 
section, however, appears to be to avoid preferential or fraudulent postpetition transfers. 
Cf. 5 COLUER, supra note 151, t 549.02, at 549-4 (stating that the section's purpose is to 
allow avoidance of transfers that would deplete the estate). 
264 See, e.g., 5 CoLLIER, supra note 151, t 549.05, at 549-11 (discussing protection of 
postpetition transfers). 
265 See supra notes 182-99 and accompanying text (discussing the imponance of prior-
ity new money credit). 
266 Although a State might repay creditors if doing so would enable the State to meet 
its remaining commitments over the long term and thereby avoid a liquidity crisis-a strat-
egy that itself can enhance the State's economic rehabilitation. Reputational concerns 
about the reaction of the unpaid creditors should similarly influence the State to avoid 
selective repayment of existing creditors. The fact that debtor-States sometimes use the 
proceeds of IMF loans to repay existing creditors does not undermine my argument, be-
cause future application of the Convention would significantly reduce the moral hazard 
that has encouraged such repayment. 
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repay creditors,267 again making avoidance of postpetition preferen-
tial payments less important in a sovereign than a corporate context. I 
therefore conclude that the Convention need not avoid either pre- or 
postpetition preferential payments. 
Creditors' Committees. Section 1102 of the Code authorizes the ap-
pointment of at least one committee of creditors holding unsecured 
claims that are "representative of the different kinds of claims to be 
represented."268 The costs and expenses of committee members are 
paid from the debtor's estate.269 The committees' purpose is to make 
the representation of creditors in the reorganization process economi-
cally feasible, because few creditors would have claims large enough to 
justify the cost of participating on an individual basis.270 
Official creditors' committees do not appear to be necessary in 
sovereign debt restructuring cases. Although the appointment of a 
committee would be neutral from the standpoints of collective action, 
moral hazard, and taxation, and might even foster economic rehabili-
tation by institutionalizing creditor involvement in the reorganization, 
the appointment of committees would affect nonbankruptcy incen-
tives by increasing administration costs, perhaps significantly.271 
Moreover, official committees appear unnecessary because the claims 
against a State are so large that many creditors, or at least a de facto 
committee of creditors chosen consensually, should find it economi-
cally feasible to participate in the restructuring process.272 Thus, the 
Convention does not provide for the formal appointment of 
committees.273 
267 See supra notes 260-61 and accompanying text (observing that the vast majority of 
corporate debtors in bankruptcy are liquidated, in which case unpaid creditors will remain 
unpaid; whereas sovereign States are not liquidated, and therefore creditors are more 
likely to be repaid over time). 
268 11 u.s.c. § 1102 (b) (7) (1994). The committee does not include secured creditors 
because their claims are not at risk to the same extent as are unsecured claims. 
269 See id. § 503(b) (3) (F) (providing for payment of the actual and necessary expenses, 
other than compensation, that committee members incur in the performance of the com-
mittee's duties). 
270 Because of this role, the committee has the right to retain the expertise of attor-
neys, accountants, or other agents such as investment bankers. See id. § 1103(a). These 
experts' costs are paid from the debtor's estate. See id. § 328(a). 
271 The debtor typically pays these costs in priority to creditors' claims. See id. §507(a) 
(granting priority to such claims over general unsecured claims). 
272 Moreover, as a practical matter, "out of pocket expenses of [these creditor] advi-
sory group[s] are frequently paid by the debtor[-State]." Mudge, supra note 2, at 65. An-
other reason not to appoint a formal committee is to avoid the need for adjudicatory 
discretion in administering the appointment of the committee and in monitoring the rea-
sonableness of their ongoing costs and expenses. But see EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supra 
note 8, at 48 (arguing in favor of formal bondholders' representative committees on the 
basis that "a confusing proliferation of committees can spring up in the absence of official 
accreditation"). 
273 Professor Eichengreen argues, however, that "[e]stablishing a standing committee 
of representatives from the various classes of creditors-bondholders, banks and other in-
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Super-Majority Voting: Sections 1123, 1126, and 1129 of the Code 
govern the contents, acceptance, and court confirmation of the 
debtor's reorganization plan.274 Its analogy in the context of present-
day sovereign debt restructuring is the de facto workout plan between 
the State and its creditors. There is, however, a very significant differ-
ence between these approaches. 
Section 1126 (c) provides for a form of super-majority voting that 
supersedes contractual or statutory voting restrictions. For example, 
large loans are often made by groups, or syndicates, of institutional 
lenders such as banks or insurance companies.275 These loan agree-
ments typically require unanimous consent of the lenders in order to 
alter essential lending terms such as the amount of principal, the rate 
of interest, or the maturity schedule.276 Section 1126(c) overcomes 
this collective action problem by providing that an affirmative vote by 
creditors holding "at least two-thirds in amount and more than one-
half in number" of the claims binds all creditors-even those who vote 
negatively or failed to vote.277 In contrast, sovereign debt restructur-
ings that change essential lending terms still require unanimous credi-
tor approval,278 which is difficult and sometimes impossible to 
stitutional investors-that meets regularly with [sovereign] borrowers would open lines of 
communication and help overcome information problems." Eichengreen, supra note 165, 
at 69. His argument recognizes that the "shift from bank to bond finance," which I have 
already observed, will make it harder for creditors to coordinate their efforts. Id. at 70. 
Historically, "standing committees of creditors were precisely the channel for disseminat-
ing information and for organizing negotiations the last time bond financing was impor-
tant, from the late nineteenth century through World War n." Id. I do not reject out of 
hand the potential need for these committees, because future circumstances might warrant 
them. If so, however, there would appear to be greater flexibility in creating standing com-
mittees under national, as opposed to international, law (the Convention being the latter). 
Bondholders of a particular State could be represented by a standing bondholder commit-
tee consisting of representative investors from that State. States such as the United States, 
in which large numbers of institutional investors reside, might want to create a standing 
bondholder committee. Consequently, those States would bear the committee's cost (or 
pass that cost on to the protected investors); States that do not have a significant number 
of institutional investors would bear no cost. In fact, that is precisely what occurred during 
the period of time which Professor Eichengreen describes. See id. at 70.71 (describing the 
Corporation of Foreign Bondholders created under the law of Great Britain in 1868 and 
the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council similarly created under U.S. law). 
274 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123, 1126, 1129. 
275 See Joseph J. Norton, International Syndicated Lending: The Legal Context far Economic 
Deuelcpment in Latin America, NAFfA: L. & Bus. REv. AM., Summer 1996, at 21, 21-24. 
276 See EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supra note 8, at 26. 
277 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c); if. TABB, supra note 260, at 7 (observing that "[o]ne primary 
reason that workouts do not succeed [outside of bankruptcy] is that dissenting creditors 
cannot be bound to the restructuring agreement"). 
278 Although a debtor-State could theoretically attempt to settle with creditors individ-
ually notwithstanding their contractual protection of unanimity, that settlement would not 
bind other creditors, who could then sue the State on the original claims. See infra note 430 
(discussing Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985), in 
which a member of a bank syndicate that refused to join a restructuring agreement that a 
debtor-State proposed, successfully sued for repayment ofits defaulted loan). The right of 
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achieve. Therefore, "efforts [by States] to organize significant conces-
sions by [creditors] have foundered on the notorious free-rider 
problem. "279 
In recent years, this problem has become even more intractable. 
Whereas sovereign debt restructurings in the 1980s and early 1990s 
primarily involved bank debt, the advent of Brady Bonds280 in the 
mid-1990s began a trend in which States obtained financing through 
the public issuance of bonds in the lower-cost capital markets.281 
Bondholders that invest in a particular State tend to have smaller indi-
vidual investments and therefore are more numerous than banks that 
lend to the same State.282 Bondholders are also less likely than banks 
to agree to any accommodations in order to maintain a commercial 
relationship "with the State.283 Moreover, because bonds are actively 
such holdout creditors to recover their original claims could undennine the willingness of 
other creditors to settle their claims. Also, if the State must grant significant concessions to 
induce the settlement, it may only want to settle on an overall basis. 
279 Cohen, supra note 4, at 110; see also Miller & Zhang, supra note 36, at 18-20 (arguing 
that the lack of an orderly procedure for resolving sovereign liquidity crises de facto forces 
the IMF to bailout troubled States). The existence of a few holdouts with relatively small 
claims should not sabotage a sovereign debt restructuring. If other creditors are willing to 
agree to the restructuring, a State could choose to structure a deal around the holdouts 
and simply let them sue. However, that approach is inefficient because it fails to achieve 
an overall settlement. Even more troublesome is that bond issues increasingly dominate a 
State's borrowings, and their unanimity requirement makes them almost impossible to 
restructure. See infra notes 280-86 and accompanying text. 
280 Debtor-States have issued Brady bonds in connection with U.S. plans for sovereign 
debt reduction. These plans encourage banks to exchange their debt claims for lower 
amount (usually below-market interest), 30-year U.S. dollar-denominated bonds ("Brady 
Bonds") issued by the debtor-State. Usually, the bonds are secured by 30-year U.S. Treas-
ury securities that the debtor-State purchases, using the proceeds of IMF loans. Banks 
relying on this collateral typically do not need to write off the principal amount of their 
investments. Because Brady Bonds are tradeable securities, banks often choose to sell them 
to other investors, thereby reducing their sovereign debt exposure. See Macmillan, supra 
note 16, at 313-15. 
281 See Chun, supra note 54, at 2664 ("In the 1990s, large volumes of highly mobile 
international bonds and portfolio investment replaced relatively stable syndicated bank 
loans to developing economies." (footnotes omitted». For example, Business Week re-
ported that during the period from mid-March to mid-April 1999, Mexico and Argentina 
each issued $1 billion in bonds, and Panama issued $500 million; moreover, Brazil may be 
about to issue an additional $1 billion of bonds. See Ian Katz & Geri Smith, The Latins Are 
Back in the Game, Bus. WK., Apr. 26, 1999, at 54,54. See generaUy Power, supra note 25, at 
2702-03 (describing the sovereign debt crisis in Latin America). 
282 See Ruth Rosauer, Emerging Market Debt Instruments Play Siren Songfor Pension Plans, 7 
MINN.J. GLOBAL TRADE 211,225 & n.123 (1998). Bondholders will therefore find it much 
more difficult, if not impossible, to achieve the type of creditor solidarity that banks have 
sometimes achieved. See Robert Gertner & David Scharf stein, A Theory of Workouts and the 
Efficts ojReorganization Law, 46]. FIN. 1189, 1193 (1991) (observing that "bank debt restruc-
turings ••. are substantially easier to organize than public debt [i.e., bond] restructur-
ings"); see also Power, supra note 25, at 2711-12 & n.44 (detailing the number of banks 
involved in the Mexican and Brazilian debt restructurings). 
283 See, e.g., Neela Banerjee, Russian Arrear.s Deepening On Debts to Foreign Group, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 1, 1999, at C3 (discussing the conflict of interest between investors, who in-
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traded, the identity of bondholders constantly changes.284 These 
characteristics of sovereign debt restructuring make the required 
unanimous bondholder consent much more difficult to obtain.285 
Solving the collective action problem is therefore essential to success-
ful sovereign debt restructuring.286 
Super-majority voting can solve this problem. This voting scheme 
is neutral from the standpoints of moral hazard and taxation. To the 
extent that it permits a debtor-State and its creditors to agree more 
rationally on a settlement of claims, this voting technique fosters eco-
nomic rehabilitation. It might also be applied without exercising adju-
dicatory discretion. The only potential drawback under the framework 
is that super-m~ority voting would affect nonbankruptcy incentives by 
modifying voting procedures that require unanimity. However, that 
impact should be economically insignificant if, as under the Code, the 
super-m~ority voting is done by classes of claims that are "substantially 
similar to the other claims ... of such class."287 The presumption is 
that a vote by holders of the requisite super-majority that benefit their 
claims will also benefit holders of substantially similar claims.288 Thus, 
creasingly want to vote to accelerate the debt, and bank lenders, who "want future business 
with Russia" and therefore "may be unwilling to pressure the Government on the [debt] 
arrears"). 
284 See, e.g., Enrique R. Carrasco & Randall Thomas, Encouraging Relational Investment 
and ControUing Portfolio Investment in Developing Countries in the Aftermath of the Mexican Finan-
cial Crisis, 34 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 539, 542 n.3 (1996) (noting the highly volatile 
nature of portfolio investments). 
285 See Trust Indenture Act of 1939, § 316(b) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77ppp(b) (1994» (requiring consent of holder of indenture security for changes in pay-
ment terms); see also MarkJ. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Worlwuts, 97 YALE LJ. 232, 
250-51 (1987) (discussing the prohibition of "modification by majority action of any core 
term of the bond"). Bondholders who are not institutional investors may also be more 
willing than banks (which maintain ongoing institutional relationships with each other) to 
hold out for a special deal. But if. PAUL L. DAVIES, GoWER'S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN CoM-
PANY LAw 733 (6th ed. 1997) (noting that an issuance of bonds under the law of the United 
Kingdom may provide for "the variation of the holder's rights with the consent of a pre-
scribed majority of the holders or an extraordinary resolution of the holders"). Thus, issu-
ing bonds under U.K. law could mitigate the collective action problem. 
286 The collective action problem renders the imposition of comparability on bond-
holders so difficult that it has not even been attempted until recently. The first effort was 
an ultimatum in February 1999 by the Paris Club, requiring Pakistan to renegotiate $620 
million in Eurobonds as part of any agreement to reschedule their $3.3 billion of debt 
owed to creditor States. See Gopinath, supra note 214, at 79. Ultimatums, however, are 
likely to lead to default, as exemplified by Ecuador's September 28, 1999 default on its 
Brady Bonds. See Emerging Market Bonds, supra note 214, at 47. 
287 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (1994); see also id. § 1126(c) (requiring voting by classes of 
claims). 
288 Cf. Barbara J. Houser et al., Plan Issues: Classification, Impairment, Subordination Agree-
ments, in CHAPTER 11 BUSINESS REORGANIZATIONS 317, 328 (ALI-ABA Course of Study Mater-
ials S024, 1998) (noting that the proper classification of claims ensures that voting on the 
plan will result in an equitable distribution among creditors). 
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the Convention might provide for super-majority voting that binds all 
parties.289 
A discussion of how the Convention should divide claims into 
classes for super-majority voting purposes is beyond the scope of this 
Article. I simply note here that courts have interpreted substantial 
similarity under the Code to mean that claims have the same priority 
in bankIuptcy,290 and in a sovereign debt context all unsecured claims 
appear to have the same priority.291 Nonetheless, the Code does not 
require that all claims of the same priority be classed together; it 
merely prohibits claims from being classed together unless they have 
the same priority.292 Thus, pari passu claims could be classed sepa-
rately if there was a rationale for separate classification. If the Con-
vention followed a similar approach, each claim of a State or 
multilateral agency could have its own classification. Additionally, pri-
vate foreign creditors could be classified separately from private do-
mestic creditors. Separate classification may be appropriate because 
domestic creditors have no jurisdiction outside the debtor-State in 
which they can sue, and consequently possess weaker remedies.293 
Cramdown: Finally, § 1129 of the Code sets the standards for con-
firmation of a restructuring plan.294 Most significantly, it implements 
the super-majority voting provisions of § 1126 by requiring acceptance 
of the plan by each class of claims.295 However, § 1129 also recognizes 
that a class of claims might sometimes vote to reject the plan, and 
therefore it provides an exception: the plan may still be confirmed if 
creditors in each class receive value under the plan equal to the 
amount of their claims, or if creditors whose claims are junior in pri-
289 Compare infra notes 347-48 and accompanying text (showing why recent proposals 
to institute super-majority voting by contract, as opposed to international convention, are 
unlikely to be successful). 
290 See, e.g., In re Bloomingdale Partners, 170 B.R 984, 998 (Bankr. N.D. TIL 1994) 
(holding that a tort-based claim is substantially similar to a contract-based claim for pur-
poses of plan classification). 
291 See supra note 15. 
292 See In re Mastercraft Record Plating, Inc., 32 B.R 106, 108 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983), 
rev'd, 39 B.R 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
293 See EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supra note 8, at 16 (discussing the effects ofjurisdic-
tional issues on sovereign debtor cases). 
294 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1994). 
295 See id. § 1129 (a) (8). To some extent, § 1129 (a) (7) (A) protects objecting creditors 
whose class has accepted the plan by super-majority voting. This subsection requires that 
objecting creditors receive value under the plan at least equal to the amount they would 
receive if the debtor were liquidated and its assets distributed according to the absolute 
priority rule. Because sovereign States are not liquidated and have an indeterminate liqui-
dation value, I do not propose that objecting creditors of sovereign debtors receive the 
same protection. Rather, they must rely on the fairness of the classification of their claims. 
See supra notes 287-92 and accompanying text (discussing classifications of claims for voting 
purposes). 
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ority receive nothing.296 This rule is referred to as "cramdown,"297 
and incorporates the principle of absolute priority.298 
Cramdown indirectly provides creditors with an incentive to 
reach agreement on a plan. In order to confirm a cramdown plan, it is 
necessary to value the debtor as a going-concern to ensure that distri-
butions are made in accordance with the absolute priority rule.299 
That valuation, however, entails some cost and delay.300 Conse-
quently, senior creditors may be willing to "give something to (junior 
creditors], enough to gain [their] consent and avoid cramdown."301 
Moreover, " [v] aluation of the company is something that sophisti-
cated participants in any significant chapter 11 reorganization avidly 
desire to avoid. "302 
A cramdown rule may not be appropriate for sovereign debt re-
structuring, however. Although the benefits of such a rule include 
minimizing the collective action problem and fostering economic re-
habilitation,303 the rule is extremely difficult to apply to sovereign 
States.304 Valuation of a corporation as a going-concern is complex, 
but it nonetheless is feasible.305 However, merely conceiving of a 
method by which to value a State is difficult. 306 Any attempted valua-
296 See 11 u.s.c. § 1129(b). 
297 See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Basics of Business Rearganization in Bankruptcy, J. 
CoM. BANK LENDING, Nov. 1985, at 36,43-44 (discussing the cramdown valuation costs that 
parties can avoid by a consensual plan). Professor Baird describes cramdown as the "most 
important" right in the event that consensual agreement cannot be reached. BAIRD, supra 
note 169, at 18. 
298 Absolute priority mandates the distribution of a liquidating debtor's estate in ac-
cordance with the strict priority of claims. See 11 U.S.C. § 726. Confirmation of a plan of 
reorganization under Chapter 11 does not, however, require absolute priority except to 
the extent that it is incorporated through cramdown. Absolute priority is dispensed with 
elsewhere in order to maximize flexibility when negotiating a plan of reorganization. In-
creased flexibility makes it easier to reach a successful plan and thereby preserve the 
debtor's value as a going-concern. See, e.g., In re Atlas Pipeline Corp., 39 F. Supp. 846, 848 
(W.O. La. 1941). 
299 See Schwarcz, supra note 297, at 43; see also Richard F. Broude, Cramdawn and Chap-
ter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Settlement Imperative, 39 Bus. LAw. 441, 452-53 (1984) 
(describing the absolute priority rule and its effect on secured creditors, unsecured credi-
tors, and equity holders). 
300 See Broude, supra note 299, at 453. 
301 Id. at 453. 
302 Id. at 454. 
303 A cramdown rule would provide these benefits by creating an incentive for credi-
tors and the State to reach agreement on a restructuring plan, in order to avoid a valuation 
of the State. The rule would also be neutral from the standpoints of moral hazard, taxa-
tion, and non-bankruptcy incentives. 
304 Cj McConnell & Picker, supra note 8, at 464-65 (concluding that the incorporation 
of cramdown into municipal bankruptcy law is ineffectual). 
305 See generaUy Peter V. Pantaleo & Barry W. Ridings, Reorganization Value, 51 Bus. LAw. 
419 (1996) (discussing the complexities of valuing companies in cramdowns). 
306 Cj EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supra note 8, at 75 ("If it is difficult to establish the net 
worth of a firm, it is almost impossible to do it for a country."); Kordana, supra note 4, at 
1057 (concluding it is problematic "to apply the absolute priority rule to a bankrupt mu-
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tion would therefore be inherently speculative and likely to generate 
costly disputes and protracted litigation. Thus, the threat of invoking 
cramdown would lack credibility, and creditors would have little in-
centive to reach a consensual plan solely to avoid that threat. 
Nonetheless, a potentially simplifying but flawed assumption 
exists that would make valuation of States possible, and would there-
fore make cramdown feasible as well. Unlike a corporation, a State 
has the power to tax its citizens. One therefore might assume that a 
State can always generate sufficient tax income in the future to pay its 
claims over time. That assumption is problematic, however, because 
at some point an increase in the tax rate will cease to raise tax reve-
nues.307 Furthermore, a cramdown rule based on that assumption 
would invite abuse. The State would be able to cram down, over credi-
tor objections, a restructuring plan that pays creditors in full accord-
ing to debt maturities that are extended over tirp.e.308 Such a plan 
would adversely affect prebankruptcy incentives. 
This abuse does not occur in a corporate context because in that 
context cramdown is a double-edged sword: it harms the corpora-
tion's shareholders as well as its creditors.309 Hence, a debtor, whose 
managers often own stock, will be reluctant to impose a cramdown 
plan if there is any realistic chance of a negotiated settlement. This 
reluctance stems from the fact that, in such a settlement, shareholder 
claims always receive some recovery in order to induce shareholders 
to accept the settlement.310 In contrast, a State has no true residual 
claimants who would lose in a cramdown.311 
nicipality"). Even the extent to which the valuation should take into account a State's 
power to tax its citizens is unclear. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 8, at 466-67 (noting 
the uncertainty of whether, and to what extent, a bankrupt municipality's valuation should 
include potential tax revenues). 
307 A tax increase may reduce economic output, and citizens might also be unable or 
unwilling to pay the increase. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 8, at 466 (discussing the 
difficulty of "identifying the tax-maximization point on this implicit 'Laffer Curve'"). 
308 My analysis assumes that debtors will make payments on a present value basis; 
otherwise, the adverse impact on creditors will be even greater. 
309 If the corporate debtor is insolvent, its shareholders, being the most junior claim-
ants, will receive nothing. In contrast, if the corporate debtor is solvent, potential litigation 
costs arising out of a cramdown would reduce the recovery to shareholders before affecting 
any creditors. See Schwarcz, supra note 297, at 242-44. 
310 See id. 
311 Cf McConnell & Picker, supra note 8, at 465 (concluding that, in a municipal bank-
ruptcy context, "[t]he incorporated Chapter 11 cramdown standard is ... of cold comfort 
to unsecured creditors," and asserting that unsecured creditors "would instead look for 
protection to § 943(b)(7), which requires the court to determine that the plan is in the 
'best interests of creditors and is feasible'"). However, even the requirement that objecting 
creditors receive at least as much from the plan as they would receive in a liquidation of 
the debtor under Chapter 7, "could not be the standard under Chapter 9 because munici-
palities are not liquidated in bankruptcy." Id. Some courts have therefore reinterpreted 
the best-interests test to simply require that creditors receive all they could reasonably ex-
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Theoretically, one could minimize the potential for abuse by im-
posing restrictions on cramdown, such as permitting its use only when 
the State is unable to pay its debts and negotiations to consensually 
restructure those debts have failed. This type of condition, however, 
would add considerable uncertainty to the restructuring process and 
would greatly expand the need to exercise adjudicatory discretion. 
One also must place the need for a cramdown provision into perspec-
tive: the Convention's goal is not necessarily to eliminate problems 
inherent in sovereign debt restructuring, but to mitigate those 
problems. From that perspective, even if the absence of a cramdown 
provision means that consensual agreements cannot always be 
reached, the Convention will accomplish its goal if, through super-
majority voting, it makes consensual agreements more feasible. Ac-
cordingly, I propose that the Convention not include a cramdown 
provision unless experience later demonstrates that debtor-States and 
their creditors cannot reach consensual agreements without it.312 
Proposed Convention: In summary, I propose that the Convention 
comprise the following rules: (1) only a State itself, and not its credi-
tors, may commence the restructuring case, and must do so in good 
faith; (2) financiers of the debtor-State's debt restructuring have pri-
ority over claims of other creditors, but the IMF (or another neutral 
multilateral institution) has the right to scrutinize and object to an 
excessive amount of new priority financing, to monitor its use as ap-
propriate in order to prevent overinvestment, and potentially to act as 
a nonrecourse funding intermediary; and (3) all creditors be bound 
to a plan of reorganization that is agreed to by super-majority voting 
by classes of claims, and, upon such agreement, debts not provided 
for in the plan be discharged. The Convention would also require 
each ratifying State to enact the Convention's rules into national 
law.313 
Implicit in these rules lies the assumption that entities such as the 
IMF will allow the market to work and will no longer act as de facto 
lenders of last resort in a way that fosters moral hazard.314 Nonethe-
less, the IMF should act as a lender of last resort in order to provide 
liquidity in cases where the debtor-State is economically and fiscally 
pect under the circumstances. See id. at 465-66. This reinterpretation, "however, leaves 
considerable room for judicial discretion and municipal gamesmanship." [d. at 466. 
312 Cj. infra notes 360-82 and accompanying text (analyzing the potential self-execu-
tion of sovereign debt restructuring negotiations by comparing corporate bankruptcy ne-
gotiations with the effect of bankruptcy law incentives). 
313 See infra Appendix I. 
314 Specifically, the IMF should not discriminate against States that adopt these rules, 
such as by cutting off funding for adopting States but holding out the possibility of funding 
for other States. The IMF may therefore wish to gradually eliminate funding for all States 
in order to motivate States to adopt the rules and adapt to capital market funding. 
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sound, but a default would result from irrational exogenous factors, 
such as a financial panic. This liquidity funding is needed to avoid a 
multiple equilibrium problem, and will not foster moral hazard; fur-
thermore, the debtor-State should be able to repay the IMF once the 
panic subsides.315 
Appendix I proposes a possible model of the Convention. I do 
not claim this model is the only, or even the best, model logically con-
sistent with the framework; it is merely a rational model that exhibits 
this consistency. Another model, for example, could add an auto-
matic stay,316 or could adopt a "menu approach," making the rules 
optional in order to permit the debtor-State to avoid costs.317 The 
primary goal of this Article is to illustrate the importance of imposing 
conceptually sound rules on sovereign debt restructuring to address 
existing problems, not to propose definitive rules. 
Next, I analyze implementation of the Convention and address 
issues raised thereby. 
315 See supra notes 226-33 and accompanying text. 
316 For example, after obseIVing that the "problem with most sovereign debt restruc-
turings ... has been the failure to apply the lessons learned long ago in the private bank-
ruptcy process," another commentator advocates "three principles governing the 
bankruptcy process that should be incorporated into sovereign restructurings": the ability 
to "regain liquidity by borrowing funds" on a priority basis, the automatic stay to give "the 
breathing space needed to return a debtor to economic health," and avoiding control of 
the "rogue creditor" by permitting "a reorganization plan to be adopted by less than a 
unanimous vote of the creditors." Hurlock, supra note 16, at 10. 
317 Professor Rasmussen partIy inspired a menu approach when he first observed, in 
the context of corporate bankruptcy, that a one-size-fits-all rule is inefficient where bank-
ruptcy covers a wide range of companies and creditors. See Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's 
Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REv. 51, 66-67 (1992) (arguing 
that companies should be able to choose from a menu of standardized bankruptcy options 
at the time when they are formed). For example, binding creditors to super-ml!iorityvoting 
could anger dissenting creditors whose rights and remedies, but for the law, could not be 
affected without their consent. A State may want the right to decide whether the benefits 
of this provision outweigh its costs. The rules might even include the option of a stay. See 
id. at 106. A menu approach, however, is likely to generate high transaction costs. See id. at 
100-21 (discussing the menu approach and addressing potential problems with this 
scheme). 
If States follow a menu approach, questions arise with respect to when the State 
should choose its restructuring options, and whether those options may later be changed. 
Presumably, the choice should be made when the State becomes party to the restructuring 
law. See, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum 
Shopping by Insolvent Corporations, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2000) (draft on file with 
the author) (examining a corporation's ability to choose venue for bankruptcy filing). Be-
cause investors would price their financing based on the State's choice of options, the 
options should be fixed thereafter. See id. at 5-6 (arguing that allowing managers to choose 
where to file for bankruptcy when the corporation is financially distressed produces ill-
effects, because by that time the interests of managers have diverged from the interests of 
the firm as a whole; alternatively, selecting the bankruptcy forum "prior to when the firm 
has to seek capital in the financial markets [would give] the managers ... an incentive to 
select the venue which promises to maximize the value of the firm as a whole"). 
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C. Implementing the Convention 
Implementing the Convention in an international law context 
raises at least three issues: (1) how the Convention should bind States 
and their creditors; (2) how the Convention should be administered; 
and (3) how questions arising under the Convention should be 
adjudicated.318 
1. Binding States and Their Creditors to the Convention 
The diminishing distinction between public and private interna-
tional law provides an interesting perspective from which to analyze 
how States and their creditors should be bound by the Convention. 
Traditionally, public international law dealt with rules between States, 
whereas private international law was concerned with private entities 
to the extent their activities crossed national borders.319 Thus, one 
can view the recently proposed United Nations Commission on Inter-
national Trade Law (UNCITRAL) draft Convention on Assignment in 
Receivables Financing as a private international law convention be-
cause it would regulate cross-border receivables financing between cit-
izens of different States.320 
In recent years, however, "[t]he distinctions between public and 
private international law have become increasingly artificial as many 
states and their instrumentalities have entered the marketplace in a 
major way ... and as commerce and foreign policy have become in-
creasingly intertwined."321 A sovereign debt restructuring convention 
based on the Convention would further blur the distinction between 
public and private international law by regulating the relationship be-
tween a debtor-State and its creditors that are private citizens of other 
States.322 
If all of these States ratify the Convention, the debtor-State would 
be directly bound, and its creditors would be bound by their own 
318 The analysis of implementation in this Part is broader than Professor Baird's analy-
sis of the dispute over how bankruptcy law should be implemented. See supra notes 136-43 
and accompanying text. While Baird primarily focuses on the role of the judge in the 
bankruptcy process, this analysis also examines jurisdictional, enforcement, and compli-
ance issues. 
319 See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRll\ffiLE, INTERNATIONAL UW 19 (3d ed. 1999) 
("In contrast to the public international law of rules between states, there has long been 
private international law dealing with the activities of individuals, corporations, and other 
private entities when their activities crossed national borders."). 
320 The convention aims to enhance the viability of cross-border receivables financing 
and to reduce its cost. See Spiro V. Bazinas, An International Legal Regime For Receivables 
Financing: UNCITRAL's Contribution, 8 DUKE J. CoMP. & INr'L L. 315, 358 (1998) (noting 
that the convention's "work may considerably facilitate the flow of lower-cost credit to a 
number of countries where such credit is currently not available"). 
321 CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 319, at 19-20. 
322 Foreign commercial banks and private investors in foreign capital markets primar-
ily fund sovereign lending. 
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States' ratification of the Convention and enactment of its rules into 
national law.323 If the Convention were given retroactive effect, it 
would bind even existing creditors.324 The importance of retroactivity 
extends equally to the sovereign debt restructing context because of 
the need to address the rights of existing creditors: 
It is a familiar canon of statutory construction that statutes normally 
only operate prospectively. Bankruptcy laws, however, test this ca-
non, because by their very nature such laws usually affect the preex-
isting rights of creditors, in order to provide relief to troubled 
debtors with respect to preexisting obligations.325 
Legal retroactivity might appear controversial in an international 
law context,326 but it is permitted so long as it is neither discrimina-
tory nor arbitrary.327 None of the substantive provisions of the Con-
vention-super-majority voting, discharge, and the granting of 
priority to financiers of the State's debt restructuring-would fail 
323 This statement assumes that the States have also incorporated the Convention as 
part of their national law; therefore, the Convention should require each ratifying State to 
enact the legislation necessary to make the Convention's provisions part of the State's na-
tionallaw. Alternatively, Greenwood and Mercer have argued in a different context that 
States might use Article VIII (2) (b) of the existing IMF Articles of Agreement to deny dis-
senting private creditors access to foreign courts. See Christopher Greenwood & Hugh 
Mercer, Considerations of International Law, in CRISIS? WHAT CRISIS? ORDERLY WORKOUTS 
FOR SOVEREIGN DEBTORS, supra note 8, at 103, 111-12. Article VIII(2) (b) provides in part 
that " [e]xchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and which are con-
trary to the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or imposed consist-
ently with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories of any member." Id. at 
111 (typeface altered). According to Greenwood and Mercer's argument, a broad inter-
pretation of the term "exchange contracts" would include loan agreements payable in for-
eign currency; hence, "where a state suspended repayment of its debt in foreign currency 
in order to protect its reserves, and did so with the approval of [super-majority voting by] 
the IMF, a debt contract which required payment to be made in a foreign currency would 
be contrary to that state's exchange control regulations." Id. The authors nonetheless 
conclude that because courts have interpreted Article VIII(2) (b) narrowly, "[i]t seems un-
likely ..• that any reliance can be placed upon the text as it stands." Id. at 112. 
324 Even without retroactivity, however, the Convention would be valuable by binding 
future creditors. 
325 TABB, supra note 260, at 680-81. 
326 On the other hand, alternative sovereign debt restructuring proposals, such as the 
inclusion of collective action clauses in bonds, see infra notes 334-36 and accompanying 
text, raise controversy themselves. See, e.g., Diane Coyle, IAfF Moves to Get Tough on Private 
Creditors in Crisis-Hit Economies, THE INDEP. (London), Oct. 4,1999, at 17 (observing that 
there is little prospect that emerging-market States will permit collective action clauses in 
their bond indentures unless developed States do likewise, because of fear that doing so 
will signal that they are more likely to default); Martin Wolf, How to Avoid the Debtors' Prison, 
FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 20, 1999, at 27 (citing William Rhodes, vice-chairman of Ci-
tigroup, as arguing that imposing these clauses selectively would "reduce private capital 
flows to both public and private sector borrowers in the emerging markets" (internal quo-
tation marks omitted». 
327 See 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw 918-921 (Sir RobertJennings & Sir Arthur 
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) (discussing retroactivity in the context of expropriation and 
confiscation) . 
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under this test. None discriminates based on the nationality of the 
bondholders; the rights of nationals and aliens holding bonds would 
be equally affected. And none is arbitrary because all are essential to a 
debtor-State's ability to restructure its debt. 
Where retroactivity amounts to expropriation, however, the State 
would be liable under international law to compensate the injured 
parties.328 Nonetheless, lawful State actions "may affect foreign inter-
ests considerably without amounting to expropriation."329 For exam-
ple, "foreign assets and their use may be subjected to taxation, trade 
restrictions involving licenses and quotas [may be imposed], or meas-
ures of devaluation" may be taken without constituting expropria-
tion.330 Non-discriminatory "taxation or other fiscal measures" also 
need not be compensated.331 Indeed, in the context of breaching a 
contract, only "the situation in which the state exercises its executive 
or legislative authority to destray the contractual rights as an asset 
comes within the ambit of expropriation."332 The rationale excusing 
compensation appears to be that contracting private parties should be 
aware of the possibility that a State may retroactively alter its contracts 
by changing its national law, and therefore the private party should 
assume the risk of such changes occurring.333 
Imposing super-majority voting (and its corollary, discharge) or 
granting priority to financiers of a State's debt restructuring is un-
likely to destroy the contractual rights of the bonds as an asset. In the 
328 In international law, the terms "expropriation" and "confiscation" have "no precise 
accepted technical meaning. 'Expropriation' conveys in a general sense the deprivation of 
a former property owner of his property, and is equivalent to a 'taking' of property; 'confis-
cation' usually connotes an expropriation without compensation .... " 1d. at 916 n.9. 
329 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 535 (5th ed. 1998). Some 
judicial authorities even hold, under the so-called principle of national treatment, that "an 
alien cannot complain provided he receives the same treatment as nationals." 1d. at 538. 
This principle, however, is not universally followed. See id. 
330 1d. 
331 1d. at 538. 
332 1d. at 550 (emphasis added). 
333 See SCHACHTER, supra note 240, at 311-24; see also F.V. Garcia-Amador, State Responsi-
bility in Case of "Stabilization" Clauses, 2]. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'y 23, 24,33-34 (1993) (argu-
ing that, in general, a State may exercise its sovereign right to alter or repudiate its 
contractual obligations, possibly subject to constitutional limitations, and that such altera-
tion or repudiation does not automatically constitute a breach of international law unless 
such a failure is confiscatory or discriminatory in nature). Stabilization clauses-under 
which a State "undertakes neither to annul the agreement nor to modify its terms, either 
by legislation or by administrative measures" -are sometimes included in contracts to re-
spond to this risk. BROWNLIE, supra note 329, at 554. However, the "legal significance of 
such clauses is inevitably controversial," and it is an "unsettled question" whether they are 
effective under international law. 10,.; see Thomas W. Waelde & George Ndi, Stabilizing 
International Investment Commitments: International Law Vmus Contract Interpretation, 31 TEX. 
INT'L LJ. 215, 236 (1996) (noting that a stabilization clause is "an attempt to bind the state 
to a greater extent than a normal contract would seem to do"). In our case, the question 
only would become relevant as to those bond indentures that contain stabilization clauses. 
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former case, any change in the underlying terms of the bonds, such as 
interest rate, maturity, or even principal amount (discharge being 
merely a change that reduces the principal amount), would be subject 
to super-m£9ority consent of the bondholders.334 The only contractual 
right that would be destroyed is an individual bondholder's right to 
hold out for greater gain by threatening to veto a plan desired by 
other bondholders. But legal systems would not likely protect such an 
unreasonable private expectation.335 In the latter case, I have shown 
that by increasing the availability of new money credit, granting prior-
ity may actually increase the expected value of existing claims notwith-
standing their subordination to the new money.336 Accordingly, 
making the Convention retroactive would not appear to cause 
expropriation. 
The foregoing analysis assumes that the relevant debtor-State and 
each relevant creditor's State have all ratified the Convention. In 
many cases, that may well occur because most States will likely want to 
ratify the Convention. Its rules generally benefit States by providing 
incentives for new credit and by imposing super-majority voting to 
minimize the collective action problem.337 Some States nonetheless 
may fear that the priority and super-majority voting provisions of the 
Convention might decrease the availability of credit or make it more 
expensive. Although the ultimate effect of the Convention on availa-
bility and cost of credit is an empirical determination, that effect 
should be minimal as long as the Convention's ratification does not 
lower the rating of the State's debt securities. Discussions with Stan-
dard & Poor's Ratings Services, a leading rating agency, suggest that 
ratification would not lower these ratings.338 Additionally, one should 
334 Recall that super-majority voting gives the creditors veto power over a plan, and 
hence over discharge. See supra notes 276-86 and accompanying text. 
335 Compare infra note 350 (similarly arguing that retroactively imposing super-majority 
voting would not constitute a "taking" under U.S. constitutional principles). 
336 See supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text. 
337 States have an interest similar to that of corporations residing in countries with 
undeveloped, or inconsistent, commercial laws: these States welcome advances toward clar-
ity and uniformity in the law because they increase the ability to obtain credit. See, e.g., 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Towards a Centralized System for Cross-BorMr Receivables Financing, 20 U. 
PA.J. INT'L ECON. L. 455, 476 (1999) (concluding that a centralized registration system for 
perfection and priority of receivables financing would increase corporate access to lower 
cost credit by increasing clarity and uniformity). 
338 See Telephone Interview with Joanne W. Rose, Senior Managing Director, General 
Counsel and Chair of the Ratings Policy Board, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services Uune 
10, 1999) (notes on file with author). Ms. Rose said that ratification of the Convention 
should not affect Standard & Poor's ratings-which are based on the likelihood of default 
and not on the amount of recovery expected in default-because the Convention does not 
affect the likelihood of default. See id. Thus, a State whose debt was rated investment 
grade would not experience a ratings change as a result of ratifYing the Convention. Ms. 
Rose suggested, however, that a sovereign debt analyst might be tempted to slightly reduce 
the rating of a financially troubled State that had ratified the Convention, such as from "B" 
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not expect ratification of the Convention to increase costs because an 
IMF loan today has de facto priority over other claims,339 and my pro-
posal only privatizes the source of the funding. Nonetheless, some 
States may choose not to ratify the Convention. I therefore consider 
below the Convention's effect on creditors from nonsignatory States. 
In some cases, the Convention would bind creditors from non-
signatory States that make loans to a signatory State. Under interna-
tional law principles, the law of the State-in this case, the Conven-
tion-may well apply to contracts between the State and foreign 
private parties absent a contractually chosen governing law.340 The 
rationale is that a sovereign entity "cannot be presumed to have made 
the substance of its debt and the validity of the obligations accepted by 
it in respect thereof, subject to any other law than its own."341 
Realistically, however, any financing agreement is likely to specify 
its governing law.342 If the law chosen is other than that of the debtor-
State, the Convention alone would not bind creditors from non-
signatory States. For example, New York or United Kingdom law gov-
erns many existing sovereign bond issues.343 A State that wishes to 
ensure the Convention will apply to such creditors therefore might try 
to include a provision in its new financing agreements that contractu-
to "B-." See id. Incidentally, although I previously observed that allowing the markets to 
work creates a risk that a State might default because it will be unable to obtain private 
market funding, that risk of default does not arise from the Convention per se, but rather 
from the IMF's determination to stop lending in a way that fosters moral hazard. That 
determination is an independent good, regardless of whether the Convention is ratified. 
339 The debtor-State will not dare to default on its IMF loan lest it lose access to future 
emergency funding. See, e.g., Appropriations Hearings, supra note 38, at 92. 
340 See Derek W. Bowett, Claims Between States and Private Entities: The Twilight Zone of 
International Law, 35 CATH. U. L. REv. 929,931-32 (1986); Rainer Geiger, The Unilateral 
Change of Economic DeveWjmzent Agreements, 23 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 73, 80 (1974) (referring 
to contracts between a State and foreign private investors and observing that if contracting 
parties do not refer to a particular legal system, "the contract, as a general rule, will be 
governed by the internal law of the host state"). For cases dealing with the role of the host-
State's law in foreign investment contracts, see Serbian and Brazilian Loans Cases, 1929 
P.C.IJ. (ser A) No. 20 at 42, No. 21 at 121, and Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Compo 
(ARAMCO), 27 I.L.R 117, 167 (1958) (Sauser-Hall, Ref.) (explaining the Arbitration Tribu-
nal's decision to adopt "the law of the country with which the contract has the closest 
natural and effective connection" when no governing law is explicidy expressed by the 
contracting parties). But if. Michael E. Dickstein, Revitalizing the International Law Gav-
erning Concession Agreements, 6 INT'L TAX & Bus. L. 54, 65-67 (1988) (asserting that an in-
creasing number of contracts have recendy been found to be "internationalized," i.e., not 
subject to the law of the contracting State). 
341 Serbian & Brazilian Loans Cases, 1929 P.C.IJ. at 42, 121. This principle especially 
applies where the State is bound by its own laws to contract in accordance with a conven-
tion. See Bowett, supra note 340, at 931-32. Thus, a State that wishes to maximize the bind-
ing effect of the Convention on creditors could adopt a law providing that all borrowing 
and other financing arrangements to which the State is a party shall be governed by the 
Convention unless the State specifically provides otherwise. 
342 See Greenwood & Mercer, supra note 323, at 106. 
343 See Macmillan, supra note 8, at 87. 
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ally binds its creditors to the Convention's rules, and also might try to 
amend existing financing agreements similarly.344 A contractual ap-
proach, however, would only bind consenting creditors. Existing 
creditors might refuse to consent, and involuntary creditors, such as 
tort creditors,345 would not have the opportunity to consent.346 
These limitations illustrate why recent proposals to contractually 
solve the collective action problem in bonds by introducing super-ma-
jority voting clauses in new bond issues347 are unlikely to be successful. 
Absent an international convention, all bondholders would be in the posi-
tion of creditors from nonsignatory States; hence, only consenting bond-
holders would be bound. As a result, a State cannot rely on a 
contractual approach to bind holders of the large stock of existing 
long-term bonds, much less future creditors that choose not to con-
sent and involuntary creditors that have no opportunity to consent.348 
In contrast, the Convention would effectively solve the collective ac-
tion problem for all creditors from signatory States. 
Because New York and United Kingdom law governs so many 
bonds, it also might be feasible to bind the nonconsenting bondhold-
ers (even those from non-signatory States) to the Convention's provi-
sions.349 Those jurisdictions could legislatively provide that their 
344 Alternatively, the debtor-8tate could attempt to require its own law to govern fi-
nancing agreements. However, a State's private creditors often insist that their own State's 
law or the law of a major financial center such as the United States or the United Kingdom 
apply. See Greenwood & Mercer, supra note 323, at 106. 
345 States are unlikely, however, to have many involuntary creditors because of sover-
eign immunity. 
346 See Greenwood & Mercer, supra note 323, at 110. A contractual approach nonethe-
less gained support when the Group of Seven ("G-7") Heads of State endorsed a report by 
G-7 Finance Ministers that encourages clauses in international bond issues permitting re-
negotiation after default in order to help solve the colIective action problem. See G-7 Chair-
man's Statement at the Birmingham Summit 'I 8 (visited March 29, 2000) <http://eq-
uity.stern.nyu.edu/-mrpibomo/asia/g7birmingham.html>; see also ErCHENGREEN & 
PORTES, supra note 8, at 30-34 (proposing that sovereign loan agreements include clauses 
explicitly permitting a specified majority of creditors to have the right to alter terms of the 
loan after default). 
347 See, e.g., ErCHENGREEN, supra note 166, at 65-70 (proposing that loan contracts con-
tain clauses requiring a form of super-majority voting); Greenwood & Mercer, supra note 
323, at 110; Peter Cook, The Next Inevitable Debt Crisis, GLOBE & MArL, Oct. 20, 1999, at B2 
(noting that colIective action clauses would allow for an orderly restructuring of a country's 
bond debt, thereby shifting some of the burden from the IMF to the private sector); Wolf, 
supra note 326, at 27 (caIling inclusion of colIective action provisions a "modest step" to-
wards the necessary goal of making it easier to reschedule loans); Diminishing Returns: There 
Are Scores of New Designs for the International "Financial Architecture, "ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 1999, 
at 98 (advocating colIective action clauses for alI sovereign bond contracts, in accordance 
with recommendations by the Council on Foreign Relations). 
348 See Eichengreen, supra note 166, at 70 (cautioning that loan contract clauses are 
"no panacea" because private placements would not be affected, and it would be difficult 
to add these clauses to existing loan contracts). 
349 Some bonds which are governed by U.K. law already may contemplate some form 
of super-majority voting. See E-Mail from Michael Buchanan, Capital Account Issues Divi-
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national law apply the Convention's provisions in cases where a State 
files for relief under the Convention. This legislation, even if retroac-
tive, should be enforceable under the legal systems of both New York 
(including, to the extent applicable, that of the United States)350 and 
the United Kingdom.351 Nonetheless, whether New York (or the 
United States) and the United Kingdom would enact such legislation 
is a political question.352 
sion, PDR, International Monetary Fund, to Steven L. Schwarcz (Oct. 22, 1999) (on file 
with author) {stating that bonds issued under U.K law "(nearly) all have some form of 
m~ority restructuring provision"; see also DAVIES, supra note 285, at 733 (noting that bonds 
issued under U.K law may provide for super-m~ority voting). 
350 If the United States Congress enacts this legislation, it would preempt New York 
law. Such legislation would be enforceable provided the retroactivity is not unconstitu-
tional. In a bankruptcy context, retroactivity should be constitutionaIly permitted; that was 
the effect, for example, when 11 U.S.C. §§ 364,1126, & 1141 were enacted as federal law, 
which granted priority to DIP financing and imposed super-majority voting in both bank-
ruptcy and discharge regardless of unanimity requirements in state law contracts. Cf. East-
ern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 528 (1998) (holding that Congress generally has the 
power to affect contractual obligations between parties); Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 
186 U.S. 181 (1902) (holding that Congress has power under the Bankruptcy Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution to retroactively impair contractual obligations);James Steven Rogers, The 
Impainnent of Secured Creditors'Rights in Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship Between the 
Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARv. L. REv. 973, 987 (1983) (arguing that 
secured creditors know, or should know, of U.S. bankruptcy law's restrictions on their 
rights, and therefore take their rights subject to those restrictions). 
If New York State enacts the supplemental legislation, it would likewise face the retro-
activity chaIlenge. See People v. Martello, 93 N.Y.2d 645, 650-51 (1999); Americorp Securi-
ties, Inc. v. Sager, 656 N.Y.S.2d. 762, 764 (1997). The constitutional issue is somewhat more 
complex because the retroactivity is imposed by a state legislature, not by Congress. None-
theless, retroactive legislation is constitutional so long as it does not constitute a "taking" by 
completely destroying property rights in a way that the affected parties could not have 
anticipated. See Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 528-29 (" [L] egislation might be unconstitu-
tional if it imposes severe retroactive liability on a limited class of parties that could not 
have anticipated the liability .... "); United States v. Riverside Bay Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 
128 n.5 (1985). If the legislation did constitute a taking, it still would be constitutional if 
adequate compensation was paid, but that would impose a cost on the state. See id. at 128. 
The consensual relinquishment of rights-a plan being subject to super-majority voting-
should not constitute complete destruction of the bonds. The only right that is completely 
destroyed is an individual bondholder's right to hold out for greater gain by threatening to 
veto a plan desired by other bondholders; that right, however, is an unreasonable private 
expectation that would not be protected. SeeJan G. Laitos, Legislative Retroactivity, 52 WASH. 
U. J. URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 81, 100 (1997). Further, granting priority to a financier of the 
State's debt restructuring may actua1ly increase the expected value of existing claims, much 
less completely destroy their value. 
351 See, e.g., 44{I) LoRD HAILSHAM OF ST. MARYLEBONE, HALSBURy'S LAws OF ENGLAND 
para. 1283, at 764 (4th ed. reissue 1995) ("[A]n amending enactment may say, expressly or 
by implication, that its effect is retrospective."); RJ. WALKER, THE ENGUSH LEGAL SYSTEM 99 
(6th ed. 1985) ("Parliament is sovereign and statutes may be, and occasionaIly are, ex-
pressed to be retroactive even where this operates to deprive a person of a vested right in 
property.") . 
352 If those jurisdictions were prepared to enact the necessary legislation, they theoreti-
cally could do so without reference to the Convention. That does not, however, eliminate 
the need for the Convention. Different laws may govern some bond issues and other types 
of creditor claims. The Convention also would provide legitimacy and a model for uni-
1018 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:956 
2. Administering the Convention 
Scholars assume that a neutral international institution is neces-
sary to administer a sovereign debt restructuring case, especially the 
debt negotiations. For example, Professor Cohen stated that 
"[e]mulating [a Chapter 11] model at the international level would 
first require the establishment of an institution authorized to play a 
role in [sovereign] debt negotiations comparable to that of the bank-
ruptcy court in the Chapter 11 procedure."353 He suggests that a mul-
tilateral convention create such an institution as a "wholly new and 
independent entity to underscore its impartiality and objectivity."354 
States that apply to this intermediary for relief would "commit them-
selves irrevocably" to the process.355 
Creating international institutions that are costly to maintain or 
that impinge on State sovereignty is politically tenuous, however, and 
recent experience is not promising. Attempts by financial officials of 
the Group of Seven ("G-7") industrial nations356 to create an authority 
to regulate world markets, for example, have achieved little success: 
Deeply divided about the best way to tame violent swings in 
world financial markets, finance ministers from the world's biggest 
industrial nations agreed here [Bonn, Germany] today [February 
20, 1999] to create a modest forum to consult on the problem more 
closely . 
. .. [T]he plan is notable more for what it would not do than 
what it would. 
In a flat rebuttal to demands by German and French political 
leaders for a broad new "architecture" or "highway code" for world 
markets, the plan would merely establish a new forum for top regu-
lators that would meet twice a year to consult and look for ways to 
improve the quality of financial information.357 
fOlm legislation that is explicitly negotiated and agreed upon, eliminating the selectivity 
feared by emerging-market States, see supra note 326 and accompanying text, as well as 
providing an international mechanism of oversight, see generally infra Part II.C.3 (discussing 
adjudication and enforcement under the Convention). 
353 Cohen, supra note 4, at 124. Cohen's rationale is that "[i]f creditors and [sover-
eign] debtors were to be persuaded to accept the risks of an alternative debt relief strategy, 
some impartial intermediary would have to exist that could assure both sides that their 
rights and needs would be respected." Id. at 124-25. 
354 Id. at 125. Cohen also suggests calling the institution the "International Debt Re-
structuring Agency," and proposes that it could be a joint subsidiary of the IMF and the 
World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development). Id. 
355 Id. 
356 The G-7 nations consist of the United States,japan, Germany, France, the United 
Kingdom, Italy, and Canada. See Bob Davis, G-7 Summit Expected to Boost Suppart for Proposals 
to Help Insolvent Nations, WALL ST. j., june 13, 1995, at A4. 
357 Edmund L. Andrews, Major Powers Agree to Take Modest Steps on Economy, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 21, 1999, at 21. 
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Previous attempts by the G-7 nations to create an international bank-
ruptcy agency have also failed.358 
I do not agree, however, with Professor Cohen's proposition that 
an administrative institution would be needed to "playa role in [sover-
eign] debt negotiations."359 Cohen mistakenly believes that the bank-
ruptcy court plays this role in the United States, while in actuality, 
Congress prohibits courts from playing such a role.360 The experi-
ence of corporate debt restructuring confirms that the parties them-
selves-debtors and their creditors-do the negotiating: " [M]ost U.S. 
bankruptcies are self-executing in that creditors, in concert with the 
debtor, collectively determine the economic terms upon which the en-
terprise will be restructured."361 Cohen's confusion may arise from 
the fact that, prior to adoption of the Code in 1978, "the bankruptcy 
judge was required to be intimately involved in all aspects of every 
case. VIrtually all of the administrative, supervisory and clerical func-
tions were the responsibility of the bankruptcy judges . . . ."362 This 
role for ajudge, however, "was in marked contrast to [ajudge's role] 
in most litigation, in which the parties themselves largely manage the 
progress of the case."363 A significant goal of the Code's adoption was 
therefore "to remove the bankruptcy judges from their role in the ad-
ministration of bankruptcy matters, assigning them a purely judicial 
role."364 The Code achieved this objective by limiting bankruptcy 
courts to an adjudicatory function, and by delegating administrative 
358 See generally Chun, supra note 54, at 2677-84 (discussing the proposal to create the 
rnA). 
359 Cohen, supra note 4, at 124. 
360 See, e.g., In re UNR Indus., Inc., 72 B.R 789, 793 (Bankr. N.D. m. 1987). 
Id. 
As the majority explained, 
[i]t has been suggested that this Court should take an active role in the 
[plan] negotiations. This course of action, however, should and will be 
avoided by this Court. With the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, 
Congress sought to remove the administration of bankruptcy cases away 
from bankruptcy judges [to achieve impartiality and] ..• to limit the evils 
that occurred as a result of the bankruptcy judge's administration of busi-
ness reorganization cases. 
361 Hurlock, supra note 16, at 12; see also EpSTEIN ET AL., supra note 168, § 10-2, at 734 
("It would be wrong to think of the Chapter 11 process as primarily a litigated, judged-
ruled adversarial process. Plans proposed and adopted in Chapter 11 almost always have 
been produced by negotiation, not by litigation."). These negotiations take place in the 
shadow of bankruptcy law provisions discussed in this Article. See id. (observing that plan 
"negotiations go on very much in the shadow of bankruptcy law"). This Article later ana-
lyzes the phenomenon by comparing incentives for negotiation under the Code with those 
contemplated by the Convention. See infra notes 371-84 and accompanying text. 
362 1 CoLUER, supra note 151, 'I 6.30[3], at 6-103. 
363 Id. 
364 Id. 'I 6.30, at 6-101. 
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functions to a separate official referred to as a United States trustee . .365 
However, the Code did not mandate United States trustees to perform 
particular administrative activities . .366 Rather, their role is "purely 
oversight ... , [and U.S. trustees should] limit[ ] their activity to fos-
tering creditor involvement and review of disclosure statements and 
fee applications.".367 These activities are not relevant to sovereign debt 
restructuring, where dollar amounts are large enough to stimulate 
creditor involvement, and disclosure statements.368 and fee applica-
tions.369 are irrelevant . .370 Moreover, the presence of a supervisory offi-
cial such as a U.S. trustee may be unappealing to States, making them 
reluctant to ratify the Convention. 
Nonetheless, corporate bankruptcy negotiations in the United 
States may be self-executing because they take place under the shadow 
of bankruptcy law. To what extent, therefore, can we expect sovereign 
debt negotiations to be similarly se1f:.executing? To answer this, this 
Article compares the incentives for negotiation under the Code with 
those contemplated by the Convention. 
From the debtor's standpoint under the Code, 
bankruptcy [law] offers the debtor a number ofpowerfuI aids in its 
negotiations, notably: 
1. the automatic stay and the breathing room it brings [and the 
motivation for creditors to negotiate a plan in order to obtain 
payment], 
2. the possibility of adopting a plan that will legally bind all 
creditors even though a minority reject it, and 
.365 See 28 U.S.C. § 581 (1994). The United States trustee is an executive official, ap-
pointed by and under the supervision of the United States Attorney General, see id. § 582, 
and should not be confused with a trustee in bankruptcy, the generic term given to the 
debtor under the Code . 
.366 The Code did delegate certain appointment responsibilities to the U.S. trustee that 
are not relevant to this discussion. See 1 COLUER, supra note 151, 'I 6.20, at 6-78 to -86; see 
also 28 U.S.C. § 586 (setting forth duties of United States trustees) . 
.367 1 COLUER, supra note 151, i 6.17[1], at 6-69. The Executive Office for United 
States Trustees issued a policy statement on March 8, 1990, concluding, that this protocol 
concerning trustees' responsibilities "is a reasonable and workable approach." See id. at 6-
70 . 
.368 A disclosure statement is a written statement containing information intended to 
enable creditors to make an informed judgment about a proposed plan of reorganization. 
See 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) . 
.369 A fee application is an application by a party for payment or reimbursement from 
the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 503. 
370 The original rationale for widespread judicial involvement under the Code's bank-
ruptcy statute predecessor focused on concern over bankruptcy's "potential for fraud, self-
dealing, and diversion of funds." 1 COLUER, supra note 151, 'I 6.30[3], at 6-103 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). However, this reasoning does not compeljudicial 
supervision because sovereign States appear less likely than private businesses to attempt to 
commit these types of fraud. 
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3. the turnover and avoiding powers, which can greatly aug-
ment the assets available and provide powerful leverage over 
certain creditors.371 
A State already enjoys the first negotiation aid as a result of its sover-
eign statuS.372 The Convention incorporates the second negotiation 
aid through super-majority voting. The third aid, which focuses on a 
bankruptcy trustee's power to avoid preferential payments to creditors 
and fraudulent transfers, is less important in a sovereign than a busi-
ness context.373 Hence, under the Convention, a debtor-State enjoys 
substantially the same "powerful aids in its negotiations"374 as a corpo-
rate debtor enjoys under the Code. 
The Code also provides negotiation aids for creditors. First, credi-
tors can threaten the debtor with liquidation if they do not reach a 
negotiated plan of reorganization.375 This threat, however, is not al-
ways compelling. Under the Code, a judge may convert a reorganiza-
tion case to a liquidation only "for cause," such as "continuing loss [es] 
and ... [the] absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation," 
"inability to effectuate a plan [of reorganization]," or "unreasonable 
delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to the creditors."376 The burden 
of proof for showing "cause" is on the creditor moving for conversion, 
not the debtor.377 Even if the creditor satisfies that burden, the judge 
ultimately has discretion to decide whether or not to convert the case 
to liquidation.378 As a result, the threat of liquidation can be unrealis-
tic, especially for large debtors: 
[Liquidation of a large company] would occur only when the bank-
ruptcy system malfunctioned. The ordinary outcome would be for 
the firm to discharge its ... debt in bankruptcy while continuing its 
operations. Empirical evidence shows this to have been universally 
the case for the past twenty years with regard to large public com-
pany bankruptcies.379 
371 EUZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAw OF DEBTORS AND CREDI-
TORS 476 (3d ed. 1996). 
372 See supra notes 164-71 and accompanying text (discussing the automatic stay). 
373 See supra notes 256-67 and accompanying text (discussing §§ 547 & 549 of the Code 
and avoidance of preferences). 
374 WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 371, at 476. 
375 See id. at 477 (observing that creditors can threaten the debtor with liquidation 
under Chapter 7 of the Code, "even though both [sides] really want to avoid it"). Credi-
tors also can threaten the debtor with a plan of liquidation if the debtor's exclusive period 
to file a plan terminates. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (1994). 
376 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b). 
377 See 7 COLUER, supra note 151, '11112.01 [2][a] , at 1112-7. 
378 See id. 
379 Lynn M. LoPucki, The Irrefutable Logic of Judgment Proofing: A Reply to Professor 
Schwarcz, 52 STAN. L. REv. 55, 63 (1999); see also In re UNR Indus., Inc., 72 B.R 789, 790 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987) (refusing to terminate the debtor's exclusive right to file a plan of 
reorganization, which would permit creditors to file a liquidating plan, even though 
"[n] early five years have passed since the commencement of the UNR bankruptcy case" 
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Thus, large debtors, which are most analogous to debtor-States, al-
most always reach consensual plans in the absence of any realistic liq-
uidation threat, thereby rendering that threat an unnecessary 
negotiation aid. Accordingly, the absence of a creditor's ability to 
threaten liquidation of a debtor-State should not undermine the sel£. 
executing nature of sovereign debt negotiations under the 
Convention. 
The other creditor negotiation aid is a senior creditor's threat to 
cram down a plan of reorganization over a junior creditor's objec-
tion.380 Although cramdown is not presently part of the Convention, 
this Article proposes that the Convention ultimately adopt a 
cramdown procedure if experience demonstrates that it is needed to 
make sovereign debt negotiations self-executing.381 
Therefore, the Convention would effectively provide roughly the 
same incentives for cooperation in sovereign debt negotiations that 
the Code imposes on corporate bankruptcy negotiations. To the ex-
tent that corporate bankruptcy negotiations are self-executing, sover-
eign debt negotiations should similarly be self-executing, and the 
parties would not need an institution generally to administer or super-
vise the process.382 However, the Convention could authorize the IMF 
or another neutral multilateral institution that monitors priority fund-
ing383 to perform any administrative tasks that arise on a case-by-case 
basis.384 
Finally, a sovereign debt restructuring process does not need an 
administrative institution to prevent strategic manipulation: the nar-
rowly circumscribed provisions of the Convention are already 
designed to prevent manipulation. If, for example, an economically 
healthy State files under the Convention in an attempt to take oppor-
tunistic advantage of its creditors, these creditors could challenge the 
filing as lacking good faith.385 Further, even if the creditors lose their 
challenge, the State would have little ability to manipulate the Con-
vention unfairly to their disadvantage. Existing creditors would not be 
harmed if the State borrows on a priority basis because the State, be-
and "progress toward the confirmation of any plan of reorganization in the UNR bank-
ruptcy is not in sight"); EpSTEIN ET AL., supra note 168, § 10-2, at 734-35 (obseIVing that the 
Chapter 11 of a "big business usually leads to some form of reorganization"). 
380 See supra notes 294-304 and accompanying text. 
381 See supra notes 302-14 and accompanying text. 
382 The Convention's self-executing nature is further reinforced, of course, by the fact 
that it incorporates only three substantive provisions of bankruptcy reorganization law. 
383 This institution might also impose conditionality when appropriate. See supra notes 
194-204 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of utilizing the IMF in this role). 
384 Thus, the Convention might designate the IMF as the location where States file 
their debt-restructuring cases. 
385 See supra notes 151-60 and accompanying text (discussing the good faith filing 
requirement) . 
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ing economically healthy, would be able to repay all of its creditors. 
(The State also would have little incentive to borrow on a priority basis 
because granting a priority would be unlikely to reduce borrowing 
costs in those circumstances.386) Also, whether or not economically 
healthy, a State would be unable to manipulate the use of loan pro-
ceeds because priority loans are monitored under the Convention to 
prevent overinvestment.387 And the requirement of super-majority 
voting by classes of claims gives veto power to each voting class, 
thereby preventing a State from devising a plan to harm existing cred-
itors or using the Convention in an attempt to divide and conquer 
legitimate creditor opposition.388 
3. Adjudication and Enforcement 
The remaining implementation issue is enforcement of the Con-
vention and adjudication of issues arising thereunder. Relatively little 
precedent exists for a body to adjudicate disputes between a State and 
its creditors.389 Outside of expropriation cases, few disputes arise be-
tween sovereign States and foreign private parties.390 Established in-
ternational courts, such as the International Court of Justice, are only 
competent to hear cases between States.391 Although a State has the 
right to bring a lawsuit against a foreign State on behalf of one of its 
386 See Schwarcz, supra note 185, at 448 ("[T]he debtor often gains no interest rate 
advantage from a secured [priority] loan if the lender would be comfortable making an 
unsecured [non-priority] loan."). 
387 See supra notes 189-93 and accompanying text (discussing prevention of 
overinvestment) . 
388 See supra notes 274-93 and accompanying text (discussing super-majority voting by 
classes of claims). 
389 See PAUL E. COMEAUX & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, PROTECTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw 36 (1997). As the prior discussion of the increasingly artificial 
distinction between public and private international law hinted, "the traditional view of 
state responsibility is that it runs only to sovereign states. Meaning, in a debtor-creditor 
context, that a debtor-State would have no responsibility to a private creditor, although it 
may have a responsibility to that creditor's State." Id. However, "[a]s a practical matter ... 
this view of international law has been superseded by modem practice." Id. For example, 
the ICSID Convention, see infra notes 397-417 and accompanying text, "firmly establishes 
the capacity of a private individual or a corporation to proceed directly against a State in 
an international forum, thus contributing to the growing recognition of the individual as a 
subject of international law." MON BROCHES, SELECTED EssAYS: WORLD BANK, ICSID, AND 
OTHER SUBJEcrs OF PUBUC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 198 (1995); see also IGNAZ 
SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, COLLECTED EssAYS ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS AND ON INTERNA-
TIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 374 (1998) ("The ICSID Convention attempts to encourage foreign 
investors to invest in developing countries by granting to them, in case of a dispute with 
the host country, a status equal to that enjoyed by that State."). Seidl-Hohenveldern con-
tinues by explaining that the "Convention intends to grant to these foreign investors access 
to international adjudication organs ... on an equal footing with the State concerned." Id. 
390 Sovereign immunity has historically blocked many of these disputes. 
391 See EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supra note 8, at 38-39. 
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nationals, it may be reluctant to do so for political reasons.392 More-
over, although a creditor could attempt to sue a debtor-State directly, 
the litigation would be governed by the debtor-State's local law and 
may therefore be biased in favor of the debtor-State.393 
Possible solutions to this adjudication issue include a United Na-
tions amendment to the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
Such an amendment would permit the court, or a lesser judicial body 
formed under its auspices, to hear disputes between a State and its 
creditors on an ad hoc basis.394 Another option is to create a new 
international arbitral tribunal competent to adjudicate disputes be-
tween States and private creditors.395 
In that regard, a relatively low-cost and unbureaucratic procedure 
presently exists under international law for adjudicating certain dis-
putes between States and nationals of other States that might serve as 
precedent for the new tribunal.396 The International Centre for Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes (ICSID), an autonomous body created 
under the auspices of the World Bank, provides facilities for arbitra-
tion of investment disputes between contracting States and nationals 
of other contracting States.397 A small Secretariat, consisting of a sec-
392 See Susan Choi, Note, Judicial Enforcement of Arbitration Awards Under the ICSID and 
New York Conventions, 28 N.Y.U.j. INT'L L. & POL. 175,177 (1995-1996). 
393 See id.; see also BROCHES, supra note 389, at 259 (arguing that "[i]f international 
disputes [involving non-governmental foreign nationals] are brought before national 
courts the 'foreign' party is likely to consider itself to be at a disadvantage on several 
counts"). 
394 To the extent that clauses contained in a State's financing agreements implement 
the Convention, those clauses could also specify an appropriate tribunal to adjudicate dis-
putes. Each State's internal laws would determine whether those clauses would bind the 
state as a matter of contract. 
395 See BROCHES, supra note 389, at 259 (referring to earlier similar proposals). Eichen-
green and Portes argue that such an international arbitral tribunal could be formed under 
IMF auspices, or could be independent. See EICHENGREEN & PORTES, supra note 8, at 39. 
Regarding an IMF-sponsored tribunal, their argument focuses on an administrative, as op-
posed to adjudicative, role for this tribunal, such as "help[ing] creditors and the debtor to 
negotiate a debt restructuring," specifically by "exanIining the economic and financial situ-
ation of the country, ... [and] consult[ing] with representatives of the creditors .... " Id. 
However, these administrative roles are unnecessary, and the only required role is the adju-
dication of disputes. 
396 As Comeaux and Kinsella explain, "[t]he cost of an ICSID arbitration [discussed 
below] is relatively low compared to other private arbitration institutes such as the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce." COMEAUX & KINSELlA, supra note 389, at 205; if. EICHEN-
GREEN & PORTES, supra note 8, at 42-43 (suggesting that an independent agency along the 
lines of ICSID could be created). 
397 See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Na-
tionals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, art. 1, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 
U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. The ICSID Convention is sometimes 
known as the Washington Convention, although this Article does not use that term. Many 
authors have focused on the general background of ICSID and ICSID arbitration. See 
BROCHES, supra note 389, at 161-356; COMEAUX & KINSELlA, supra note 389, at 199-212; 
SEIDL-HoHENVELDERN, supra note 389, at 371-82; Choi, supra note 392, at 177; Antonio R 
Parra, The IWle of ICSID in the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 16 ICSID NEWS, Wmter 1999, 
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retary-general, one or more deputy secretary-generals, and an admin-
istrative staff,398 manages ICSID and maintains a panel of 
multinational arbitrators399 with recognized competence in the fields 
oflaw, commerce, industry, and finance.400 ICSID covers expenses by 
charging for use of its arbitration facilities.401 
The arbitration itself is straightforward. The arbitral tribunal con-
sists of one or more arbitrators upon whom the parties agree,402 or 
absent agreement, three arbitrators.403 A Secretariat staff lawyer 
serves as the tribunal's secretary and acts as a channel of communica-
tion between the parties.404 The parties agree to rules of law, accord-
ing to which the tribunal decides disputes by majorityvote.405 Absent 
party agreement on such rules, the tribunal relies on the law of the 
contracting State and any applicable rules of international law. 406 De-
cisions are binding on the parties and not subject to appeal.407 
The ICSID arbitration procedure is also well established. At least 
147 States are signatories to the ICSID Convention, and 131 of those 
States (including the United States) have ratified it.408 Provisions for 
ICSID arbitration are "commonly found" in investment contracts be-
tween States and nationals of other States.409 States have consented in 
advance to submit their investment disputes to ICSID arbitration in 
approximately "twenty investment laws and in over 900 bilateral invest-
at 5; International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, About ICSID (visited 
Aug. 17, 1999) <http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/about/main.htm> [hereinafter AboutIG-
SID]. See generally MOSHE HIRSCH, THE ARBITRATION MECHANISM OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CENTRE FOR THE SETrLEMENT OF INVESTME.NT DISPUTES (1993) (describing the International 
Centre for the Settlement ofInvestment Disputes, its jurisdiction, and the applicable law). 
398 See ICSID Convention, supra note 397, at arts. 9-11. An Administrative Council 
composed of one representative of each contracting State elects the secretary-general and 
any deputy secretary-generals. See id. at arts. 4, 10. 
399 ICSID also maintains a Panel of Conciliators. See id. at art. 12. 
400 See id. at arts. 13-14. Panel members are also representative of the principal legal 
systems of the world. See id. at art. 14. 
401 See id. at art. 61. Member States, however, are ultimately liable for shortfalls. See id. 
at art. 17. The Secretariat's ordinary operating expenses are financed by the World Bank's 
budget. See About ICSID, supra note 397. 
402 See ICSID Convention, supra note 397, at art. 37. The parties could even choose a 
single arbitrator. See id. at art. 37, para. 2. 
403 See id. 
404 See Parra, supra note 397, at 2. 
405 See ICSID Convention, supra note 397, at art. 48, para. 1. 
406 See id. at art. 42, para. 1. The tribunal is also authorized to require the parties to 
produce documents or other evidence and to conduct appropriate inquiries. See id. at art. 
43. 
407 See id. at art. 53. Contracting States are required to "recognize an award rendered 
pursuant to this [ICSID] Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations 
imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that 
State." Id. at art. 54. 
408 See ICSID List of Contracting States (as of Oct. 1, 1999) (visited March 1, 2000) <http:/ 
/www.worldbank.org/icsid/constate/c-states-en.htm>. 
409 About ICSID, supra note 397, at para. 7. 
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ment treaties."410 Furthermore, ICSID arbitration is "one of the main 
mechanisms for the settlement of investment disputes under four re-
cent multilateral trade and investment treaties,"411 including the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).412 As of February 
2000, ICSID has concluded thirty-eight cases,413 and thirty cases are 
pending.414 
Thus, ICSID is a useful model to the extent that a tribunal is 
needed to resolve sovereign debt restructuring disputes.415 A tribunal 
based on that model could maintain a panel of neutral arbitrators hav-
ing recognized competence in bankruptcy and insolvency law. Rules 
could require panel members to have different nationalities, and to 
be representative of the principal bankruptcy and insolvency law sys-
tems of the world. Similarly, the tribunal's expenses could be met by 
charging a fee for the arbitration.416 Finally, the arbitration could fol-
low ICSID's simple format: it would involve a panel of up to three 
arbitrators who decide disputes by mcyority vote in accordance with 
applicable rules of international law, and who render decisions that 
are binding and not subject to appeal.417 
410 ld. 
411 ld. 
412 See id. 
413 See ICSID List of Concluded Cases (visited March 1, 2000) <http://www.world 
bank.org/icsid/ cases/ conclude.htm>. 
414 See ICSID List of Pending Cases (visited March I, 2000) <http://www.worldbank.org/ 
icsid/cases/pending.htm>. This relatively small number of concluded and pending cases 
actually belies ICSID's importance. As Seidl-Hohenveldern asserts: 
[i) t would, however, be a fallacy to conclude from the small number of 
awards that the ICSID Convention is of only small practical importance. 
The link between ICSID and the World Bank appears to be so formidable 
that host States endeavour to avoid as much as possible disputes with a for-
eign investor that may cause the host State adverse publicity in circles which 
may have to decide on that State's creditworthiness. The ICSID arbitration 
clauses thus are just as effective by their mere existence as the British Navy 
was during the 19th century. The 'fleet in being' kept the peace on the 
oceans without having to fight any spectacular battles. 
SEIDL-HoHENVELDERN, supra note 389, at 373; see also HIRSCH, supra note 397, at 156 ("The 
small number of disputes that have been addressed to [ICSID] does not necessarily attest 
to its failure, for the aim of the founders of the Centre was not to increase activity in the 
area of dispute settlement, but rather, to promote international investments."). 
415 Surveys of the world's important arbitral institutions, for example, conclude that 
ICSID arbitration is preferable to other forms of arbitration. See HIRSCH, supra note 397, at 
155-56 (reviewing those surveys). Clearly, ICSID "is a truly international institution, which 
is independent of municipal systeIUS of law. The major international commercial arbitra-
tion institutions (the International Chamber of Commerce and the American Arbitration 
Association) are subject to the laws of the states in which they operate, and the enforce-
ment is sought." ld. at 158; if. BEl'!JAMIN J. CoHEN, DEVELOPING-CoUNTRY DEBT: A MIDDLE 
WAY 31-32 (Essays in Int'l Fin. No. 173, 1989) (discussing ICSID as a possible "referee" of 
negotiations between a debtor-State and its creditors). 
416 Unpaid expenses might have to be paid out of the IMF's budget. 
417 SiInilar to the rules under the ICSID Convention, one of the new organization's 
staff lawyers could also be appointed to serve as the tribunal's secretary, and to act as a 
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Distinctions would exist between ICSID and a sovereign debt re-
structuring tribunal, but those distinctions should not prevent ICSID 
from being used as a model. For example, the ICSID Convention does 
not necessarily bind contracting States to submit any particular dis-
pute to arbitration; only disputes that the disputing parties agree to 
submit to ICSID are subject to its jurisdiction.418 In a sovereign debt 
restructuring context, however, an unresolved dispute between a cred-
itor and the debtor-State might disrupt an overall settlement among 
all creditors. To facilitate prompt settlement, the Convention should 
therefore provide that ratifying States thereby subject themselves to 
the jurisdiction of the new tribunal. This requirement should not be 
overly controversial: at least thirty States have already enacted legisla-
tion automatically submitting investment disputes with nationals of 
other States to ICSID arbitration.419 
Another possible distinction is that ICSID primarily arbitrates dis-
putes between contracting States and nationals of other contracting 
States, whereas in a sovereign debt restructuring context the large 
number of creditors suggests that some may be nationals of States that 
have not ratified the Convention. Should the new tribunal adjudicate 
a dispute between the debtor-State and a creditor from a noncontract-
ing State? AS discussed earlier, an unresolved dispute between a credi-
tor and the debtor-State might disrupt an overall settlement among all 
creditors; I therefore propose that the Convention authorize the new 
tribunal to arbitrate disputes between contracting States and any cred-
itor that subjects itself to the tribunal's jurisdiction. Most creditors 
would prefer this scenario to the alternative of suing the debtor-State 
directly.420 ICSID has actually taken this same approach since 1978 by 
authorizing the arbitration of investment disputes between con-
tracting States and nationals of noncontracting States that consent to 
arbitration.421 
Another concern under the ICSID arbitration model is the diffi-
culty ICSID has had in enforcing some awards against recalcitrant 
States.422 Nonetheless, even ICSID's critics concede that "most arbitral 
channel of communication between the State and its creditors. The tribunal could also be 
authorized to require the parties to produce documents or other evidence and to conduct 
appropriate inquiries. 
418 See ICSID Convention, supra note 397, at art. 25, para. 1. However, once the parties 
do consent to jurisdiction, the ICSID arbitration will exclude any other remedy. See id. at 
art. 26. 
419 See Parra, supra note 397, at 3. 
420 See supra note 393 and accompanying text (explaining that a creditor would be 
prejudiced in a lawsuit directly against the debtor-State). 
421 See About ICSID, supra note 397, at para. 5. 
422 See Choi, supra note 392, at 180-81 (noting that although contracting States are 
bound to recognize ICSID arbitral awards, execution of the award is governed by the 
State's own law, which might give sovereign immunity against execution). Choi explains 
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awards are satisfied through voluntary compliance of the parties."423 
Moreover, in a sovereign debt restructuring context, the Convention 
could provide compelling remedies against a recalcitrant State, such 
as depriving it of the benefits of the Convention, assessing money 
damages, or making the State's failure to pay an arbitral award an 
event of default under its new money financing agreement. 
Thus, to the extent that a need exists for a tribunal to adjudicate 
sovereign debt restructuring disputes, the ICSID model is compelling. 
That need should be minimal, however, because disputes should 
rarely occur in a sovereign debt context. The Convention's rules are 
narrowly crafted, following the axiom that the rules should minimize 
adjudicatory discretion.424 The only interpretative disputes that might 
arise would concern either the good faith requirement for filing or 
the right of creditors to object to an excessive amount of new money 
financing. Nonetheless, disputes over whether bankruptcy filings are 
made in good faith are extremely unusual even in a corporate con-
text.425 Also, corporate creditors "very rare[ly]" object to an amount 
of DIP financing as excessive,426 and in a sovereign debt restructuring, 
the need to object should be equally rare because of the public scru-
tiny involved. A tribunal would therefore be required to settle inter-
pretive disputes only in very limited circumstances. 
It also is unlikely that creditors or debtor-States will need a tribu-
nal to enforce the Convention. Debtor-States should want to adhere 
to the Convention because its provisions are largely for their benefit 
and also because their reputations-necessary to regain access to capi-
tal market funding at a later date-will depend on compliance.427 If a 
that as a result, "[iJn two of the three cases in which enforcement of an ICSID award was 
sought, parties were unable to receive payment of the award because the funds they at-
tached did not qualify for execution under national laws." Id. at 181. In a sovereign debt 
context, execution is unlikely to become a significant issue because enforcement of the 
underlying debt claim is outside the scope of the Convention. 
423 Id. at 175. 
424 See supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text. That axiom has not, however, made 
the Convention's rules inappropriately narrow. A review of this Article's analysis of each 
Code section reveals that minimizing adjudicatory discretion was only a marginal factor in 
determining which section's rules should become part of the Convention. See supra Part 
II.B. 
425 See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 110, at 927-42 (observing that bankruptcy 
filings made by public corporations are never dismissed for lack of good faith, but noting 
that courts are more likely to dismiss certain filings involving single-asset cases and tax 
fraud, which would not appear to be relevant to sovereign debt restructuring). 
426 Telephone Interview with Lester M. Kirshenbaum, Bankruptcy Partner, Kaye, 
Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler (May 28, 1999). 
427 See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER GRAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNlY: CoMPLI-
ANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 10, 27 (1995) (observing that in the 
increasing world climate of interdependence, States. are prone to comply with their treaty 
obligations in order to preserve their international reputation). More reliable ways to en-
sure State compliance exist, although they do not appear necessary. For example, each 
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creditor located in a nonsignatory State objects to a restructuring plan 
achieved through super-majority voting or to another creditor's new 
money priority, its only remedy would be to sue the debtor-State. If 
the creditor brings the suit before the new tribunal, however, the tri-
bunal would simply adhere to the rules of the Convention. The ob-
jecting creditor could attempt to bypass the tribunal, perhaps by suing 
in a foreign court;428 outside the debtor-State.429 However, even if the 
objecting creditor wins that lawsuit,430 the only practical remedy is to 
attach the debtor-State's foreign assets,431 a remedy that is inconse-
quential in most cases.432 
In sum, implementing the Convention should be relatively 
straightforward. States themselves should want to become signatories 
to the Convention because its primary goal is to foster the State's ulti-
mate economic rehabilitation in a time of crisis. Under the Conven-
tion, debt negotiations should be self-executing, although a neutral 
signatory State could be required to deposit money into an international escrow account, 
equal to a percentage of the State's sovereign borrowings. The State would forfeit the 
money if it subsequently breached the Convention. A State that ex ante does not intend to 
breach should be prepared to make this deposit, provided that the escrow account bears a 
market rate of interest and is small enough to not impair the State's liquidity. 
428 This scenario assumes that the objecting creditor has a proper jurisdictional basis 
to commence such a lawsuit. Sovereign immunity would not impede such a suit if, as is 
typical, the doctrine is waived as a defense in the financing agreement. See Greenwood & 
Mercer, supra note 323, at 106; see also Steven L. Schwarcz, The Universal Language of Cross-
Border Finance, 8 DUKE J. CoMP. & INT'L L. 235, 245 (1998) ("Requiring the company to 
waive sovereign immunity may be a solution to [the sovereign immunity defense] prob-
lem."). As a practical matter, private creditors might be reluctant to commence such ex-
pensive litigation. 
429 To prevent this, the Convention might provide that all lawsuits commenced outside 
the tribunal should be moved to the tribunal. 
430 A court might uphold the objecting creditor's claim. For example, in AUied Bank 
Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartogo, 757 F.2d 516, 519 (2d Cir. 1985), a member of a 
bank syndicate that refused to join a restructuring agreement between Costa Rican sover-
eign debtors and other syndicate members sued in the United States for repayment of its 
defaulted loan. See id. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the objecting 
bank on the basis that the loan was clearly due and payable, notwithstanding Costa Rica's 
unilateral regulation suspending its external debt payments. See id. at 522-23. The court 
held that the U.S. act of state doctrine, which provides that "the courts of one country will 
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own terri-
tory," was inapplicable; the court found that the situs of the property in question-the 
objecting bank's right to receive payment from the Costa Rican debtors-was New York, 
where the debt was payable. Id. at 520-21. Costa Rica's unilateral suspension of debt pay-
ments was "inconsistent with the orderly resolution of international debt problems ... 
[and] contrary to the interests of the United States." Id. at 522. This case does not suggest, 
however, that an objecting creditor will always be able to work mischief. The court might 
have decided the case differently if the restructuring agreement was reached in accordance 
with an international convention to which the United States was a party. Moreover, courts 
in other States, faced with the same facts, might have reached a different outcome. 
431 Cj., e.g., Felixstowe Dock & Ry. Co. v. U.S. Line Inc., 1989 Q.B. 360 (permitting 
U.K. creditors to freeze a U.S. corporate debtor's assets in the U.K. notwithstanding a con-
trary order of the U.S. bankruptcy court). 
432 See supra note 422-23 and accompanying text. 
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multilateral institution such as the IMF will be necessary to monitor 
and impose conditionality on priority financing. That same institu-
tion could also serve as a nonrecourse funding intermediary, or could 
perform other administrative functions that may arise. To the limited 
extent that disputes between a State and its creditors require adjudica-
tion, hearings could occur on an ad hoc basis before an existing inter-
national judicial body, or the Convention could establish a new low-
cost tribunal based on the rCSID model. 
CONCLUSION 
Sovereign debt restructuring currently gives rise to various 
problems. The conflicting interests of the State and its creditors, as 
well as the collective action problem among creditors, make it difficult 
to reach agreement on a restructuring plan. The increasing shift 
from bank to bond financing exacerbates this difficulty. Multilateral 
entities such as the IMF have attempted to aid the process of sovereign 
debt restructuring, but may have worsened matters: their efforts cre-
ate a risk of moral hazard and, to the extent that IMF funding is de-
rived from member-States, foster taxpayer subsidy of foreign States 
and their creditors. This Article has examined whether supranational 
legal regulation based on principles of bankruptcy reorganization law 
could effectively address these problems.433 
Although regulation should have normative underpinnings, no 
existing scholarship purports to offer a normative legal theory of sov-
ereign debt restructuring. r have attempted to do so by examining 
how the conceptual basis of bankruptcy reorganization law can be 
adapted to sovereign debt restructuring. Disputes over the concep-
tual basis of bankruptcy reorganization law complicate, but at the 
same time universalize, my examination. Some scholars argue that 
bankruptcy reorganization law should advance traditional goals; other 
scholars argue that the only goal of bankruptcy reorganization law 
433 In March 2000, concurrently with the final editing of this Article, the International 
Financial Institution Advisory Commission, created by the United States Congress in No-
vember 1998 to study the future role of the IMF, issued its report (the "Report"). See 
International Financial Institution Advisory Commission, &part (visited March 29, 2000) 
<http://phantom-x.gsia.cum.edu/IFIAC/USMRPTDV.html>. To the extent there is over-
lap, the conclusions in the Report turn out to be consistent with the conclusions in this 
Article, including that the IMF should restrict its lending to providing liquidity loans to 
economically sound States that are facing default because of irrational exogenous factors, 
such as financial panics. See id. at 2, 5. There nonetheless might appear to be an inconsis-
tency: the Report criticizes the "detailed conditionality •.• that has burdened IMF pro-
grams in recent years," ill. at 6, whereas this Article contemplates that the IMF would 
continue to impose conditionality. See supra notes 31-32, 203 and accompanying text This 
Article does not analyze, however, whether conditionality should continue; it merely as-
sumes that conditionality will continue. To the extent conditionality is inappropriate, 
nothing in this Article requires its continuance. 
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should be economic efficiency. The disputes reflect the different ini-
tial axioms scholars use. 
First, this Article analyzed these disputes in an attempt to under-
stand which axioms should apply to sovereign debt restructuring. 
Next, it used those axioms to derive a normative framework for regu-
lation. The Article then completed this framework by accounting for 
the previously identified problems of sovereign debt restructuring and 
used the framework to model a simple but arguably effective system of 
rules for an international convention on sovereign debt restructuring. 
In so doing, the framework effectively blurred the distinction between 
public and private international law. 
Under my proposed Convention, financiers of a State's debt re-
structuring would have priority over claims of other creditors. Also, 
the Convention would bind all creditors to a plan of reorganization 
that classes of claims agree to by super-majority voting and, upon such 
agreement, would discharge debts not provided for in the plan. This 
benefits debtor-States by providing incentives for new credit and by 
minimizing the collective action problem. States therefore should find 
it in their interest to ratify the Convention. 
Appendix I sets forth a proposed model form of the Convention. 
To preserve the dignity of States seeking the protection of this Con-
vention and to avoid discouraging its use, the Convention does not 
speak in terms of bankruptcy or insolvency, nor does it require a State 
to be insolvent to seek protection thereunder or otherwise differenti-
ate between exogenous and endogenous factors that lead to de-
fault.434 Although this construction increases the potential for 
strategic manipulation, the Convention's provisions are narrowly cir-
cumscribed to prevent opportunistic behavior. 
Contrary to assumptions made in the economic literature, the 
Convention would be largely self-executing and would not require su-
pervision by a bankruptcy court. Only occasional monitoring is 
needed to ensure that the priority financing does not result in over-
investment. A neutral international institution such as the IMF could 
perform that monitoring, without raising the problems associated with 
direct IMF funding. To the limited extent disputes must be adjudi-
cated under the Convention, that task could be performed by estab-
lishing a low-cost arbitration procedure, perhaps based on the ICSID 
model. Furthermore, by acting as an intermediary funding source, 
the IMF or other institution could continue the current practice of 
imposing conditionality on funding without causing the problems 
presently associated with IMF lending. 
434 An exception is the limited extent that irrational exogenous factors could justify 
IMF funds for maintenance of temporary liquidity. 
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,ApPENDIX I 
PROPOSED MODEL CONVENTIOW35 
Chapter I: Scope, and Use of Terms 
ARTICLE 1: SCOPE 
This Convention applies to debt restructurings between sovereign 
States and their creditors. 
ARTICLE 2: USE OF TERMS 
For purposes of this Convention: 
(1) "Contracting State" means a sovereign State for which this Con-
vention is in force; 
(2) "creditor" means an entity that has a claim for payment against a 
Contracting State; 
(3) "debtor-State" means a Contracting State that has filed for relief 
under this Convention; 
(4) "Plan" means a debt restructuring plan; 
(5) "Supervisory Authority" means the [International Monetary 
Fund]. 
Chapter IT: Invoking the Convention 
ARTICLE 3: PETITION FOR RELmF 
(1) A Contracting State may invoke application of this Convention by 
filing a voluntary petition for relief with the Supervisory Authority. 
(2) Immediately after such a petition for relief has been filed, and so 
long as such filing has not been dismissed by the Supervisory Author-
ity for lack of good faith, the provisions of this Convention shall apply 
to the relationship between the Contracting State and its creditors. 
ARTICLE 4: NOTIFICATION OF CREDITORS 
Within 30 days after filing its petition for relief, the debtor-State shall 
notify all of its known creditors of its intention to negotiate a Plan 
under this Convention. 
Chapter III: The Debt Restructuring Plan 
ARTICLE 5: SUB:MISSION OF PLAN 
(1) The debtor-State may submit a Plan to its creditors at any time, 
and may submit alternative Plans from time to time. 
(2) No other person or entity may submit a Plan. 
435 The author acknowledges with appreciation the assistance of Adam Munson in 
drafting this model. I intend this model to be illustrative rather than definitive. 
Therefore, I have simplified its provisions and omitted technical matters such as approval 
of claims and voting disclosure. 
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ARTICLE 6: CONTENTS OF PLAN 
A Plan shall: 
(1) designate classes of claims in accordance with Article 7(3); 
(2) specify the proposed treatment of each class of claims; and 
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(3) provide the same treatment for each claim of a particular class, 
unless the holder of a claim agrees to a less favorable treatment. 
ARTICLE 7: VOTING ON THE PLAN 
(1) A Plan shall become effective and binding on the debtor-State and 
its creditors when it has been submitted by the debtor-State and 
agreed to by each class of such creditors' claims. Thereupon, the 
debtor-State shall be discharged from any debt then in existence,436 
except as provided in the Plan. 
(2) A class of claims has agreed to a Plan if creditors holding at least 
[two-thirds] in amount and more than [one-half] in number of the 
claims of such class [voting on such Plan437] [entitled to vote on such 
Plan] agree to the Plan. 
(3) Each class of claims shall consist of claims against the debtor-State 
that are pari passu in priority, provided that (a) pari passu claims 
need not all be included in the same class, and (b) claims of govern-
mental or multi-governmental entities each shall be classed separately. 
Chapter IV: Financing the Restructuring 
ARTICLE 8: TERMS OF LENDING 
The Supervisory Authority shall have the right, but not the obligation, 
to lend money to a debtor-State on such terms and conditions as the 
Supervisory Authority deems appropriate, taking into account the 
debtor-State's use of the loan proceeds. 
ARTICLE 9: PRIORITY OF REPAYMENT 
(1) Debtor-States must repay loans made by the Supervisory Authority 
prior to paying any other claims. 
(2) Such priority of payment shall extend to any assignee of the Su-
pervisory Authority. 
ARTICLE 10: NONRECOURSE BORROWING BY SUPERVISORY 
AUTHORITY 
(1) To finance its lending to a debtor-State, the Supervisory Authority 
may borrow on such terms and conditions as it may negotiate, pro-
vided that neither the Supervisory Authority nor its assets shall be lia-
ble, contingently or otherwise, for repayment of such borrowing 
except as set forth below. 
436 [Alternatively, the Convention could except discharge of debts owed to entities that 
neither had notice nor actual knowledge of the Plan.] 
437 [The Plan can be more easily approved if this alternative is selected, but reliable 
notice to creditors then becomes more important.] 
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(2) As collateral for a borrowing, the Supervisory Authority may assign 
as security its right to payment under the loan made from the pro-
ceeds of such borrowing. 
(3) The Supervisory Authority may borrow on a general recourse basis 
in order to make loans to debtor-States whose financial distress results 
primarily from factors that are [unforeseeable and] beyond their 
control. 
Chapter V: Adjudication of Disputes 
[This Chapter could follow the model of ICSID's convention, except 
that States ratifying this Convention would thereby subject themselves 
and their nationals to submit all disputes arising under the Conven-
tion to the jurisdiction of the adjudicatory tribunal.] 
Chapter VI: Ratification 
ARTICLE 11: PROCEDURES 
(1) This Convention shall enter into force upon ratification or other 
approval by at least [three] sovereign States. 
(2) On or before ratifying or otherwise approving this Convention, 
each Contracting State shall undertake such legislation or other meas-
ures as may be necessary for making this Convention effective as na-
tional law in its territories. 
ARTICLE 12: EFFECT OF RATIFICATION 
Ratification of this Convention shall be binding on each Contracting 
State and on each national thereof, irrespective of contractual provi-
sions that are inconsistent with the provisions of this Convention or 
the date that a national's claim against a Contracting State arose. 
